Our men—they joke on the eve of battle. They go forward never faltering, never dismayed, on the road to victory. They shall lack nothing our support can give them. We are in duty bound—each one of us—to SALUTE THE FIGHTING FORCES with more and yet more saving!

Issued by the National Savings Committee

World Review

INCORPORATING REVIEW OF REVIEWS

EDITED BY EDWARD HULTON

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

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IN THE CART

"Quick, quick, policeman, help me. I am in the cart."

"*Be not so foolish, oh driver. You are standing in the road.*"

"Physically speaking, I stand in the road, but metaphorically I am in the cart."

"*Leave rhetoric to your intellectual superiors. What's biting you?*"

"I am bitten by the loss of a wooden case, about two feet by eighteen inches by nine. I was bringing it from the railway station to the officers' mess."

"*And who has taken this case do you think?*"

"Choors. Dacoits. Budmashes. Men of great violence and determination. Take quick your *lathi* and pursue them."

"*You saw these men?*"

"Well — not exactly."

"*Were you perchance sleeping as you creaked along the road?*"

"*Kabhi Nahin.*"

"*Sure?*"

"Well, I may have just permitted myself to nod. I attended a marriage feast last night."

"*I see. And while you were snoring, this case of Rose's Lime Juice vanished?*"

"I never said it was Rose's Lime Juice. How did you know?"

"*We of the police know everything. It is our duty. That case of Rose's fell off the back of your cart. It was picked up in the road some seven miles back and now awaits you at the police station.*"

"Oh, policeman, you have made the sun to shine. Accept a chew of betel."

"*We police do not accept gifts of money or money's worth. But accept from me a word of advice. In future sleep at night when you have charge of Rose's in the daylight.*"

ROSE'S — *There is no substitute.*

THINKING ALOUD

BY A GUEST WRITER

WHAT is going to happen after our victory over Germany?

It is suggested that Mr. Churchill is already looking forward to the time when he can pack his bags and fly to the Far East, to see about things there. I admire Churchill's unflagging ardour, and have no doubt that he will be intolerably bored if he has to stay thousands of miles from the centre of action. But who is to look after our affairs if his thoughts are concentrated elsewhere? Europe will be no less important after our victory. In fact, this is the time when we have to face up to the most momentous European problems. How do we mean to settle the German question? Are we going to restore the old dynasties and ruling classes of all the little European states in all their old-world independence? Do we mean to break up the European economic machine, which the Germans have unified for the purposes of war, and which we could retain in its unity, for the purpose of feeding Europe properly and abolishing its deep poverty belt? These, and many other equally formidable problems are pressing hard upon us.

Most intimate of all to the ordinary man and woman is the question: how long will our men have to stay in Europe?

There is a popular idea that Northern Germany is to be occupied by British troops, South-western Germany by American troops and Eastern Germany by the Russians, and that all these nationalities will meet in Berlin. Perhaps the rest of Europe will be occupied on much the same pattern. It is obvious that the Americans have the final say on Anglo-American policy in France. It is equally obvious that we have accepted Russian leadership in Eastern Europe. If any part of the continent is to be specially under British influence, it will be the Netherlands and Scandinavia, the countries whose seaboards are of the greatest strategic importance to us and whose imperial interests are most closely bound up with our own.

If we can form a closer understanding with Norway, Holland and Belgium—all three countries which clung to the illusion of neutrality before 1940—we shall have gained immensely from the war. But the outlook would be brighter if we had a little more news about the future world organisation which was talked about when the Dominion Premiers were in London, and about which nearly everybody has since been strangely silent.

The fashionable idea nowadays is that there should be an interim period—perhaps as long as five years—between the Armistice and the Peace Conference, so that passions can cool, and every aspect of the peace can be thought over with a complete objectivity. There is just one snag about this idea—the world won't stand still during these five years, and the Powers which have done the fighting may find that the position has changed very much to their disadvantage. I can hardly imagine that the Americans will want to stay in Europe any longer than they have to; nor will we for that matter, for the simple reason—putting the pull of 'home' aside—that we are a small nation with a limited manpower, and shall need every man to supply our quota against Japan and to get on with the job of reconstruction. Hence, if we want our voice in the

resettlement of Europe to have any authority behind it, we shall have to raise that voice as soon after the Armistice as possible.

Europe's fate will not be settled at the Peace Conference, whenever it takes place. Her fate is being settled now and will be settled in the chaos which is likely to follow the Armistice. Mr. Churchill's views may not be our views in some details—chiefly in the detail of Franco's Spain—but he is the undisputed leader of this country, and the only man who can make this country's influence felt in the counsels of the world. It is to be hoped that, after our European victory Mr. Churchill will leave events in the Far East to the men already on the spot, and concentrate his mind on a job just as big and needing just as much courage as the winning of the European war—turning Europe into a peaceful and prosperous continent.

WHO BESIDES CHURCHILL?

At every turn we are brought up against the question: who is there except Churchill? Eden is his natural successor. It is a pity Cranborne is in the Lords, because that rules him out. But don't forget that Stafford Cripps is still in the Government. When he left the War Cabinet and accepted a technical job at the Ministry of Aircraft Production, he eliminated himself as a popular, political leader for the rest of the war. Cripps is always apt to play his cards badly when they are all in his hands, but, just as certainly, the cards come back. That is why he is still important in a government of men who do their jobs well, but attract little following.

IDEAS FROM CLOUD-CUCKOOLAND

One voice which has not been silent on the world after the war is the voice of America's foremost publicist—Walter Lippmann. In his new book *War Aims,*

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS. *He had all the cards in his hands on returning from his ambassadorship in Moscow, and perhaps he will have them again*

Lippmann throws overboard the idea of a world organisation and plumps for a globe cut up into gigantic spheres of influence. He calls them 'orbits', but they are the old 'spheres' just the same. The unreality of the idea has to be read to be believed. Britain, apparently, is to be in Orbit Number 1, sharing the leadership with America, and the component parts are to be those countries which are grouped round the Atlantic. Then there is to be a Russian orbit, including most of the Eastern European countries (yes, even Poland), and perhaps Jugoslavia. The Chinese orbit is to include Japan and the states of South-Eastern Asia. And then there is a vague Moslem and Hindu 'orbit', which may eventually embrace the lands of North Africa and the Middle East.

The first conclusion Mr. Churchill is likely to come to if he studies Lippmann's plan is that he is apparently expected to preside over the liquidation

of the British Empire after all! We are honoured by the idea that we shall be partners with America in the leadership of Orbit No. 1, but what kind of leadership will this be? Under such a plan, Britain will cease to be a world power and will retain any kind of leadership on sufferance. The idea is reminiscent of a plan produced by the Henry Luce firm of publishers a couple of years ago, under which America and the British Empire were to be united in such a way that all the direction would come from Washington.

The trouble with many writers on foreign policy is that they consider themselves bound to produce some cut and dried plan for the future of the world. Lippmann, in spite of his wide knowledge and his gift for close reasoning, is one of these and his plan is certainly as cut and dried as a slice of dehydrated banana. It seems to be founded on the belief that nationalism has had its day and that the world is passing through a void, waiting for some master planner to direct it along its course. The truth is, of course, that the world is living not in a void but in a period of history; its course is directed not by paper schemes but by past experiences and present energies.

Lippmann's fantastic plan for saving the world is particularly unfortunate because it will reawaken all the suspicions of those who fear American expansionism and of those who are always on the look-out for arguments against American influence in Europe. However, this cold douche from across the Atlantic comes at a moment when American prestige stands higher than ever, as a natural result of their notable achievements in the Cherbourg peninsula and in the air. The Americans personally have never been so popular with us, and more and more of us are forced to realise that a better world can only be built by American machinery and by American understanding of how to use machinery. We welcome America's attainment of her full strength as the Great Power, and recognise that our greatness depends on hers. Only we hope she will use her strength as one of the leaders of a real world organisation, not as the leader of a great block formed according to the monopolist's dream.

HOW TO DELAY VICTORY

As soon as we found a way to win the war, and were well on our way to winning it, somebody was bound to suggest that we should scrap it all and go back to a way of not winning the war!

I have every respect for John Gordon as an editor; he has made the *Sunday Express* a first-class entertainment. But sometimes, when he breaks into print himself, he is enraging. At the height of the flying-bomb attack, Gordon wrote and published an article called, 'The real reply to doodle-bugs', which consisted of a hysterical scream for the use of Allied air power to bomb the German cities 'one by one, until Germany is one vast rubbish heap and cemetery.' Gordon would have announced the names of six German cities, towns and villages every day, and informed the Germans that by next morning one would be dead beyond recovery. He indignantly denied that his policy could be called 'reprisals' —because he meant to keep it up whether Hitler called off his flying-bombs or not. So this 'reply to doodle-bugs' was not a reply at all!

Whether as a consequence of Gordon's outburst or not, a rumour ran round an affected area just afterwards to the effect that all our bombers were going to carry out a mass reprisal. So Gordon could claim that his plan was at any rate popular. Of course, it would be popular with the people who were longing for

any relief, and who could not stop to think about larger considerations. But Gordon is in a position where he ought to think of the larger considerations.

The sinister part of Gordon's plan was indicated by the following sentence: 'Let us send every bomber we can put into the air to do it, even if we have to leave the doodle-bugs' nests alone while it is being done.' We should not only have had to leave the doodle-bugs' nests alone! We should have had to leave our soldiers in France alone too. Of course, this was precisely what the Germans wanted: it was probably target number 1 in the flying-bomb campaign.

THE OLD AIRY SONG

GORDON was merely singing an old, old song with words which bore most of us to death. It was as long ago as 28 July 1942, that Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris proclaimed to the Germans in a broadcast: 'Soon we shall be coming every night and every day, rain, blow, or snow. We are going to scourge the Third Reich from end to end, if you make it necessary for us to do so.' Well, that was in 1942. Since that day Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris and the Americans have pretty well scourged the Reich. Their crews have been magnificent; and have made a substantial contribution towards winning the war. But we have moved on.

Surely it ought not to be necessary so late in the day to explain that strategic bombing on its own was not the way to win the war against Germany. When Gordon talked about breaking German morale, he didn't seem to realise that German morale had already broken in many places, but what difference did that make? The Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht were then in control of Germany and her people. Munich might be hysterical under bombardment, but what effect did that have on the war? Hamburg was in ruins long ago, but that didn't finish the war. A warring country has to be broken at the top—as we broke Germany last time when we defeated the German army. Once again, in this war, the crack has come among the officers.

The reasonable view of stragetic bombing is that it was an interim weapon of immense value before we had the necessary strength to invade the Continent; and the bombing of key-targets in Germany, particularly oil refineries and ball-bearings plant, has paid us rich dividends. But as soon as we were able to invade, all air power had to be placed behind the punch against Hitler's armed forces. The main work of aircraft then was to protect the men and the ships and to blast every German line of communication ceaselessly. A bomb on a French railway, along which Rommel hoped to get supplies to the battlefront, was worth a hundred bombs dropped on German civilians. In short, the civilians of this country have endured the flying-bomb ordeal because they knew that in doing so they were helping the boys in Normandy.

It was the height of irresponsibility to suggest diverting any of our strength from the invasion in order to teach the Germans a 'memorable and final' lesson. And it was strange that such bloodthirstiness found its outlet in a newspaper which helped to leave us unprepared for the war by proclaiming that there would be no war. Naturally enough, such people now rush to the other extreme and betray a lust for blood at all costs which is almost as alarming as their former complacence. It is an old story: Lord Halifax, who signed the telegram instructing Lloyd George to squeeze Germany 'till the pips squeaked', afterwards became the arch-apostle of appeasement, and one could multiply the examples ad lib. It is to be feared that the people who will fight against a

reasonable peace settlement will not be the people who always wanted to stand up to Hitler, but the people who used to kow-tow to him and lick his boots.

AN INSULT TO THE PEOPLE

In every county school the children are to be taught the right and duty of the citizen to defend his native land: at any rate, the Minister of Education is to issue a circular to this effect—so the Earl of Selborne has announced in the House of Lords.

Since when did such lessons become necessary? The very suggestion is an insult to the people of this country, who were hoodwinked, deceived, misinformed and consistently bamboozled throughout the years of peace, who were assured day after day by their newspapers that there would be no war and denounced for their war-mindedness by timorous leaders, but who nevertheless compelled these same leaders to stand up to Hitler in the end, and who have since given the most magnificent demonstration of their ability to defend their country that has ever been seen.

On the extreme left, this new artificial insemination of patriotism is interpreted in the usual sinister way. It is thought to be a move in the rearguard action which is being fought by the Chamberlainites with an eye to the next election. The only way to rehabilitate the Baldwinites and the Chamberlainites is to convince enough people that this country fell into danger, not because of the incompetence of its leaders, but because the ordinary people were so slack, so pacific, so lost in the pleasures of cinema-going, football pools and greyhound racing that they would never respond to the cry of the recruiting sergeant. There are some people with bad enough memories to swallow this rubbish.

That the Board of Education should do anything to help along the schemes being hatched in the Conservative Central Office is, of course, unthinkable. Let us be charitable and say that it has delivered its deadly insult to the people of this country through thoughtlessness and ignorance.

THAT OXFORD RESOLUTION

One incident in the campaign to 'blame the people', is worth special notice. That staunch old Liberal, Lord Mottistone, once more familiar under the name of Jack Seely, voices his horror at the freedom of speech which existed at Oxford in 1933, when a large majority at the Union Debating Society decided that they would never again fight for 'King and Country'. Lord Mottistone quotes the august authority of Mr. Churchill for the assertion that Mussolini formed an exaggerated idea of England's decadence, and turned against us on the strength of this resolution.

If Mussolini was such a fool as to believe that the youth of Britain had degenerated because it didn't like the government of the moment and said so in unmistakable terms, so much the worse for Mussolini, who was thereby committed to a policy which has proved fatal to Fascism in Italy; and so much the better for us, who have rid ourselves of his ridiculously swollen presence. For my part, I abhor pacificism but would rather have on my side a reasonable number of the young men of Oxford who agitate against war in peacetime and fight like hell when war comes, than all Mussolini's bravos who confined their yellings for 'War! Blood! Glory!' to the secure precincts of Mussolini's favourite balcony.

DEMOCRACY'S DILEMMA

I am bored with the Oxford anti-war resolution, but it is a useful peg on which to hang one of our most baffling national problems, one which we shall

have to face when the war is over and one on which our future as a Great Power depends. To put the matter bluntly, it was not merely a handful of debaters at Oxford who were suspicious of the Government of those times, and reluctant to trust such a government with huge armaments, unless they were certain of being used to reinforce the League of Nations: it was several million voters. There is a reasonable suspicion that if a man has a gun he will let it off some day, and the voters, who have to provide the blood and the sweat and the cash, have a natural desire to know in which direction the gun will be fired. Where would it have been fired if we had put it in sufficient quantities into the hands of men who had done its best to encourage our natural enemies and to discourage our natural friends?

There is—or was—one man who could justly claim that he had ceaselessly screamed his head off for gigantic armaments—and that was the late Lord Rothermere. But here is a very strange thing. The late Lord Rothermere no less vociferously cried for friendship with Hitler and Mussolini, and it is hardly feasible that he wanted to make the sky black with aeroplanes in order to obliterate his friends. Rothermere did not stand alone in this paradoxical outlook. Hence the suspicion that some people wanted us to be highly armed not in order to resist aggression but in order to stand side by side with the aggressors.

There is a real dilemma here. In a democracy we cannot vote huge armaments unless we know how they're going to be used, and that means we cannot vote them or pledge our lives until very nearly the last moment. Then this means we are always likely to enter a war (if there is to be another war!) to some extent unprepared? It is a fearful risk, admittedly. But, with the example of the late Lord Rothermere and his friends in front of us, it seems as if we've got to take it.

In any case, these continued attempts to prove that we were unprepared because of the Oxford resolution and the misnamed Peace Ballot (which still horrifies Lord Keyes) are entirely beside the point. It was in 1937 that the House of Commons voted £1,500,000,000 for rearmament, at the rate of £300,000,000 a year. What we want to know is—where did the money go?

AN ADMIRER OF MUSSOLINI

I SHOULD have thought that the glory of Roman Mussolini was a little tarnished by this time but, if you can borrow a copy of an expensive periodical called *The Quarterly Review*, for July, you will find that the Italian cut-throat still has one fervent admirer. He is a certain Robert Sencourt, who, at this critical moment in history, thinks it wise and just to extol the Duce as 'a genius on the grand scale'. Mr. Sencourt has a passion for the word 'genius'—at any rate where Italy is concerned. 'The developing genius of Benito Mussolini' . . . 'we alienated the genius' . . . 'the mottled genius of the blacksmith'—these are some of Mr. Sencourt's phrases. A fair example of his literary style, as well as of his international outlook, is the following: 'the genius of Italy rises again and again and offers to the world the tradition of her civilising genius.' Apparently all the genius is on one side for, with his adulation of Fascist Italy, Mr. Sencourt combines a detestation of the way the Allied troops have behaved during the Italian campaign.

Who is this Robert Sencourt? He is an irrepressible writer about Italy, Spain, King Alfonso, the Vatican and—most surprisingly—Winston Churchill. Yes, he wrote a book called *Winston Churchill*,



The late LORD ROTHERMERE. *He agitated for big armaments, but also —paradoxically enough—for friendship with the dictators!*

which the eminent firm of Faber and Faber thought fit to publish in 1940. I should have thought that 1940 was a year of all years when writers and publishers should have been careful not to injure our national cause, but I can imagine nothing more damaging to Mr. Churchill than Sencourt's book—that is, if the book is taken seriously. Sencourt is of the extreme right, appears to be terrified of Masonry and regards Russia as the source of pretty well all modern evil ('a gang of degenerate criminals', 'an Asiatic tyranny' and so on). Astonishingly enough, he devotes his 300 pages, in which his writing plumbs the depth of banality and the height of absurdity, to an attempt to prove that his hero shares his phobias. The curse of our time is democracy and the rule of public opinion; Russia planned the war from the beginning; Churchill committed his 'almost solitary inconsistency' when he advocated an agreement between Britain and Russia in 1939. This is the sort of stuff you find in *Winston Churchill* by Robert Sencourt. It would be difficult to imagine that Churchill's bitterest enemy could have written anything more harmful.

Is Sencourt a friend of Mr. Churchill's then? All he claims is that he has 'personal connections with some of Mr. Churchill's relatives and many of his friends'. That is quite bad enough.

SPEAKING AGAINST ENGLAND

I CAME across the following in a letter given great prominence in the *Daily Telegraph*. 'The pity is that there are today no great English novelists, playwrights or poets to hold the beacon for youth as there were thirty years ago. Nor, with the exception of the Prime Minister, is there any characteristic English figure in our politics.' I don't



ERNEST HEMINGWAY. *Like other American writers, and unlike our own, he has a craving for action*

know what 'holding the beacon for youth' means, but I should like this correspondent to name any country in the world with a stronger or more promising contemporary literature than our own. If I understand the word 'characteristic' at all, I believe that Eden, Morrison, Bevin and several other politicians could hardly be more 'characteristic' of this country. And when the same letter-writer says 'continental political ideas and propaganda are assiduously pedalled,' I suspect that he is completely ignorant of our greatest achievement—the preservation, in spite of the most deadly assault from within as well as without, of English parliamentary democracy.

It is a strange phenomenon of our time that the kind of people who write to the *Daily Telegraph*—or some of them—are the very people who run down their own country!

The habit, of course, is not confined to *Daily Telegraph* writers and is quite marked on the Brains Trust. Some time ago, a questioner mentioned that Browning's name was the last to be inscribed on the wall of the British Museum Reading Room: which names, he asked, would the Brains Trust suggest, to follow Browning's? Believe it or not, the Brains Trusters were completely stumped by this one! Somebody, of course, said 'Shaw'; then there was a good deal of muttering about the glories of Kipling. But nobody else was mentioned. The general impression left on the mind of the listener was that Anglo-Saxon culture went to pot after Browning expired. No Brains Truster that evening, apparently, had heard of Henry James, Thomas Hardy, or W. B. Yeats. These, I think, are certain choices. After that we can argue ourselves till we are blue in the face about Wilde, Moore, Wells, Bennett, T. S. Eliot and E. M. Forster. At any rate, there is no dispute about the richness of our choice.

VIGOUR OF AMERICAN CULTURE

ALTHOUGH I admire modern English literature and believe in its future, the best American writers have one quality which is apparently denied to our best writers. They have a constant itch to be near the scene of action in the world, to skim widely over reality and to write about real people. This is shown by the number of good American writers who have come to Europe to see the war at first hand. Hemingway is in London—and over France, whenever he can get a plane to take him. Meyer Levin, author of that remarkable novel, *The Citizen*, is here, and so is Ira Wolfert. Wolfert is almost unknown to the British public, but he is the author of one of the best recent American novels, called *Tucker's People*, an amazing picture of the Numbers Racket in New York. I believe he has already been wounded in the Pacific War, and now he is reporting the war in France. English writers of the same rank prefer the ivory tower.

IN DEFENCE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

LEOPOLD SCHWARZSCHILD

Author of *World in Trance*, published in 1942

It is high time to remember the Balance of Power.

The fables popular after the first world war gave this concept a bad reputation, and some of it still has wide currency. The very words 'Balance of Power' sound indecent to many ears. But reality has never worried about fables. The need for the balance of power has remained a focus of international politics. The sins that were committed against it are today being expiated at bitter cost. And as for the future, it is no exaggeration to say that the problem of the balance of power looms more gigantic than it ever did. All speculations about the post-war world which overlook this towering problem are idle fantasies.

The hard fact is that the defeat of Germany and Japan will create a totally unprecedented position. Take a globe, and consider the political formation called 'Europe'. You will see at once that Europe is bigger politically than it is geographically. Because of Russia's Siberian appendage, the European Continent extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Bordeaux to Vladivostok. On the morrow of victory an enormous transformation will take place on this huge expanse of land.

There have always been great military powers on it; several first-class land armies existed, forming potential barriers against one another. This in a nutshell was the 'Balance of Power'. The states on which it was based might change, but the balance itself was always present. Before the beginning of the present war it was mainly constituted by the four armies of Germany, France, Russia and Japan. The first three held each other in check in the western part of the Continent, the two last in its eastern part. (See Diagram I.)

It was an equilibrium, although it had some defects. But what equilibrium will exist after this war? The answer which emerges from the mists of the future seems to be: none. In the East, the military power of Japan, in the West, the military powers of Germany and France, will be eliminated. Russia seems destined to remain the only great military power in the area. (See Diagram II.)

After a few years—but very important years—a French army of some strength might conceivably arise again. But no one can sensibly expect France to resume the military rôle she played—or, more accurately, she seemed to play in the 20's and 30's. And in no case can the 39 million Frenchmen at the extreme end of the Continent be regarded as balancing the 190 million Russians.

Such, then, is the situation that seems automatically bound to arise from this war. Military exclusiveness will replace the former military balance on the European Continent—a monolithic power instead of the thousand-year old multiplex power.

The question arises: why should this interest those who do not live on the European Continent? Why should the United States on its great island, why should even Great Britain on her little island, worry about it?

THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE

The question will naturally be asked by all those who do not realise that the source and object of 'high politics' has always been and presumably will still be for a long time, that very Continent of Europe. And it is understandable that nowhere should this be realised less clearly than in America.

Everyone is inclined—and in many respects rightly so—to consider the things nearest to him as the most important things. For the American mind the 'heart-land' of the world is America. The old Continent is felt to be decadent, dying. But the naked, fatal truth is that the 'heart-land' of the world is still inescapably the gigantic Continent between Bordeaux and Vladivostock. And, without exaggeration, this truth is still the red thread without which no orientation is possible in the labyrinth of international politics.

This Continent is inhabited by 550 million people—almost twice as many people of the white race as in all the rest of the world. The economic potential of this Continent is by far



DIAGRAM I

greater than that of any other zone. Finally, on this Continent there is the most disproportionately overwhelming quantity of military experience, training, science, tradition and organisation in the world. In brief: on this Continent from Bordeaux to Vladivostock, today, as always in the past, the greatest mass of power on this earth is accumulated.

For centuries, this fact has been the key to world history.

Superficially this greatest agglomeration of power does not seem to exist. Europe is not a single block. It comprises many countries that are not only not merged together but are often engaged in bitter conflicts with one another. But what does not exist actually is a constant possibility. In fact, repeated attempts have been made to monopolise the European Continent and thus the bulk of all existing power. Every country that felt strong enough militarily at one time or another has tried to achieve this goal. The perpetual urge for mastery of the Continent, and the perpetual resistance to this mastery constitute the classical conflict of mankind.

The first line of resistance always naturally forms on the Continent itself. The overwhelming majority of the Europeans have so far opposed every attempt to 'unify' them by subjection. But when the situation becomes serious, the resistance on the Continent always receives succour from overseas.

There are good reasons for this. For the people living across the seas there is no more alarming prospect than the mastery of one state over this Continent. No more than the European countries have the overseas countries an adequate defence against the greatest aggregation of power in the world. For the strongest power, the ocean is more a highway than a barrier. Countless conquests of overseas lands were made even with the help of the old sailing vessels. The state that has usurped the monstrous power over the entire Continent can only too easily extend its domination across the seas if it chooses. Obviously, even the overseas nations have a vital stake in preventing the hegemony of one power over the crucial Continent. And they must also prevent the first step towards such domination, military predominance, let alone exclusive possession of power.

For many centuries the overseas nations meant only England. She has always been on guard against the remotest threat of one power becoming the master of the European Continent. She has always supported every combination of Continental powers that opposed such a threat, and has made much greater sacrifices to prevent it from becoming a reality than for any other purpose. In doing this England only followed her instinct of self-preservation.

The same compulsion became operative when a second great overseas power of the white race arose. The United States firmly resolved not to have anything to do with European politics. But the steamship, and later the aeroplane, reduced the width of the ocean. The Atlantic became to an increasing degree what the English Channel had been. The United States fell more and more into the same situation as only England had previously been in. In 1914 and in 1939 she found herself compelled to support the coalition that opposed the monopolisation of Europe. The Americans have never clearly realised why this came about. But the real reason was nothing but the crushing weight of power represented by a Europe united under a single rule. Not even America could expose itself to the murderous risks of co-existence with such a monster.

Thus, there has always been one single eventuality that is unacceptable to all nations—Continental as well as overseas. True, local antagonisms and conflicts have always existed in all the corners of the world, but the great general upheavals took place when attempts were made to usurp that Continent which can justly be called 'the Continent of destiny'. These general conflicts actually occurred one stage



DIAGRAM II

earlier: when one power threatened to become militarily omnipotent on the continent of destiny. And that answers the question why the overseas powers are interested in the European balance.

IS IT OBSOLETE?

Has the principle of the balance of power become obsolete? It would be difficult to formulate any argument in support of this contention. Let us recall that the balance of power serves for purposes of intimidation; it seems to say to every state: 'Beware of extravagant plans! Superior strength is ready to oppose you. Probably you will be defeated.'

What is wrong with that?

Least of all is it necessary to dwell on the moral verdicts that were rendered during the hysterical epoch following the last war. Morally, there is no objection to a policy intended in the last analysis to preserve all nations from subjugation —and if possible only through intimidation by, without the use of, military power. It will be sufficient to point out that the much-longed-for world peace organisation will fundamentally have no other purpose and will dispose of no other means.

More important is the question: Did the policy of balance of power actually accomplish its purpose? The answer to this question is twofold. It did indisputably achieve its ultimate purpose. Up to the present date no conqueror has succeeded in monopolising the Continent that contains the bulk of all power.

It is equally indisputable that this purpose was not always achieved purely by intimidation. Sometimes intimidation worked; sometimes it failed. It was effective, for instance, during the entire century from 1815 to 1914. The striving for Continental domination was actually checked in that century.

The balance of power policy failed to be effective in 1914 and 1939; Wilhelm II and Hitler were both insane enough not to be intimidated. But no remedy has yet been invented against the possibility of a madman's not being intimidated. Every League of Nations can be compelled to wage war. And as for the war of 1939, it cannot at bottom be said that the balance of power policy failed; it would be more accurate to ascribe the outbreak of this war to the too long neglect and maltreatment of this policy. Hitler's onslaught is clearly the product of twenty years that either wilfully ignored the balance of power, or even travestied it into a policy of unbalancing power. It is clear enough that we would have no war today, and probably no Nazism, if during these two decades the old-fashioned policy of the balance of power had been practised solidly.

But the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the balance of power is, in truth, a secondary question. The important question is whether there is a better, more perfect substitute for it. And the only answer to this question is: No, there is nothing better.

For the second time now mankind hopes to find a better substitute for it in a world peace organisation. The success of this second League of Nations is uncertain. But it is absolutely certain that such a League will collapse for the second time, unless the superstition that a League of Nations is the antithesis or negation of the balance of power is given up. This fantasy contains the germ of failure. The very opposite is true. A League of Nations composed of sovereign autonomously armed states can itself be nothing but another form of the policy of balance.

I have mentioned before that the ends and means of such an institution would not be different from those of the policy of balance. Both are intended to intimidate the aggressor or to defeat him by armed force. The world organisation would only extend and strengthen such a policy. In the action against the aggressor not only the states that freely desire to do so would participate, but all would be obliged to participate. And the action would take place not only in the event of great attempts to achieve

he hegemony of the Continent, but against aggression of every kind anywhere. These are certainly desirable complements to the policy of balance. But they do not imply any break with it.

Least of all will the perpetual objective of the policy of balance disappear. A state of factual military balance will have to be sought and constantly preserved. For in order to have any chance at all, the world organisation must have at its disposal a superior combination of continental power; it must be able effectively to threaten and really to defeat every country. But if there is no balance on the Continent, it will be impossible effectively to threaten or actually to suppress the single monolithic military state. No matter what such a state wants to do on the Continent, the world organisation will have no real authority over it. In other words, this organisation will have no real authority in matters concerning the Continent. It will be valueless with regard to its most important task.

No, a world peace organisation does not eliminate the need for balance. On the contrary. Whatever power may be possessed by such a supreme organisation can be derived only from an actually existing balance of power.

The imminent destruction of every trace of balance of power on the crucial Continent is thus a disquieting prospect from whatever angle one looks at it. From the point of view of the 'better world', it involves the destruction of all hope for an effective world association. From the point of view of traditional politics, it implies that the very state of affairs that has always been feared as eminently unbearable will suddenly be established as a chronic reality.

Of course one might say: 'Have faith in Russia! Although she will have monolithic military power on the Continent, she will not use it to monopolise the Continent.'

Perhaps. But in the domain of world politics it is neither customary nor permissible to rely on an exaggerated degree of self-restraint and to show confidence to an exaggerated degree. This applies to every state, whether it is called Russia and is Bolshevistic, or is called by another name and has another régime. And in all fairness no state can ask for such confidence. Russia herself would not grant it to any state in the world. Even where the governments of today seem safe, the governments of tomorrow are unknown.

Practically, the prospect is not just that the monolithic military machine will be set in motion and troll over the rest of the Continent. A completely unopposed military power exerts an irresistible influence even when it does not budge. Without one regiment being sent forth, without a single outward appearance being changed, control can establish itself. At the height of Hitler's power on the Continent, the following sinister witticism passed from mouth to mouth in Lisbon: 'We will be conquered by the long-distance call.' More than that: the owner of the monolithic military power need not even demand mastery over the Continent: it will be brought to him; it will fall into his lap. He would have to refuse it. Such is the effect of the laws of gravitation.

No one should harbour illusions about the consequences of such a state of affairs. A world permanently confronted with this hazard would be in a chronic state of political alarm and would be compelled to take the most exhausting precautions and live in a perpetual preparedness. Is there no way out? Must the great paradox of this war—that it seems destined to create the very thing we fought to prevent—be accepted? Can no way out be found again to re-create a balance of power on the Continent?

AGAINST WHOM?

To newcomers and amateurs in world politics the question seems indiscreet. The fact that the new balance would have to be established 'against' an ally makes the question appear unfair to them. All one can say in answer is that the existence of a balance of power on the crucial Continent—no matter 'against' whom—is simply a neutral right of all the states.

The truth is self-evident that all nations are endowed by their Creator with the inalienable right to further and strive for that which is the first premise of all international security. The natural claim that a balance of power must be established on the crucial mainland has been asserted by all the states at various times. Protests and misinterpretations always come only from the state that had evil intentions at the moment and was strong enough to have such intentions. The attempt to reconstitute a balance of power on the Continent that contains the bulk of all power in the world cannot give Russia any pretext for protests and misinterpretations.

However, the practical realisation of this goal is exceedingly difficult. The material for the reconstruction of a new European balance is unfortunately scanty.

To add many little countries together on paper is always misleading. But in this case a number of small countries, inhabited by about 100,000,000 people, must be excluded in any

case. The whole chain of little states in central Europe, from Poland down to Yugoslavia, cannot possibly take part in something that would even remotely be 'directed against Russia.' The only conceivable participants are the Western Countries—and Germany.

But while the West plus Germany would obviously be a strong counterweight, the West alone is completely inadequate. The 55,000,000 inhabitants of France, Belgium and Holland could form parts of a new equilibrium, but not the equilibrium itself. And this inadequacy of the Western Continent cannot be remedied. Even if all the remaining splinters are gathered from the corners, and even if all the Western Countries are combined and called Pan-Europe, the whole remains inadequate. The material for a new balance can be constituted only with the help of overseas powers. These could only be England and the United States.

In brief, for the problem of balance of power there is only a German or an Anglo-Saxon solution. And this alternative does not derive from anyone's opinions or prejudices but from mathematics.

AN ARMY FOR GERMANY?

The German solution naturally implies the possession of an army by Germany. Without power no country can have any part in the balance of power. But hazardous as this 'solution' may seem, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that it will certainly find advocates, and probably has already found them. Behind the scenes Germany is doubtless striving for this solution and some fertile brains in the Allied camp have doubtless hit upon the same idea. And after the war a certain tendency to take this seemingly comfortable way out will doubtless make itself felt. At this point the opinions begin. However, the opinion that the goat should not be made gardener still enjoys great credit.

There are overwhelming arguments in favour of eliminating all experiments with a German army. In 1918, too, the idea was current that the Reich could be used as an element in a new balance of power, and for that reason it was not completely disarmed. But the experiment failed signally. Germany was not contented with a mediocre rôle; and her strength soon enabled her to play her own political game. To expect anything else from an armed Reich after this war would be a wicked gamble. Moreover, only total radical demilitarisation, for many decades, can dry up the sources of the militarist traditions and instincts of the country, and offers the only hope of a really changed Germany sometime in the future.

Once the German solution is excluded, absolutely nothing remains but the Anglo-Saxon solution. Thus the United States and Great Britain are confronted with a historic dilemma. Either they acquiesce in a situation in which they have never been willing to acquiesce; or they take over a burden that they have never been compelled to bear.

If they acquiesce, one of the decisive foundations of their previous international existence will be destroyed. For all practical purposes it will be as though one single state had accomplished the monopolisation of the greatest power aggregate on this earth. Great Britain and the United States would enter the historic phase of their greatest potential insecurity.

If they refuse to acquiesce, the only thing they can do is to reconstitute the balance with the help of their own strength. This requires in the first place the unequivocal decision not to permit the monopolisation of the Continent at any price, and to enter the arena against any attempt in this direction. But such a political decision has a military implication. In the power relations that will prevail, this decision implies the physical military presence of the two powers on the Continent. They will naturally not fail to help strengthen the local elements of the balance—France and the rest of the West, and in Asia, China—as much as possible. But to exclude military surprise, these forces must adequately and constantly be complemented on the spot.

It so happens, however, that the military presence of the United States and Great Britain on the European Continent is also necessary on account of Germany. Demilitarisation is nothing unless it is controlled through occupation. The Anglo-American contingents of occupation would also represent the complement of the balance of power on the Continent. At least in normal times they would suffice for that purpose. In tense situations they would have to be reinforced.

This will be a heavy burden. But the burdens of the alternative will be heavier, incomparably heavier. One may also draw comfort from the thought that on this basis—and only on this basis—a world peace institution can really be tried again.

HOW TO DEAL WITH GERMANY & THE GERMANS AFTER THE WAR

PROF. DR. J. A. VERAART of the Technical University of Delft, Netherlands

It will not be necessary to emphasise that I am not an historico-materialist. But quite apart from this, I believe there never was a war the causes of which could be traced *less satisfactorily* when considered from an economic point of view. Certainly you would not expect an economist by profession to be blind to the many and complicated economic facts and data of this world conflict. They demand our full attention, and will do so for many years to come. But that is quite another question from the motives which drew Great Britain into battle. Up to now, not a single historian, from any country, has dared to advance economic arguments as an explanation for Great Britain going to war. I am not paying the slightest attention to the cries about plutocracy or Jewish plutocracy raised by propagandists on the Axis side. There is not a sane person in the world who does not know that no country was more afraid of a world war than Great Britain. No country was worse prepared for the enormous burdens of such a war. No country was more intent on making sacrifices to avoid war. And this went so far that, for instance in my country, Holland—and I am proud to refer to a country of which Professor Denis Saurat said: 'In all parts of the world, all those who could not believe France when she spoke of the Germans, will believe Holland'—more than 95 per cent of the population looked scornfully to Great Britain for years, asking daily how far this great country would go before dealing with German aggression. You should not say that it is quite understandable that Great Britain did not want a war because economically she was quite satisfied. For, even if I should entirely agree with this conception (but I do not, and only want to say that this is another slogan without any sense), you would have done nothing more than confirm my argument that Great Britain had not the slightest desire for an armed conflict.

On the other hand, economic arguments can explain very little of the attitude of Germany. The whole world was ready and even too anxious to assist Germany in its economic reconstruction. French and British capitalists, as unscrupulous and as unmindful as ever of the real interests of their own countries, contested in giving as many opportunities as they could to satisfy the German industrialist appetite. No sensible person can be duped by the slogan 'more *Lebensraum*'. Everyone knows that this means desire for world power. This may be full of economic interest, but above all it stands for domination by the German people over all other peoples of the world. The German intelligentsia have actually made no secret of this aim. The disgusting literature of Germany in the 'thirties inspired by 'the new philosophy' of Nazism, full of the absurdities of race theory, with its incredible doctrines about Jews and so-called inferior races—this literature boasted of designs which were much more important than economic ones. Moreover, the Germans did not hide their fury at losing the first world war. The country resounded with the blast of trumpets calling to revenge. Ludendorff and his friends of the Prussian General Staff did their utmost to electrify the German youth with much higher ideals than economic goods. Those who know anything of the history of that formidable General Staff in combination with *Junkertum* know, too, that for the last two hundred years each generation has wanted its war to satisfy its lust. This time those powers found the greedy collaboration of Germany's big industry and, as always, of the armament industry in the whole world. Together they found an invaluable tool in the hysterical corporal, Adolf Hitler, and his gang of Nazi ideologists, disappointed officers, criminals and sadists. This horrible compound was cemented by the safety found by German capitalism in institutions of the Nazi régime.

POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF NEW EUROPE

Before going into the economic and political consequences of the division of Germany, we have to deal with the principles concerning the frontiers of the countries in Europe after the war.

There are many people who think that this problem can be solved at once by adopting one single principle. But the matter is much more complicated. For a new political organisation there are several principles, and I will devote some attention to each of these.

The *first* principle is that of *Nationality*. It is in this connection that the biggest mistakes are continually being made. When we consider the

political constellation after the last world war, there appears to have been no other principle than that of Nationality. It seemed as if there was nothing better than to divide Europe into national groups, and to give each of them the position of a state. In my opinion, the application of this principle alone meant the acceptance of one of the *worst* ideological slogans which were responsible for so much misery in the world, and its demagogic power was the basis of Nazism. Germany for the Germans, Poland for the Poles, and every other nationality a nation apart! This was the danger which, in its simplicity, misled public opinion and provided new demagogues with a foundation for their deplorable work. It did not seem to matter, for instance, that Switzerland was an outstanding example of a country with four nationalities forming the soundest political community that ever existed in the world. Neither did the fact that the Sudeten Germans had always lived in Bohemia, and never had anything to do with even the oldest German Reich, seem to be of any consequence. But now, as we are on the threshold of the new world, we have to make it clear to ourselves that the principle of Nationality can never be the whole truth and that, although this principle will have to play its part in the decisions taken by our statesmen, there are other principles which are equally valuable for a new political organisation of Europe.

This leads me at once to the *second* principle of frontiers of the countries in the new Europe: the principle of *History*. It goes without saying that this principle also can never be the *only one* for dividing the Continent. Indeed, this principle demands that the historical events bringing potential changes should find expression in new frontiers. But it also means that full attention will have to be given to the independent countries which formerly came into existence, and that what was before will have to be taken into consideration when endeavouring to shape the new political organisation.

The *third* principle is of the greatest value, and hitherto never had such value, namely *Collective Security*. It could even be said that neither the principle of *Nationality* nor that of *History* would be of any value if they were to endanger the *Collective Security* of the world after the war. Happily for us, a combination of this principle with the others is possible, but the fullest attention should be given to *Collective Security*. When the world acknowledges that the dangers threatening peace have always come from Germany, and can well come from Germany again, it is the rest of the world which will be responsible for a third world war if the application of that principle is neglected.

The last of the *four principles* could best be described as the principle of *Common Sense*. Let me illustrate this. The most striking example is the political organisation of a new Poland after the war. On the one side, Common Sense tells us that we must not expect Russia to give in to the request for the restoration of the whole of Eastern Poland as it was after 1920. On the other side, Common Sense makes us realise that the story of the Danzig Corridor must not be repeated, and that a part of Upper Silesia will have to belong to Poland which, as Stalin declared, should be a strong and independent country. There are many such problems which can only be solved by Common Sense: the question of Alsace-Lorraine (which it is inconceivable to think of detached from France); the question of islands and parts of the Continent which will have to be mandated territories, etc.

DIVISION OF GERMANY

Guided by these four principles, a reasonable division of Germany as it was in 1938 will not encounter any obstacles of importance. The great powers—Great Britain, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.—have already decided on the restoration of Austria. There has to be an independent Bavaria. (We know that important people of that country are entirely in agreement with the idea.) A Rhineland has to be formed, including Westphalia and Hessen. The old Hanover will have to be restored with some extensions in a northerly and easterly direction. A Saxony will have to be formed, consisting of the old kingdom of Saxony and the Prussian provinces of Saxony and Silesia. Finally, Prussia should comprise only Brandenburg, West Prussia, Pomerania, and, possibly, the two Mecklenburgs. What we have to observe at once when we look at this division is that annexations at the cost of the countries forming the old Germany are only to be made when essential. That Alsace-Lorraine has to return to France has nothing to do with annexation by France. That the region of East Prussia should fall entirely to a restored Poland is obvious, and the problem of emigration of Germans to Prussia should not form an obstacle after all the migration we have witnessed in the days of Hitler.

But, above all, what is of importance is that in this way the principles of Collective Security and Common Sense have found their fullest application, whereas the principles of Nationality and History have not suffered in the least. We have only to remember all the ruses of Bismarck to form a Northern German Empire from parts which did not wish to be centralised at all, to

realise how very little the Germans of large parts of Southern and Western Germany will regret the severance of these artificial bonds. As regards Nationality, the difference between true Bavarians and true Rhinelanders on the one hand, and Prussians on the other, is just as big as the difference between Austrians and Prussians. But what prevails is that the principles of Collective Security and Common Sense could not be better served than in this way. The enormous centralisation of the German-speaking peoples in the centre of Europe, always inspired by Berlin with the spirit of Prussian *Junkertum* and the Prussian General Staff, is the greatest danger in the world. Not to deal with this danger would be to neglect our greatest duty after the war. Common Sense should teach us that all these German peoples can live a much healthier life politically, economically, socially and culturally, and without fear on the part of their neighbours, when they are decentralised than when they live in an artificially big unit.

There is no sense in the argument of *The Times* of 29 February, 1944, that a 'break-up of Germany into a number of separate units . . . would rehabilitate the narrowest nationalism of Germany in the very hour of its overthrow.' That it 'would fan to its highest point German determination to remain united. . . .' In the same way it could be argued that the disarmament of Germany 'would rehabilitate the narrowest nationalism of Germany.' That the efforts of re-education 'would fan to its highest point German determination to maintain its own Nazi principles of education.' Arguments of this sort start at the wrong point. They neglect one or more of the principles that should guide the victors of tomorrow in their work of reshaping the map of the world, and in particular the map of Europe. These arguments leave out of consideration the chief cause of the misery brought upon the world. They forget that armament and education on Nazi principles were the result of the big *Reich*, inspired by the unbearable arrogance of a caste of people forming a relic of the times before modern civilisation: *Junkertum* and the Prussian General Staff. Further, that the latter employed the unity of a powerful Germany above all other means to terrify the whole world in each generation. Such arguments overlook the fact that when German peoples of a fundamentally sound national character are brought back to their original state, these Prussian groups will be powerless to start the same trouble again. The great danger is the conglomeration of eighty million people in a forced unity. It is in the interests of *Junkertum* and the Prussian General Staff to keep that unity intact. If they do not lose it, disarmament and all the other measures will prove useless. The slightest difference of opinion between the United Nations will bring back armament with the same speed as it was brought back after the last war. But when, on the contrary, Munich, Cologne, Dresden, Vienna, as well as Berlin, become from the beginning different German centres of life, the influence of these powers will be broken. One should not think of a federation of these different parts of Germany. This would only mean a pitiable camouflage of the old united Germany. But Bavaria should be brought into close contact with Austria and Czechoslovakia; Rhineland with Belgium and France; Saxony with Poland and the Balkan States. In this way the danger to Collective Security by the old Prussian power would be nullified in the most thorough manner.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A DIVISION OF GERMANY

Here we have to be on our guard against many slogans. I have already heard in debates of the 'Balkanisation' of Germany. Some have tried to repudiate my opinion by speaking of 'bringing Germany back to the status of 1815.' Let me make short work of that kind of argument.

The five or six successor states of the Third *Reich* will have economically and politically the same importance as Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Switzerland, and so many others. What harm would be done to the Germans by letting them live in states of that size? Only if the economic life of the successor states were to be threatened—and we shall see to it that this will not happen—would there be reason for complaint. But no one can prove that to belong to a big state guarantees *ipso facto* a greater welfare than to belong to a small state. On the contrary, in the years 1919 to 1939 the small states of Europe were more prosperous than the big ones. It will be clear that the reproach that I would bring the Germans of the Third *Reich* politically back to the situation of 1815, is pure demagogy. Obviously, five or six states are not three hundred states.

Remember what I said before, that in my proposals there is nothing of annexation of the Third *Reich* by its neighbours. What is, then, the meaning of the exclamation which I heard uttered by a man of political and scientific standing that he would go back to the old neutrality policy, and did not wish to live in a Europe with seven or eight Alsace-Lorraines? As for Alsace-Lorraine, itself, who would not venture to restore it to France after this war? As mentioned before, there is no question of annexation here. The only annexation in my proposals is that of

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East Prussia by Poland. Everyone who does not want the muddle of the Danzig Corridor to start again, and wishes to see a strong Poland restored, has to agree with that annexation. Any other solution would end in failure.

Let me now deal with the economic consequences of the division of the Germany of the Third *Reich*.

I again wish to remind you of the two economic solutions I gave a long time ago, expounded as the natural and necessary consequences of the Atlantic Charter, i.e. the two treaties of which all the states of the world have to be partners, the Monetary and Commerical Treaties. Let me briefly repeat the principles of these thoughts.

When the nations are not sure of the exchange value of their money for international use, nor of the

minimum quantities of exports and imports after the war, there will be no possibility of economic life, let alone economic welfare.

It is inconceivable how such an elementary economic truth is not in the minds of all statesmen, and that an international conference of all the United Nations to start work on these two most important subjects has not yet been convened.

I must tell you frankly that without such a foundation it is impossible for me—and for all other normally thinking persons—to give any idea of whatever solution may be adopted after this war. What I have told you is founded on the hypothesis that those treaties will materialise. Should this not be so, then all political and economic planning for the future would completely lose its sense. But when those treaties become actual fact, the position of the five or six successor states is in principle as simple and as sound as the position of all the other states. A minimum economic existence is guaranteed to all. Purposely, I do not speak of the lower economic level of those German states as a consequence of their economic obligations after the war. We have simply to ascertain what part of the old imports and exports belongs to each of the successor states, and limit the amount of their international money accordingly. (I refer to my article in *World Review* of April 1943.)

About the political consequences of the division of the Germany of the Third *Reich*, some people have very singular ideas. They agree with a division, but believe that a 'federation' of the different parts should begin at the same time as the division takes place. Why? What reason would there be to federate? Political reasons? The danger is obvious, and of the same nature as similar ideas about a federation of Europe, a federation of Asia and a federation of America, leading to the formation of gigantic units which, in a not distant future, will result in another world war. I cannot often enough repeat that *we need at once politically and economically a world organisation*—a strong League of (all the) Nations, a Commonwealth of Nations, and nothing less. In the case of Germany there is, then, the particular danger that in another form the threat to the world would start again under the hegemony of Prussia.

What we need is to direct the cultural and economic life of several new parts of the old Germany, of the several successor states in the direction of quite different states. It is for that reason that Bavaria should come in close contact with Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, while Rhineland should be brought into contact with Belgium and France, and Saxony could be a valuable neighbour to Poland and the Balkan peoples. I can say that such new shaping not only corresponds to the views of the best citizens of the successor states—those whom Hitler expelled—but that it will put an end to the greatest danger to new generations: that of having a monstrous big Germany again in the centre of Europe.

If, after many years, some of the successor states have proved themselves loyal, passive members of the World-Community, these could be made active members, and take their seats in the Assembly by the side of the other smaller states. Perhaps Prussia alone would prefer to stay outside, and would not wish to change its unavoidably passive position for an active one. In that case, the loss to the world would be small.

One word only about the singular opinion of those who are in favour of a division of Germany 'in view of the advantages for world security', but want to see it in the way of 'spontaneous, particularist or separatist tendencies on the part of the German people themselves'. Here, instead of a *frank policy* of the United Nations founded on the interest of the whole world on the day that peace will be dictated, a *shrewd policy of intrigue* seems to be adopted. This is evidently a speculation on Quislings 'the other way round' who will be despised in their own country, and looked upon in the same way as the traitors so well known in the days after the first world war. It is obvious that such a miserable policy could never be adopted in a centre of Christian Democrats.

GERMANS IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

What has to be broken in the Germans is the imperial spirit, the spirit of domination over others, the thought of world power—much more dangerous than any material armament. That has been the great danger to the world for nearly a hundred years, and the world will not stand it any longer.

The position of the individual Germans after the war will, of necessity, be a very difficult one. Not only will their material existence have to be a very low one, but in every country of Europe they will be outcasts. Europe will not easily forget. The misery brought by the Germans to the millions of victims has been too great.

The only way out will be a breaking with the past as radically as possible, and every effort will have to be made to establish a new democratic order. It will only then be possible that the distress of these days will change into a happy future, in which all the peoples in the world will have their share.

WANTED—A NEW POLITICAL DICTIONARY!

NEGLEY FARSON

It has been said recently that to put a collection of second-rate men together does not necessarily make them first-rate. The charge was directed against certain Parliamentary Commissions, and with reason. But there is a queer omniscience associated with the title Committee, Cabinet, Government, that automatically, in our own minds, endows them with an aggregate wisdom that transcends the ordinary mortal's brainpower; whereas, if you have the endurance to read either Hansard or the American Congressional Record, you will often wonder what our leaders must think they are talking about. For many of their speeches, particularly from the Old Guard of Party orators, simply don't make sense.

Outcome of this sloppy thinking—on our part—is the careless way we speak confidently of what we call the Russian attitude, the attitude of His Majesty's Government, the American attitude. Only the first is correct. Russia, an oppositionless country, with no vested interests whatever working behind the Kremlin, can speak with 100 per cent authority. There is such a thing as the Russian attitude. But we don't, when we speak of His Majesty's Government, always have in mind the limitations put on its politics by the malign influence of London City. Taken as a whole, the attitude of the British Government, as we have come to speak of it, has been definitely on the side of liberalism in Foreign Affairs, ever since the fateful meetings of Versailles in 1919–20. The influence of London City during that period has just been the opposite; it was during the years 1919–39 that London City was most active in co-operating with, or forming, the big International Cartels. Henry Wallace, Vice-President of the United States, has recently attempted to put one of these International Combines on the spot, when he publicly charged its American member with withholding vital synthetic rubber processes from the United States Government—while, at the same time, it had transmitted the secrets of its highly valuable process to Germany, which, at that time, was at war with Britain. Had that been Soviet Russia, the highest officials of that American Big Business Corporation would have been shot through the back of the head. But as this happened in the United States, whose scarred people are almost immunised to such big-scale selfishness and corruption, nothing will happen. There is hardly an American Big Business Corporation which has not insinuated itself into high positions in the direction of U.S. Foreign Policy.

Therefore, I assert, there is no such reality as the American attitude. There is the attitude of the Roosevelt Administration. There is the attitude of the United States Congress. That is, there is the 1944 attitude—until after the Presidential Elections of November 1944. After that there will be another United States Congress attitude—probably very reactionary. And behind the façade of both the Executive and the Legislature stand these nineteen or twenty big Corporations, which, before the Franklin Roosevelt régime, literally ran the United States Congress, and, under Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, had their chief and most powerful spokesmen in the White House itself.

The average American has come to dread Committee Rule at Washington. The term Committee itself has become synonymous with defeat. Send a Bill to a Committee, and you have sent it to its death. Congressional Committees are coming to be recognised as National Cemeteries—the grave of all progressive hopes. In Britain your sins of omission are done by Commissions. The way it works out with you is only now coming to be recognised as one of your Parliamentary failings. To wit: you have got into the habit of taking the programme for the accomplished fact. Appoint a Parliamentary Committee—and the thing has been done. It was unbearable, during the dark days in Egypt, when Rommel was less than eighty miles from Alexandria—and vital reforms in technical production in Britain were imperative, without delay—to listen to the B.B.C. giving out the names of Commissions or Committees which had been erected to meet this eleventh hour 'escape from death' demand—then, to our consternation, detailing how each Commission would be split into Sub-Commissions, etc. etc., until you began to feel certain that every vital intention would get itself lost in the official labyrinth.

That is a back cast. You English have a peculiar and engaging quality, which I think



HENRY FORD, *the materialist's idea of the greatest man in the world. His dicta are often meaningless*

might best be defined as 'the momentum of intention'. In spite of a maze of Committees and Commissions, you do get things done—usually in the right direction. That, I think, can be traced directly to the fact that the bulk of your opinions, the desires latent in the hearts of the mass of the British public, are made up of good intentions, fair and liberal desires; what, in short, we have come to speak of as the British attitude towards life. Now that *is* an Attitude. And many an American foreign correspondent will tell you that, when he came to report on Britain's actions in an oncoming crisis, he very often *deliberately did not go to the British Foreign Office*. Why? Chiefly because he feared that the likeable and plausible members of the Foreign Office who dealt with the press would propagand him, in spite of himself. They might try to prepare an American opinion, via its press, to be ready for a more favourable solution, to the British, of the present problem at question, whereas this correspondent felt that if he stuck strongly to 'British character' in reporting what the British would do, he was on the main road. British payment of the War Debt to the United States was one example. I, and many of my colleagues, deliberately did not go to the Foreign Office when writing our cables as to whether Britain would or would not pay her Token Payments, at least. And there one of the best among us slipped. In 1934 he did not see the significance of the French pressure on Britain *not* to pay the U.S. any War Debt Token Money. The French had made up their minds that they were going to default 100 per cent. They persuaded 10 Downing Street that the British couldn't let the French down; Britain must also default. At that time, and it covered a shamefully long period, when the French Policy was leading the British Policy by the nose, Britain defaulted. I wish all Englishmen could know the shock that that gave Britain's most wholehearted supporters in the United States. It wasn't the money—there was almost as much opposition in the United States as there was in Great Britain against the trade-wrecking policy of the High Tariff Republicans in demanding the economically impossible repayments of this money—it was just the fact that the word British had been accepted automatically in the United States as a synonym for financial honour. And it still is. The British people are still regarded by the majority of the American people as being one of the most honest nations on earth—despite the recent charges of the five globe-trotting, anti-Roosevelt U.S. Senators. The universal American belief in the national honesty of the British has turned most of these political shots (really aimed against Roosevelt) into blank cartridges.

That brings me to my plea that what both we Americans and British need is a New Political Dictionary. Foremost outcome of this—the correct labelling of Political Parties, their motives, etc.—will be a clearer realisation on both sides of the Atlantic as to what is actually going on around the bewildered head of John Citizen. The extraordinary antithesis of the childishness vanity, combined with political shrewdness, and so universally in the make-up of most of the leading statesmen of our Age, is a thing which the people of both Britain and America should be strongly aware of, and on guard against. Judged by sematics, the real meaning of words themselves, the average speech of sentimental Ramsay MacDonald, for example, works out at just so many blah, blah, blahs. This vain Scot, who actually had the courage to address a huge luncheon of the World Press, on the eve of the World Economic Conference, saying that he 'would far rather leave one word, one fine phrase, in the English language . . . than reach any international agreement', had no regard for the strict *meaning* of words at all. He used them with a prodigality that swept hundreds of thousands of English men and women off their mental feet. I heard him make that famous speech at Seaham Harbour, on the eve of the 1931 Elections, where, playing every instrument in his wide emotional orchestra, he left those honest coal-miners and their worried women-folk simply dizzy.

2

I had never before, in all my years in Europe, and in journalism, witnessed such a shocking spectacle. For, analysing its grandiose contents —trying to find a hard core to write a cable about—that speech just did not make sense. It was just words, words, words . . . Similarly, to show you the brand of oratory which the great American public can fall for, take a look at this: it is E. E. Cox, of Georgia, June 1937, addressing the U.S. House of Representatives, in a speech against the New Trade Union, the Congress of Industrial Organisations, formed by John L. Lewis:

> 'I warn John L. Lewis and his communistic cohorts that no second carpet bag expedition into the Southland, under the Red Banner of Soviet Russia, and concealed under the slogans of the C.I.O. will be tolerated. If the minions of the C.I.O. attempt to carry through the South their lawless plan of organisation, if they attempt to demoralise our industry, to corrupt our coloured citizens, to incite race hatreds and race warfare, I warn him here and now that they will be met by the flower of Southern manhood and they will reap the bitter fruits of their folly.'

Georgia, you may know, is the State notorious for its 'Chain Gangs', where shackled white and black convicts are out to work on the State roads. Representative E. E. Cox, who comes from a 'poll-tax' State, was therefore probably elected by only five to ten per cent of the voters. The 'poll tax', in the too, too Solid South, is meant just as much to disfranchise the 'poor whites' as it is the negroes. In most parts of the Sunny South a negro dare not go near the polls, even if he has paid the tax, because of physical intimidation. And it is a matter on record that, in the State of Tennessee, less than one in four of the adult population has the right to vote. In possession of these facts, how does that speech of Representative Cox read to you now?

Or another, the great Henry Ford, in his book, *Moving Forward* (1930):

> 'Monopoly, we know now, is impossible, for the reason that a monopoly based on anything but service is self-destructive. It throws away its customers as it goes along. This has been demonstrated time and again. Centralisation may degenerate into monopoly, but proper centralisation means higher service.'

The crime of the use of fine-sounding words is that the people who use them actually believe in them themselves. So do millions of other people. When, during the summer of 1934, strikes were sweeping the United States from coast to coast, I had two one-hour interviews with Henry Ford at his River Rouge plant, that great industrialist said to me, 'I never use the words "working man"—we are all just folks together.'

I suggested that some of his workers did not feel that way—not those I had been talking to. It did not please him. Writing my story afterwards, I expressed my conviction that Henry Ford meant, absolutely, every word he said; that he was an incontestably honest man; that he *did* believe, if his workmen would only listen to him, that they could all be 'just folks together'—and that that was just the hell of it.

It was just as necessary to get behind honest Henry Ford's words—to the bubbling troubles being rigidly held down inside the River Rouge plant (that is, if your intention was to report what was really going on in Detroit) as it is to get behind the speeches of every Senator or Representative, every Member of Parliament, to see what forces are operating behind the United States Congress or the British Houses of Parliament at the moment. To do that, every individual should be exposed to a clear analytical examination. One way to begin has just been taken by *The New Republic*, foremost American liberal weekly: it has just published a supplement to its weekly edition, called *Reaction in Congress*. It has taken all Bills; concisely stated what they stand for; published the names of every Congressman who voted either for or against them—or, so that he might not duck the responsibility, showed on which Bills he has conveniently absented himself—so that his name might not appear among the 'Noes'. It is enough to take your hair off to see the solid ranks of the Old Guard Republicans and Democratic Diehards—in Bill after Bill—voting 100 per cent against American progressive liberalism.

The other thing that can be done is a purely personal affair. It can be done by our attitude, John Citizen's. That is, divorce all thinking from accepting any body politic as being an entity in itself. Do not think in terms of Powers, Cabinets, or Parliaments. But do think of the composition of such bodies. What are the calibres, the intentions, the obligations to Party Policy of the men who compose these bodies? What are the forces which they obey—say, London City and/or Wall Street? And never read the speech of any statesman without putting it to the searing light of sematic examination—the real meaning of words.

If our statesmen knew that their week-end speeches were going to be subjected to that acid test, they might, before long, become as silent as Joseph Stalin, and loquacity could no longer be named as Democracy's greatest weakness.

NO SQUARE PEGS IN ROUND HOLES!

C. B. FRISBY, Director, National Institute of Industrial Psychology

THE productive capacity of the nation depends on the individual efficiency of each member of the working population, be he the chairman of the company or the most newly engaged apprentice. Just as in war the survival of a nation is largely dependent on its industrial capacity, so in peace its wealth and general standard of living are related to the volume of production of which it is capable. The highest level of national efficiency can be attained only if each individual is engaged on a type of work for which he is fitted by his talents and temperament. The guidance of young people as to the type of employment they should seek must therefore always be a matter of the greatest importance to the nation. No two human beings are precisely alike. Each is differently endowed with innate qualities and capacities in certain degrees. Each develops his own highly complex pattern of interests, temperament and character. There are many thousands of different types of employment available in Great Britain—the Ministry of Labour Dictionary of Occupations lists 16,800. Each of these makes its own demands on those who follow it, and calls for the possession of certain qualities in certain degrees. The problem is to match the individual to the job.

Apart from efficiency, the question is of great importance from the view-points of health and happiness. The individual struggling with a task beyond his capacity is not always rejected as incompetent. He may succeed in attaining a standard of work just high enough to avoid dismissal; but he achieves this at an excessive cost to himself, which takes toll of his physical and mental health. Again, one who is employed at work which does not adequately utilise his capacities becomes bored, frustrated and discontented.

It is a regrettable truth that in the past the choice of an occupation on leaving school has been for most a somewhat haphazard affair. Similarly, the majority of employers have not exercised very much care in the selection of new recruits to their businesses. Improvement can only be effected by the introduction of more systematic methods of vocational guidance and vocational selection, and by the deliberate allocation of much more time to the reaching of decisions on these questions. It is impossible to hope for a high standard of guidance if this must be given as the result of a twenty minutes' interview at the school-leaving conference, when the advisors have no real chance of forming an accurate assessment of the capacities or personality of the boy or girl. Similarly, a perfunctory interview by a foreman or manager cannot permit him to determine how suitable an applicant may be for a particular vacancy.

The comfortable theory sometimes advanced, that a trial and error method of taking employment no doubt results in the end in most people finding themselves in suitable work in the long run, is not only of doubtful truth. It ignores the waste of effort and of training involved, and the discouragement and frustration of those who are the victims of the method, and who may try a dozen different types of employment before they settle in to what may be at best an uneasy niche. Experience gained from a variety of employment may be of value. But it will be of much greater value if the individual progresses on lines which have a *plan* than if he is left to the mercy of chance.

During the last twenty years, occupational psychologists have sought to improve both vocational guidance and selection by developing more systematic means. The National Institute of Industrial Psychology and the Industrial Health Research Board have carried out research. And the former body has done much practical advisory work, both for individuals and employers. Certain educational authorities (notably that of the City of Birmingham) have also carried out experiments in the use of psychological methods.

It is upon the basis of this experience that the Services have, during the war, built their methods of allocating men to the various arms and trades. And the army has made a notable contribution to the subject by the system of officer selection which it has evolved.

The problem in the future is how to apply existing knowledge, and to ensure the steady development of the techniques used.

The new Education Act, providing for the expansion and improvement of facilities for technical education, and the provision for all

Aspiring Youth! A picture taken at the recent Youth Reconstruction Conference

children of an appropriate form of secondary education which will begin at the age of 11+, implies that a tentative broad vocational choice will be made at this age. The decision as to the appropriate type of secondary school for each child will be reached by his teacher in the light of his progress at school (in both work and play), his interests, and his parents' wishes—and possibly the results of tests of intelligence, and other qualities. Although provision is to be made for transfer at 13+ to another form of school if the preliminary choice proves ill-founded, it is clear that, for administrative reasons, wholesale transfer of children will be impossible. And consequently, under the present proposals, the accuracy with which the assessment of the child at 11+ is made, and the degree to which it is in fact possible to forecast the future development of the child of that age, become matters of the greatest importance to the educational plan, and not only to that. For, although the decision to be made is primarily an educational one, it is also a *vocational* one, since the 'grammar type' secondary schools will provide an education which will fit the child for such careers as teaching, medicine, law, and higher clerical positions. The technical schools will serve those entering engineering and 'practical' careers, while 'the modern school' pupils are expected in the main to provide the rank and file of industry and commerce.

Although the general mental capacity or intelligence of the child can be measured quite accurately at the age of 11+, and this measure will also provide a reliable guide as to his future general mental development, research hitherto conducted makes it doubtful if the special qualities necessary for success in engineering and other 'practical' work can be measured or forecast at this age. Such evidence as there is suggests that these qualities normally make their appearance between the ages of 13 and 14. (Further research on this subject is urgently needed.)

In educational and vocational guidance, full details of the progress of the child during his school life are necessary in assessing his abilities and temperament. This means that the school record card should play an important part; whereas now it is rarely adequate in its scope, and the methods employed for its maintenance reduce its potential value. The best system for recording not only formal progress in school subjects, but also all the information about the child which is possessed by his different teachers, by the school medical officer, and by others, demands the recognition of the task as a special function, to be organised by a particular and suitable member of the school staff.

Educational and vocational guidance must be recognised as an uninterrupted process, which begins with the massing of information about the child from an early stage in his school career, and continues throughout that career, and throughout the early years of employment. Information must be given to the child during his later years at school which will permit him to form a picture of what is entailed in different types of occupation, not only matters of training, pay and prospects, but what the work involves, and what it demands for success. One point which is sometimes overlooked is the necessity for directing a child's thoughts away from a particular career which he would like to follow, if he has some weakness which makes his choice impossible.

The boy or girl (and their parents) should be led to consider the choice of an occupation at least a year before the time of leaving school—whether he is to enter a University, or a training or technical college, or is to go direct into a profession, industry or commerce. It is not the function of the teacher to place the child in employment. But he should guide his choice within broad limits. Occupations can be grouped into those involving mainly work of a clerical kind, those concerned with practical constructional activities, and those of a social nature, where contact with other people is the outstanding feature. Occupations in each of these groups can be ranged again according to the degree of intelligence, skill and sociability demanded.

At least one teacher in each school should have sufficient knowledge of this broad grouping of occupations, and of the occupational implication of information concerning each child, to permit him to act as the child's adviser. In the majority of cases it is for the Juvenile Employment Officer to carry out the actual placing of the child in employment.

It is now possible to sketch the lines along which educational and vocational guidance should develop in the future. The collection of information about the child should be systematised, and made as comprehensive as possible. There is wide scope for the use of psychological methods to throw additional light on the child's capacities. The study of occupations must be pushed forward, so that the qualities they demand for success may be more accurately determined. Teachers must be trained in the use of psychological methods, and must learn something of occupational requirements. Juvenile Employment Officers must become skilled in the interpretation of the fuller facts about the child to be supplied by the school, in terms of the occupations available. The follow-up of the child on leaving school must be systematically carried out, so that advice can be given to him on his continued part-time education, and so that his progress at work can be watched, and changes of employment effected when these are seen to be necessary. In all this work the welfare of the young worker is the paramount object, and this, in the long view, is also the first consideration from the point of view of industrial and national efficiency.

Employers, too, must give much more consideration to the selection of their workers. Just as the child must not be compelled to enter an occupation to which he is averse, so the employer must have freedom to select from those put forward by the Employment Officer the ones he believes to be most suitable for the work carried out in his particular organisation.

Progress will depend on the facilities for research into the best means of assessing the capacities of the child and the demands of the occupations, and for the training of all those concerned with the guidance, the placing and the selection of the entrant to occupational life.

At present the facilities for such research and training *are very inadequate* even when the activities of the Ministry of Labour, of the Industrial Health Research Board, of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, and certain Education Authorities, and industrial and commercial companies are considered together. The necessity for, and importance of, increased national expenditure on research on the technical side of industry is widely recognised. Sir John Orr in the June issue of *World Review* pointed out that psychological and intelligence tests are one of the most recent advances in research; surely the time has come when the equal importance of research into the human problems of occupational life can be admitted, and adequate financial provision be made?

ONLY ENGLISH SPOKEN!

PENNETHORNE HUGHES

An Egyptian skilled worker making a walking stick. A common sight in the bazaars of Egypt

MR. CHURCHILL has reiterated that Basic English is not intended as a means of communication for Englishmen, but rather that Syrians and Esquimaux and Japanese and precocious Gaels may have a common medium of expression. This is excellent. It is to be hoped, however, that it is not merely an attempt to make all nations as bad and lazy linguists as the English, who throughout time have re-invigorated their language by adopting expressions of trade from the Low Countries, convention from the French, scholarship from the Greek, or whatever it may be; whilst individually adding virtually nothing to their vocabularies from the age of eighteen onwards, except technical terms and (recently) old English words re-imported from America via the cinema. In fact, the Englishman has not learned, and will not learn, foreign languages. For two hundred years he had the money, and it was up to other people to understand him. To too many Englishmen, it still is.

In the Middle East this is peculiarly apparent. It is, of course, to be expected that men snatching a few hours from the desert hardly want to spend them learning Arabic irregular plurals, and are in a state of exuberance when *bonhomie* can usually supply lack of vocabulary. The men in the ranks, too, are still (many of them) the good mixers English soldiers have traditionally been, and with a great deal of backslapping and crying of 'chum' can, and do, get on good relations almost straight away with the most parasitic seller of defective fly-switches, or disappointing street-literature. It is the officer class, and the middle-class rankers, who are more difficult. The methods employed by these people for speaking to the indigenous population of Egypt, for example, are usually these:

(1) *Ordinary standard English* spoken very loudly and angrily, with 'I don't suppose the fool understands' added, not necessarily under the breath, as a formal coda. This is particularly affected by subalterns, who quite obviously would be at a bad loss if expected to order a meal in any 'well-known London restaurant'. There they would be terrified of the waiters. Here however, particularly in company, they are convinced that their shyness is best overcome by a show of military fury. In any case, it is in some way assumed that to order your food rudely is a sign of imperial consciousness and virtue.

Senior officers who have never had occasion to adjust their manners since they were raw subalterns themselves sometimes adopt this method, using a higher frequency range.

On the order being misunderstood, or information given that it is unprocurable, the original demand is repeated, still in English, but in more ringing tones.

(2) *Colloquial English* spoken with the back to the addressee. This is used by many kind but unimaginative men. Having asked a servant (the Egyptians most Englishmen address are of the servant class) whether he can speak English, and

obtained a proud claim that this is so, he relapses into what may be called the tired gun-room form of address. Being asked if he wants tea, he turns away mumbling, 'Wouldn't mind a spot of half-and-half out on the old thingummy in the loggia place.' This is unhelpful to the newly-fledged English scholar.

(3) *Execrable Arabic* used wrongly. On arrival in Egypt the first and expiring cry of the traveller is for a drink. He tries to attract a servant. Those round him call Ezma (or, in a Kensington-cum-Alexandria way, Izma). The waiter comes, and Ezma, the first word of the magic tongues of the East, is his. It means 'listen!' But for a long time the traveller thinks it means 'waiter'. He soon learns what he believes to be the Arabic for left, right, straight ahead, stop here, and wait, and then becomes a menace to everybody. It so happens that all taxi-drivers know, if nothing else, the English for left, right, straight ahead, stop here, and wait. This does not deter the boisterous passenger, who screams his bad Arabic directions, usually wrongly, and always at the last moment, cursing the driver if he is not understood.

This tiresome and arrogant habit of speech is also employed, by those who affect it, on porters, in shops, and even to hotel receptionists, whose English vocabulary and manners are far better than their own. Needless to say, these sorts of people never learn the Arabic for 'please' or 'thank you'. Or, indeed, often the English.

A sub-division of this school, on finding that their fiercely mispronounced phrases are making no impression, switch to Lower Certificate French, lashed with whisky, and on obtaining equally bad results retreat under high blood pressure to Shepheards Hotel, and are never seen again.

Those are the normal ways. There are also those who take trouble, in the following degrees:

(1) Those who know no Arabic learn to say so in Arabic; realise that after all it's nobody's fault but their own, and leave it at that. After all, a very large percentage of Egyptians do know English and like to practise it. If they make mistakes, it is better than the Englishman who can't even say enough Arabic to do that.

(2) Those who learn all the Arabic they want, for simple shopping and dealing with servants and so on. It may not be good Arabic, but it's useful, and it saves money.

(3) Those who learn one sort of Arabic extremely well. It may be classical Arabic, in which case they can converse with the educated man from Morocco to the borders of Persia, with only slight variations, although they find themselves incomprehensible to the *majority* of the inhabitants in the whole territory—for the classical Arabist is not understood by the peasants of his own land. Or it may be the dialect of Egypt, which will be thought very strange and difficult in, for instance, Syria, and vice versa. But those who acquire these languages are respected, and learn much of interest about the people and places where they work.

(4) And so through various gradations to the Arabist—the man who can read and write the language of the Koran; speak dozens of dialects; visit on terms of intimacy countless sheikhs and imams; sway governments; outflank publishers. There are only half a dozen or so real ones, and they will most of them tell you, in confidence, what they think of the others. However, they are almost all in fact men who have lived full and valuable lives, and it is through them that the cultural exploration of the Near and Middle East has been so largely a British work; through men who have devoted time and love to the language of the people they were studying.

No one expects the soldier to find much opportunity for learning languages. But a few do, and more could, even in what are, we hope, these last stages of the war. Those who do will be the ones whose opinions will be worth hearing when the particular areas in which they have been serving come up for discussion. They will know the habits and expressions of thought of all classes (if they have used their knowledge), and not merely the second-hand beliefs of parasites, or the prejudices of their less-informed fellows.

For those who, in whatever civil capacity, are going to go on living about the world and speaking English, it is essential that they should have the ordinary courtesy to try to learn as well the speech of those whose guests they are. The proud assumption that it is up to the foreigner to learn English is simply not going to pay. In the Dutch East Indies, and the Belgian Congo, Dutch and French are not assumed: business is conducted in the native tongues. And the Middle East, for instance, is going to be no colony of that sort for anybody. The British Council and such missionary bodies exert themselves in teaching good little foreigners English. For the cause of world relationships, if we have this at heart, the English must really learn a few languages themselves.

For governments, nation shall speak unto nation. But nationals, when playing on the away ground, should speak unto nationals as well. And not only in Basic English.

2

ERRORS OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES (I)

THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION TO THE VICTORY OF 1918

VICE-ADMIRAL MUSELIER

From 1916–18 Admiral Muselier collaborated with Painlevé and Clemenceau. From 1917–18 he was a member of the *Cabinet de la Présidence du Conseil*. Since June 1940 he has continued the struggle on our side, and after creating the Air Force and Navy of Free France at the side of General de Gaulle, he was Commander-in-Chief of the Free French Naval Forces until May 1942. His evidence is thus particularly valuable.

At the beginning of October 1918 the Belgian army had succeeded in driving back the German right flank, and in emerging from the zone flooded by the Yser. The Allied armies, despite their heavy losses, were every month receiving very valuable reinforcements from the young American army. They had been able to renew the staggering blows dealt by Marchal Foch without respite since the victorious battle of 18 July at the end of the second Battle of the Marne.

On 6 October 1918 the German Minister in Berne asked the Swiss Government to hand a note to the President of the United States, in which the German Government asked President Wilson 'to take up the cause of peace, to inform the belligerent nations about it, and to invite them to send plenipotentiaries to open negotiations.' The Germans accepted, as a basis for these negotiations, the programme set forth in President Wilson's message to Congress of 8 January 1918, and in his subsequent declarations. They ended by asking for the 'immediate conclusion of an armistice on land, on sea and in the air'.

President Wilson replied on 8 October, to the effect that the preliminary condition to the conclusion of an armistice was that the German armies should be withdrawn immediately from the invaded territories. This reply was rather dangerous, because an armistice concluded with this sole reservation would have allowed the Germans to re-group themselves in the Rhineland and behind the Rhine, and to establish a line of resistance difficult to penetrate. Marshal Foch, as soon as he heard of the German overtures and Wilson's reply, stated that, 'before the cessation of hostilities could be considered, even momentarily, three things were necessary: (1) that the invaded countries (Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg) be liberated, and that their populations be brought back immediately; (2) that a military springboard be assured, by means of two or three bridgeheads on the Rhine; (3) that the Allies take over the left bank of the Rhine, as security for the reparations due for the destruction done to the Allied countries.' He then indicated a few complementary conditions of a military nature. Lloyd George, after a discussion with Clemenceau, drew President Wilson's attention to the inadequacy of the conditions which he had indicated, and added: 'the conditions of an armistice can only be fixed after consultation with military experts and in accordance with the military situation prevailing while negotiations are being carried on.'

On 12 October, Prince Max of Baden, the Chancellor of the Reich, hastened to let Washington know that he was ready 'in order to reach an armistice, to fall in with the evacuation proposals put forward by the President.' But the latter, warned in time by the Allies, was able to avoid the trap, and on 14 October he wired the German Chancellor that 'the conditions of the armistice are questions which ought to be left to the judgment and opinion of the military advisers of the government of the United States and of the Allied governments.' Negotiations continued until, as a result of their successive defeats on the Western front, the collapse of Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey in the East, and after discussion among the Allies, the Germans were obliged, during the night of 6–7 November, to ask Marshal Foch to fix a meeting place for the plenipotentiaries of the Reich and the Allies. It was under these conditions that, on 8 November, the negotiations began in a compartment of Marshal Foch's special train (which was used as an office), within the range of heavy artillery, and near the

WILSON *became over-confident*

station of Rethondes in the Forest of the Eagle. This armistice, as Marshal Foch said, was neither a peace treaty nor even peace preliminaries. It was a suspension of hostilities in the course of the struggle to stop bloodshed, and to give the belligerent states the delay necessary for establishing the Peace Treaty.

The Allied armies were to hold the two banks of the Rhine, in order, if necessary, to end any difficulties which the German Government might have raised during the discussion of the Treaty. The greater part of the German fleet and all the submarines were to be disarmed, interned, or handed over to the Allies. The latter would then be entirely masters of the situation.

This capitulation was certainly, whatever one may think about it, the result of a military victory because, ever since the second half of July, the Allied armies had beaten the German armies everywhere, and had captured 8,000 officers, 350,000 men, more than 6,000 guns, and almost 40,000 machine guns—a success which surpassed anything previously recorded in history. Moreover, the demoralisation was such that Germany, starved after four years of war, saw more than two hundred divisions reduced to a rabble; and insurrection was rife in the majority of the large towns. This indisputable victory had been achieved, as far as land success was concerned, by the valour of the Allied troops, under a leader whom no difficulty had ever beaten—Marshal Foch.

Of all the Allies, France had borne by far the hardest trials. A large part of her territory had been invaded, in particular the regions of the North and East, the richest industrial areas. The coal mines in the North and the iron mines in the East had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and had been exploited by them for nearly four years.

The factories in the occupied zone had been destroyed. In all regions where battles had been fought, the towns and villages had been ravaged, and at the time of their successive retreats the German armies had put the coal mines out of action, destroyed the bridges, and even cut down the trees in the orchards. The sum total of the damage caused by Germany to the property and people in France amounted, according to a memorandum handed over in January 1921 by the French Government to the Reparations Commission, to the sum of 136 milliards of gold marks, or about 7 milliards of pounds sterling, not to speak of the physical and moral suffering which was beyond measure. The French war fleet was reduced by half, with no possibility of its being replaced, since French naval construction had ceased. Apart from those not physically fit, the French army had lost 1,368,000 men killed in battle, to which must be added 740,000 maimed, and 3,000,000 wounded. During the four years of war the birth rate in France had fallen very low, so much so that, generally speaking, it could be said that the Great War had almost decimated the population. Moreover, France was heavily in debt to Great Britain and the United States, and yet she could not obtain a guarantee of her security from her Allies in the post-war years.

If I feel in duty bound to recall some of the clashes, some of the serious difficulties, which arose between the French, the British and the American Governments and High Commands in the course of the 1914–18 war, and in the years which followed, it is certainly not in any spirit of disparagement or recrimination. I even hesitate to recall these incidents, in spite of their gravity, because, particularly at the moment of the final combined action, it might seem inopportune to dwell upon these old quarrels. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that France and Britain have sometimes been generous to a fault. During last century they assisted the unification of Italy, and then permitted the union of the German states. The military victory of 1918 might have assured the triumph of the democracies, and the right of peoples to self-government. But because of our disagreements, also because the United States adopted an isolationist policy towards us, and finally because Soviet Russia was kept out of the picture

for twenty-five years, the Treaty of Versailles, badly planned and badly applied, finally ended in our losing the peace, and our allowing the Germany of the Weimar Republic to herald the advent of Hitlerism, despite the excellent intentions of that unarmed policeman, the League of Nations.

The problem must be approached anew. And it must be realised that territorial, political or economic discord between France and Britain cannot be permitted to exist under any pretext whatsoever. It is a question of life and death for the two countries.

From the military point of view, it is fitting that British readers should be acquainted with the part played by France in the common victory, and in particular how it was owing to the energetic intervention of the armed forces of General Foch and his personal action that the German march on Calais was stopped and England saved.

At the beginning of the war, and until the end of November 1914, the British army in France consisted of only four Army Corps: the 4th Corps returned from Antwerp, and was reduced to one cavalry division and one infantry division. (Military service was not compulsory in Britain and, as in 1939, the British army was not ready for war.) The French army was more then ten times superior. After the victory of the Marne came the period known as *la course à la mer,* during which the British army was placed on the left of the principal group of the French armies.

The German front extended in front of the Allies in a continuous line from the Vosges to the North Sea. The German army had Calais as its chief objective, in order to reach England. It was at Ypres that the chief encounter took place. On 26 October 1914, the struggle was bitter. On 31 October the 1st, 2nd and 3rd British Cavalry Divisions were driven back. Fortunately the General commanding the 9th French Corps directed all his available forces to the aid of the 1st Cavalry Division, and was thus able to sustain the British front. But a gap was created, and the British had no forces available to bridge it. In agreement with Field-Marshal French, General Foch sent him eight battalions. The same day, the 1st British Division, in spite of strong resistance, was routed, and fell back. The commanders of the two 1st British Divisions were killed. The situation was so acute that the British commander envisaged the retreat of the whole of the 1st Corps. Foch and French met again in the afternoon, and French drew a very sombre picture of the state of the 1st Army Corps

PRINCE MAX OF BADEN *tried to remain debonair*

in full retreat, as the British line was broken: 'If such well-tried troops are asked to continue fighting, there is nothing for me but to go and get killed with the 1st British Corps.' Foch put the strength of three French army corps at the disposal of French, and succeeded in making him abandon his plan of retreat.

During the day of 1 November, Foch had been called to Dunkirk to receive the President of the Republic, General Joffre, Millerand (the Minister of War) and Lord Kitchener (the British Minister of War) Lord Kitchener was very uneasy, and approached Foch with: 'Well, are we beaten?' Foch replied that we were not yet, and would not be. He insisted on asking the British Minister of War to send reinforcements as soon as possible, and Kitchener replied: 'On 1 July 1915 you will have a million British trained soldiers in France. Before that date you will have nothing, or next to nothing.'

However, thanks to the energy of Foch, the great battle of the Yser was over on 15 November, and the Germans had not reached their objective. Their losses were enormous. Their Guards were decimated, and more than 250,000 men lay dead.

The victory of the Marne had already broken the initial German effort. Subsequently the operations in Champagne, and the glorious defence of Verdun at the cost of terrible losses, were purely French actions. Then in 1918, after the driving-in of the 5th British Army under General Gough, and following the interview at Doullens, it was Foch again who re-established the situation by filling the gap with French infantry. Then, as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies, it was he who led them to victory by forcing the German army to clamour for an armistice.

In January 1918, the British held a front of



FRENCH
felt glum

200 kilometres, with 61 divisions (two of which were Portuguese). The French held 530 kilometres, with 99 divisions. As a result of their losses the British did away with 9 divisions, and on 16 May 1918 they had only 52. Clemenceau was obliged to insist (in the presence of Lloyd George) on some of the men mobilised inside the United Kingdom being sent as reinforcements. The situation established by the War Office on 22 April showed that there were 1,285,000 men in Britain. The 9 divisions which had been done away with were reformed between May and September 1918.

But, from 11 November 1918, once the danger had passed, Britain adopted her own policy again. In his book, *The World Crisis*, Mr. Winston Churchill relates that he dined with Lloyd George on the evening of 11 November, and that the conversation revolved entirely round the best way to help Germany! It is Clemenceau who points out the fact in his book, *Grandeurs et Misères d'une victoire*. And he adds: 'At such a time it would perhaps have been more natural to think of aiding France, so cruelly ravaged by German soldiers!' And Clemenceau goes on to relate how, when he went to receive an honorary degree from Oxford, Lloyd George begged him to go and see him in the House of Commons. 'His first words were to ask me if I had anything to tell him.'

'Yes,' I replied, 'I have to tell you that ever since the day after the armistice I have found you hostile to France.'

'Well,' he answered me, 'was it not always our traditional policy?'

It is not surprising, then, that subsequently Lloyd George in his discussions with Clemenceau sometimes made such violent gestures that one day President Wilson was obliged to pass between the two of them, with his arms forming a barrier, exclaiming: 'Well, well, I have never seen two more unreasonable men!' This allowed the two statesmen, who suddenly regained their composure, 'to finish the scene of wrath in a burst of laughter', as Clemenceau relates.

Let us now examine the part played by the French Military High Command in the effective direction of operations which led to victory.

From the very beginning of the war unity of command had seemed essential in France. But the idea of seeing a French General in command of British troops was for a long time unbearable to the British man in the street, and more so to the British army and Parliament. An unsuccessful attempt was made in 1917 under the temporary command of General Nivelle. On the American side, the difficulty was no less, the President, according to the Constitution, being Commander-in-Chief of the army. Moreover, for political reasons, the Americans wished to create and send to fight one, or several, entirely American armies, under the direct authority of their leader, and fighting under their own flag. A constitutional objection had also been raised by the Chief of Staff of the Belgian army. Now these obstacles had to be overcome at all costs.

In the course of conferences at Doullens, and later at Beauvais, the French, British and American governments agreed to entrust General Foch with the co-ordinating action of the Allies on the Western front.

One of the most serious difficulties which General Foch encountered was the question of effectives. In the face of the French and British armies with their critical deficiency of infantry and machine-gunners, the German depots had still a reserve of from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 men. Foch asked that at least 120,000 Americans should be sent every month during May, June and July. And, as Clemenceau has said, these soldiers 'though superlatively brave, were in the main only half-trained.'

In the month of April 1918, the American army in France numbered only five fighting

2

divisions, of which one, the 1st, rejoined the 1st French Army. Three others, the 2nd, 26th and 42nd, held the quiet sectors of the front; and the last, the 32nd, had its infantry temporarily distributed among the French divisions in order to complete its training. In all, at this time, 23,000 American infantrymen constituted the sole direct aid sent to fill the gaps in the French army. American help to the British army was limited to one division of infantry in the process of being transported. The joint Franco-British armies could not anticipate the immediate help of more than 70,000 American infantry.

The decisive effort was earmarked for 1919, and it was necessary for the Entente to have an indisputable numerical superiority over the 220–240 German divisions, which meant bringing from America 80 divisions during April 1919 and 100 divisions during July 1919.

In the middle of June 1918, the American army (in the United States as well as in France) numbered only 42 divisions, a total of 1,750,000 men who were not, so to speak, fighting. On 10 October 1918, the American army had 30 divisions at the front. But the deficit in these 30 divisions amounted to 90,000 men. The 'seventy-five' guns, the aviation, and the horses were supplied by France!

It was not until 27 July 1918 that the creation of the 1st American Army was brought about. But its tardy organisation had cost us, and our Allies, much blood. The war was well advanced when the 1st American Army was engaged at Saint Mihiel in September 1918. The advice and caution of Foch and Clemenceau were unfortunately quite justified.

The effort made by the American Army cannot be denied, but it is worthy of mention that after a brilliant attack at Saint Mihiel on 12 September, it attacked again at Argonne on 26 September and 20 October with comparatively little success.

As regards the Italian front, it was Foch who, after the disaster of Caporetto, re-established the situation with the help of artillery and French divisions hastily despatched.

On 2 May 1918, after a conference at Abbeville, the Italian front was also co-ordinated by General Foch; but the Supreme Command was not entrusted to him until circumstances made it imperative that beyond the Alps the Allied armies should fight under his command under the same conditions as in France.

I think I have shown how the French High Command and the French troops, at the cost of unheard-of sacrifices, several times saved desperate situations; and how at the time of the

FOCH
took the baton out of his knapsack!

knock-out blow, Marshal Foch, with consummate tact and military skill, gave the Allied armies directions which led to victory.

These facts, historically indisputable, gave France the absolute right to speak freely when discussing the terms of a treaty designed to prevent the Reich from again being able to renew the massacre of the first world war.

France is justified in thinking that the debt of gratitude due to her because of the victory of 1918 has not been wiped out by the armistice of 1940—an armistice which the huge majority of Frenchmen never accepted, and which the Free French have never recognised. Free France has never stopped fighting against the terms of this armistice, overtly with her soldiers, sailors and airmen, and underground by the hidden, but active, Forces of Resistance.

The great Allies have no right to deny France this mortgage on the coming Victory. In the next article we will examine the most important clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Then we shall see how, as a result of successive desertions, and the discord of the Allies, and as a result of a false humanitarian ideology which believed in a 'good Germany', we lost the fruits of victory, and were led straight into the present war. Let this lesson from the past be a sober warning!

YOU CAN PLAN JOBS FOR ALL

NOEL F. COHEN

How combine individual initiative with the large-scale plan so necessary in the modern world? How bridge the gap between Whitehall and the citizen? This article describes how all the talk is being, in one energetic district, put into ACTION

BACK in 1940 Dunkirk days, when our armies were in retreat and invasion threatened hourly, it was discovered in certain factories in Kent, lying around the Medway Valley, that a great many problems involved in stepping up wartime production to meet the new threat could be solved on the spot by the creation of a local clearing-centre. Without waiting for a lead from the top—in fact, in the very face of a refusal by Parliament to institute a Ministry of Production—the workers doing the job, the managers, and the trade unions, came together and created their own district production committee. It worked so well that the pattern became regional, then national, and finally led to the creation of the Ministry of Production itself.

In May 1944 another invasion was threatening: the men of Dunkirk were going back, on D-Day, armed with the weapons that the new production machinery had created. And even while the final preparations were being put in hand, those same workers of the Medway Valley grew conscious of a new obligation to the men who were to storm the Continental beaches: an obligation to reward their heroism and sacrifice with a fair prospect of decent employment when they returned. Ten days before the news of invasion thrilled the world the Government produced its own full employment policy in the White Paper, perhaps wisely, to strengthen the morale of the men who so soon were to go into battle. The White Paper in its foreword warns the country: 'employment cannot be created by Act of Parliament or by Government action alone . . . the success of the policy will ultimately depend on the understanding and support of the community as a whole—and especially on the efforts of employers and workers in industry.' The support of employers and workers in the Medway Valley was guaranteed before it was asked for. Believing that what could be done for full production in war could be done for full employment and full life in peace, thirty representatives of local factories and traders, of utility companies and banks, of trade unions, of municipal authorities and interested Ministry departments, met together five weeks before D-Day, and constituted themselves Britain's first local Full Employment Council.

As their first task they decided to 'collect, investigate and report on facts and proposals concerning our common objective of sustaining full employment under fair wages and conditions for the employable population of the district, with particular reference to the return of men and women from the fighting forces and other special wartime services.' Dividing their problem into four parts:

1. Production
2. Development and Planning
3. Economics and Statistics
4. Distribution and Consumption

they created a specialist committee to tackle each department of the problem and report back to the full council for appropriate action to be taken. What that action will be nobody as yet can say. It may be that the council itself, through its various constituent members and represented bodies, can accomplish much in the attainment of the first post-war priority of jobs for all; or it may be that action will need to be initiated through local and national authorities.

This four-fold division of the problem was adopted on the suggestion of Mr. George Dickson, Chairman of the District Joint Production Committee and first Chairman of the new Full Employment Council. In an earlier article in this series dealing with 'Evolution in Management' (*World Review*, March 1943) Mr. Dickson explained the practical philosophy of this analysis as he himself has applied it in industry. The individual, he believes, in whatever group he may be and for whatever purpose, has four interests:

1. Giving his share
2. His future
3. His past
4. Getting his share

He calls it his Star Plan for industry, and translates these needs into four industrial departments:

1. Production—Works Management
2. Development and Planning

2

HOW STAR PLAN GREW



Simplified version of original star



Another way of drawing it applicable to industry



As a five-pointed star—diagram of the democratic individual in his political and economic home

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3. Economics—Statistics—Records
4. Distribution (or Supply)—Sales Management

Projected on to the national plane, the departments would become:

1. A Ministry of Production
2. A Ministry of Development and Planning (Reconstruction)
3. A Ministry of Economics (Exchequer)
4. A Ministry of Supply (Board of Trade)

Already he and his associates helped to fashion the Ministry of Production as described above by evolving local and regional machinery, and they are now urging its retention to deal with post-war production problems, with parallel national, regional and local bodies to serve the needs of production, planning, economics and distribution. Hoping once again to lead the way, they have in their own area commissioned the four committees to tackle full employment under these headings.

DETAILS OF ORGANISATION

Each committee consists of three employers and three Trades Unionists, with joint secretaries. There is a co-ordinating committee composed of all the joint secretaries and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the full council, and these two also act on each of the committees. The exact terms of reference are as follows:

1. *Production Committee*

To collect, investigate and report on facts and proposals relating to existing production capacity in the district. This will include (*a*) the study of Labour Supply ranging through all the different kinds of production skills and management methods available for peacetime full employment; (*b*) the study of existing capital plant and machinery; (*c*) the study of Raw Materials Supply for the existing industries; (*d*) the study of existing industries in the district with particular reference to Factory and Storage Space available for production; (*e*) the study of existing forms of transport available for production.

2. *Development Committee*

To consider or initiate, and report on research, development and planning in relation to full employment in the Medway Towns district. This will include (*a*) proposals of what Labour Supply conditions might make possible in regard to production and distribution in the Medway Towns district; (*b*) proposals regarding new types of capital plant and machinery that could be used; (*c*) proposals regarding the use of raw materials not used or not used to the utmost in our Fully Employed Industries; (*d*) proposals regarding new factories or other industrial enterprises which might be initiated for the district; (*d*) proposals regarding new forms of transport, or large-scale developments of existing transport facilities in the district in relation to future full employment.

3. *Economics Committee*

To collect, investigate and report on facts and proposals submitted by the Production, Distribution and Development Committees in terms of accountancy statistics for the district. This will include (*a*) the study of total wages, salaries, dividends, prices, rates and taxes and other charges in terms of money directly related to the full

employment of existing means of production and distribution in the district, including study and analysis of the total full employment man-hour problem; (*b*) the study of investment in capital plant and machinery; (*c*) the study of material purchase and stocks finance; (*d*) the study of investment in factory and storage space; (*e*) the study of finance in relation to all forms of transport affecting the district.

4. *Distribution Committee*

To collect, investigate and report on facts and proposals relating to consumer needs that will affect peacetime full employment in the district. This will include (*a*) the study of all local, national and export consumer needs; (*b*) the study of existing distribution organisation; (*c*) the study of available supplies in terms of existing consumer needs; (*d*) the study of existing shops, showrooms, warehouses, stock-yards, etc.; (*e*) the study of existing forms of transport available for satisfying consumer requirements.

Convinced that only the men in the locality can supply the necessary information, they plan to approach them through the various trades and industrial associations—the butchers, the bakers, and the aeroplane-makers, the builders and the farmers, and the housewives who live in the homes they build and eat the food they grow—asking them, wherever there is a suitable organisation in being, to compile their own statement of their needs in terms of men, money and materials, and their own assessment of their productive potential under conditions of full employment. What volume of goods is exported directly from the district; how does it balance with the goods that come in from outside; what is the surplus available for re-spending in the district? What resources of the area still wait to be exploited, and what plans are being made, by industry and by local authorities, to develop them after the war? What new types of capital plant and machinery might be used; to what extent do existing transport facilities need expansion? And what does all this mean in terms of accountancy statistics—total wages, salaries, dividends, prices, rates and taxes, investment in plant and equipment and factory and storage space, the purchase of materials and stocks, finance? In this community of say 150,000 consumers, of whom 75,000 are workers, what number of people can be employed for what number of hours a week, and for how many weeks in the year, with the available resources? These are some of the questions which have determined the terms of reference of the research committees.

THE FIRST STEPS

The work has been started in two directions. An analysis is being made of:

1. All the firms who sell goods that carry man-hours out of the district, and
2. All the firms who sell goods in the district.

From the first analysis the district hopes to prove what they are able and willing to make for the nation, and, perhaps more important, from the second analysis they are hoping to prove that they are an infinitely valuable consuming community when we have full employment. For instance, the analysis might prove that with full employment the district has a consuming potentiality of 5 pianos, 15 cars, 50 prams, 100 vacuum cleaners and washing machines, and an infinite number of other commodities, roughly estimated at a total of several thousands of pounds worth of goods per week.

There is no doubt that the standard of living of the nation as a whole depends on the balance of exports and imports to a great extent. From Mr. Bevin's speech introducing the Government's Employment Policy Report, it is interesting to note that in pre-war days we had between 10 and 13 per cent of our man-hours unemployed and at the same time used between 10 and 13 per cent of our man-hours on the manufacture of export goods. There is something wrong here. But export and import balance is even more important to a district than it is to a nation. It would seem that, whereas the Nation gets by in peacetime by exporting about 12 per cent of its man-hours, the Medway Towns District had to export 30–40 per cent of their man-hours. There might even be an inquiry as to whether or not the National and International Economists should give more attention to balancing *man-hours* internationally, rather than concentrating so exclusively on tokens of international *currency*.

The Medway Council faces its tasks in the light of modern scientific possibilities, and of the art of group leadership and industrial management. But it also lifts its vision to a higher spiritual objective and plants its feet firmly on the widest possible sociological base. Joseph McCulloch, noted theologian and a parish priest in the heart of the Medway area, welcomes the setting-up of the Council as 'the most clearly Christian project in the Medway area', affirming 'it is the first and necessary step towards tackling the even bigger task of ensuring that men may not only have jobs, but also jobs in which they are happy.' Into the picture also and into full membership of the Council has come the local Naval authority, Admiral-of-the-Fleet



THEORY INTO ACTION. *On page 38,* World Review, *March 1943, George Dickson published a diagram explaining his Star Plan Theory for the organisation of democratic group management and government.*

This article describes how this same plan has now been put into action in the Medway district where it is working with 100 per cent efficiency in every respect, and in 100 per cent accord with the declaration of the recent conference of the I.L.O. The nation and the world is only a collection of districts on a large scale.

The simplification of a diagram does not of course indicate clearly every detail. In a democracy every national group leader or minister is ultimately responsible to the people through the Prime Minister and an elected Parliament. As an example of an important division which is not marked on the diagram for the sake of simplification, take the foreign minister: he can be regarded as the leader of the group of people interested in foreign affairs, and is of course responsible to the Prime Minister who is group leader of the nation; but in the Foreign Office on this plan there would be four chief departmental heads interested in:

1. *Production*
2. *Development and Planning*
3. *Economics*
4. *Consumption or Supply*

To take another example—the Minister for Total War and Defence who is the chief of all our armed forces, would have, as they very nearly all have in the individual services now, four chiefs of staff responsible for

1. *Tactics (production)*
2. *Strategy (development and planning)*
3. *Forces economics*
4. *Supplies*

Each of these supporting departmental chiefs would be in close and constant touch with his corresponding Minister, who in his turn supports and keeps in touch with the Prime Minister, so that all national activities would be integrated and synchronised on the same basic framework.

Sir John Tovey, commanding the Nore Station, after a lifetime of naval experience and more recently of the sombre Russian convoy route.

LET THE PEOPLE PLAN

Karl Mannheim, who has written in this series on 'Democratic Planning and the New Science of Society', states in his book, *Man and Society*: 'The fact that in a functionally rationalised society the thinking out of a complex series of actions is confined to a few organisers, assures these men of a key position in society. This is the state of affairs which has led to the growing distance between the elite and the masses, and to the "appeal of the leader" which has recently become so widespread.' That leader-ideology is being fought in one way by the men who have stormed the Normandy beaches; their fellow citizens at home in the Medway basin are fighting it in another way, by taking local and democratic action to help combat the spectre of post-war mass unemployment. They contemplate with anxiety the Government plan to entrust the analysis of economic trends to a "small central staff". For unless the central staff, necessary as it is, works with the co-operation and understanding of the people, we shall be one step nearer bureaucracy and one step further from the democracy we are fighting to preserve.

Says Mannheim again: 'Just as nature was unintelligible to primitive man, and his deepest feeling of anxiety arose from the incalculability of the forces of nature, so for the modern industrialised man the incalculability of the forces at work in the large and complex social system under which he lives, with its economic crises, inflation, insecurity, and so on, has become a source of equally pervading fears.' Is the problem then too big, the framework within which we must encompass the millennium too massive, for human modelling? It is certain that in this world of scientific technology and intricate financial controls, the ordinary man, dwarfed by its size, bewildered by its complexity, and bruised by its impersonal handling of his own private life, feels powerless to contrive the conditions for which he yearns.

Small wonder that in some countries the individual has abdicated responsibility and followed an assertive few or an unscrupulous Führer who will allow nothing to stand in the way of decisive action. What is needed is a new and powerful impetus of democratic determination that will not only infuse the old forms of Government with a new life, but will thereby transform them into a mobile and elastic structure answerable at every point to the needs and energies of the people.

THE GOAL

Never has the desire for reform been so ubiquitous, and probably never has there been such universal agreement on the objectives towards which our reforms should be directed. We desire a full life for all men, and the conditions of the full life are so easy to enumerate that most politicians can do it without pausing for breath: a job that will pay the weekly bills and provide the wherewithal for creative leisure, that will give both a sense of security and a sense of personal fulfilment; a home where human relationships can be worked out in all their richness, where the household group can be the nucleus of democratic citizenship; and a background of schools, hospitals, clinics, libraries, art galleries, dance-halls, theatres, playing fields and holiday camps.

To attain what we all agree we want is the problem; to apply our new twentieth-century powers for a worth-while object. Democracy was practised first in the comparatively simple and placid conditions (based on slave labour) of the Greek city-states, and the technique must now be developed to fit another age. Historians no doubt would say we have already developed it, and that by the twin mechanisms of representative government and the wide and rapid dissemination of information, we have made it applicable to modern complex societies of millions. But representative government has also made the business of running society more remote, placing in the hands of powerful groups the means of perpetuating their power; while modern instruments for spreading knowledge can be misapplied to serve the ends of anti-social propaganda (for example—Hitler). Such mechanisms, though useful, are not in themselves sufficient to keep us afloat in present weather conditions. There are, broadly speaking, three channels through which the desire for a better Britain can flow into action: through Parliament, and the various Government Departments concerned respectively with health, education, trade, building, social security and the rest; through local authorities in terms of improved social services and amenities and through their joint machinery for town and country planning; and through the giant structures of separate and often opposed industries, each struggling for a place in the national post-war set-up, and plotting to snatch markets in a fiercely competitive world. Those are the three channels: the tragedy is that unless something is done about it they will never flow



The Medway district includes Chatham, Gillingham, Rochester, Strood, and is indicated on the shaded portion of the sketch map

The industries represented on the council include:

Ship and boat builders
Ship repairers
Engine builders
Papermakers
Brickmakers
Flour millers
Furniture makers
Varnish manufacturers
Shirt makers
Specialised paper products manufacturers
Engineers and iron founders
Flying-boat and airplane builders
Contractors plant manufacturers
Concrete machinery manufacturers
Cement and building materials manufacturers
Oil and cake millers
Gypsum products manufacturers
White lead manufacturers, etc. etc.

together into one broad and compelling stream. We do well to remember that in those early Greek democracies the system worked because every free citizen took part personally in the government of his city and accepted personal responsibility for it. Democracy worked then because the groups were small enough to make it manageable: the democrats knew each other and the conditions in which they had to govern. They could comprehend their situation; they were not overwhelmed by numbers or by distance or by complexity. They felt that they mattered to government, and that government mattered to them. If Democracy is to be made to work again in our so much bigger and more bewildering environment, we must contrive somehow to restore those conditions of simplicity, of first-hand knowledge, of personal contact, of direct individual responsibility. We must no longer leave it to 'them' and complain when the results disappoint. 'We' must help to attain what all of us are needing.

THE METHOD

How then, and when and where, can we start to help? The answer is provided by the Medway District Full Employment Council: now, in our own locality, by coming together in devoted and determined groups. *Now:* because we cannot leave it until 'the boys come home', tired and dispirited as they are bound to be, expecting them to create out of the void the better world for which they have been fighting. *In our own locality* because we know better than anyone the conditions of our area, its needs, its possibilities, and the power of its people; what is wanted and whether it can be done and how. *By coming together in devoted and determined groups* because that is what Democracy means, not marking crosses on ballot papers, not counting heads, not leaving it to *them*, but *we* ourselves combining with our fellows on the spot and rolling up our sleeves and getting down to it and showing not only what we want, but also how we mean to set about finding it.

Does that make sense? If it doesn't, then Democracy itself doesn't in the modern world: and we are heading fast for autocracy or bureaucracy, and for Fascism and thuggery. But it does make sense, the sense that we the people can always make of it when we come together in groups with a clearly defined social purpose. What is our social purpose to be? What is the highest common factor upon which we can

agree? It begins with jobs, and goes on to include homes and hospitals and the rest. In each area these are the things we want to know about: we want to know how much we have got, how much we want, and how much we can get if we go all out for it. Let us then, without waiting for a lead from the top of the governmental pyramid, give the lead from the broad base, by instituting now fact-finding surveys in every sizeable locality in Great Britain. When we have unravelled and arranged the facts we may find there is much we ourselves can do without seeking the aid of government authorities; and so much as we cannot do alone we can urge upon our representatives with all the force of indisputable knowledge.

The field is wide: for everything we do as communities and in communities is related to the problem of full employment: the schools and houses we build, the doctors and the dustmen we engage, the libraries we stock with books and the playing fields we prepare, all create jobs for someone, locally or beyond, and are therefore part of the pattern of what the locality gives to the wider community and takes from it. For while cricket balls and stethoscopes would not be made in all the localities where they were to be used, they would form part of the balance of trade in each area and would therefore contribute a quota to the national picture of full employment. The Medway Council has already declared its view, after considering the White Paper, that the district balance of trade is even more urgently vital than the national balance. At a pinch, it has been pointed out, *the nation*, in siege economy, could adjust its total industry to sustain a certain standard of living almost without any imports; but *the district* must balance exports with imports to live at all, unless it is subsidised as a distressed area. The Medway Towns do not wish to live on unearned subsidies, and they challenge other industrial districts to follow their lead by compiling equivalent balance-sheets of imports and exports. One district Council alone might do much. But the nation needs two hundred, if the phrases of the White Paper are to be transformed into reality in the localities. Imagine the effect on the people of such a number of councils, dotted throughout the land, enlisting in their search for authoritative material thousands of people in all their different specialist capacities; what a glowing piece of democracy, what an irresistible body of known and documented fact they could place in the hands of those—say the National Planning Council—to whom the final decisions in the creation of the New Britain would have to be entrusted!

There is a pressing need for some co-ordinating machinery to bring together the plans of government, the plans of industry, and the plans of local authorities. Would not such district councils as these supply the missing key? Representing as they would all the interests in an area, including the industrial, and making their findings felt through the local town hall and through Whitehall, they offer just that co-ordinating and stimulating *individual* action that has been so disastrously lacking in the planner's schemes. Moreover, they imply a recognition of the fact that if as planners most of us cannot yet think effectively on the national scale, we can nevertheless tap our rich reserves of goodwill, talent and specialised knowledge in the localities, making the pieces fit together into the national jigsaw.

Previous articles in this series:

1941, *June, 'Threshold of a New Age' by Herbert Read; July, 'Transformation in Science' by Professor J. D. Bernal, F.R.S.; August, 'Painting and Sculpture' by E. H. Ramsden; September, 'Life from a New Angle' by C. H. Waddington, Sc.D.; October, 'The New Groundwork of Architecture' by John Summerson; November, 'Matter, Form, Evolution and Us' by Dr. Joseph Needham, F.R.S.; December, 'Man—The Anachronism' by Dr. Edward Glover, M.D.*

1942, *January, 'The Revolution in Literature' by Kathleen Raine; February, 'The Helter-Skelter Universe' by J. G. Crowther; April, 'Exploring the Unseeable' by J. G. Crowther; May, 'The New Politics' by Dr. F. Borkenau; July, 'Democratic Planning and the New Science of Society' by Dr. Karl Mannheim; August, 'The Future of Sociology' by Lewis Mumford; October, 'The Revolution in Education' by Dr. C. D. Darlington, F.R.S.; December, 'The Revolution in Economics' by Thomas Balogh.*

1943, *January, 'This Shrinking World' by W. P. Hildred, C.B., O.B.E., M.A.; February, 'Music in the Twentieth Century' by Eric Blom; March, 'Evolution in Management' by George Dickson; April, 'Changes in Philosophy' by John MacMurray; May, 'The Philosophy of Change' by Herbert Read; June, 'Revolution in the Family' by Constance M. Hildred; M.B. Ch.B.; July, 'The Revolution in Town Planning; Domesday Up to Date' by Max Lock, A.R.I.B.A., A.M.T.P.I.; August, 'Films—Today and Tomorrow' by Basil Wright; September, 'Outline of a Plan' by Thomas Balogh; October, 'Religion in Transformation' by John MacMurray; November, 'The Revolution in Environment' by E. A. Gutkind.*

1944, *January, 'Map into Globe' by Professor E. G. R. Taylor; February, 'The Zest of Life' by André L. Simon; March, 'Three Big Changes in Education' by J. H. Newsom, M.A.; April, 'Science and the Rising Generation' by David S. Evans; May, 'Birth of a Nation' by C. H. Waddington, Sc.D.; June, 'The Influence of Science Upon Politics' by Sir John Orr. July, 'Nationalism' by Frederick Hertz.*

In Book form: *'This Changing World' (June 1941 to October 1943), edited by J. R. M. Brumwell, published by Routledge, 12s. 6d.*

2

WOMEN WRITING TODAY

PATRICIA JOHNSON

THE woman writer first began to be taken seriously at the end of the last century. The Brontës, George Eliot and Jane Austen had been accepted, though reluctantly, yet were still looked upon as eccentrics, unwomanly exceptions, well-advised to hide their identity under a masculine nom-de-plume. But slowly women themselves were beginning to take an interest in reading; and the new public created a new demand, so that at the turn of the century the great period of sentimental fiction came into being. Stories of love and restrained though undying passion were read with avid enjoyment. A further change, however, was to take place, and became noticeable before the last war. Women writers, inspired perhaps by the dramatic attempts of women to establish themselves in political life, gradually started to abandon the reputation they had acquired; and began to take their place beside the writers of the opposite sex, and to produce work of a more serious nature. Today, the position of women in contemporary literature of the English language is a very interesting one. For it is a place of distinction won after a hard fight, and in the teeth of public prejudice.

The attitude of the two sexes is very different, complementary rather than opposed, roughly comparable with the masculine and feminine aspects of the human personality. The male writer, broadly speaking, can be described as 'objective'. He writes about what he observes, presenting the evidence, and leaving the conclusions to the reader. In so doing he does not neglect the deeper motives which lie behind the actions he describes: rather he leaves them to be *implied*. Ernest Hemingway is an obvious example of the objective writer whose judgments are inferred and not declared. The female writer, on the other hand, using her acute sensibility to the emotions, is 'subjective', seeing the world, as it were, through a screen of intuitive consciousness. The emphasis here is on reaction instead of action. If the male writer is intellectual and rational, the female writer is sensitive and inspirational. Obviously, there are many contradictions, and this can be no more than a salutary definition. The two will constantly overlap, just as the aspects of the personality overlap. Some women writers are as incapable of writing 'subjectively' as some men writers are of writing 'objectively'. However, one point seems obvious, and that is, that there are certain characteristics in the make-up of the sexes which suggest that they are specially fitted for different kinds of writing. There are certain fields in literature which the woman writer has made particularly her own.

Before going on to a consideration of these, some mention should be made of the women writers who have been prominent as influences on the contemporary writers of both sexes. Virginia Woolf, who was one of the great writers of all time, used a fictional form to express the results of her own creative experience and introduced new and daring ideas which startled other writers into innovations of their own. The characters in Katherine Mansfield's stories were the result of a meticulous and loving observation, of a delicate and sensitive nature, a part of herself which was poured into her writings, and which produced a style that was to influence many of the short story writers who were to follow. Other women whose influence is still very apparent in the literature of today are Stella Benson, Dorothy Richardson, and Elizabeth Bowen.

Fiction has survived from the last century as the most attractive form for the woman writer, a form which she has developed far beyond the conventional 'love story'. The novel has become a canvas upon which the pattern of human emotions can be minutely examined. Rosamond Lehmann is one of the most interesting of present-day writers. Her sensitive, flowing, colourful style is practically subjective, almost precluding action, except where it is necessary to show the conflict in the private thoughts of her characters. It is natural that a woman, even though she has an idea to propound, rather than a story to tell, should use the novel form. Principal among the writers of *ideas* are Storm Jameson, Rebecca West, Radclyffe Hall, and more recently Djuna Barnes and Elizabeth Myers. It is difficult to draw an exact line between the writers about *ideas* and the more straightforward *tellers of tales*. The form of writing now grimly referred to as the 'psychological novel' would include both these. Such names as Barbara Goolden, Phyllis Bottome, Sylvia Thompson, Pamela Hansford Johnson, Margaret Kennedy, Hilda Vaughan, Susan Ertz, Beatrice Kean Seymour, Richmal Crompton, and

REBECCA WEST. *Started her career on staff of* Freewoman *as a reviewer author of* The Rake's Progress, The Thinking Reed, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, *etc.*

many others, whom there is no space to quote here, would fall into this category.

The 'regional novel', in the very nature of its setting, is often more of a story, less the propagation of an idea. Phyllis Bentley's *Inheritance*, for instance, is about the life and people of Yorkshire. Lettice Cooper's *National Provincial* centres round the political life of a provincial town. In both of these the background plays an important part, actually affecting the life and behaviour of the characters. An intense awareness of the country and knowledge of its problems is apparent in Naomi Mitchison's books about Scotland, and Kate O'Brien's about Ireland. Mary Webb's West Country novels have earned a unique place in the literature of this country. Margaret Mitchell's *Gone With the Wind* demonstrated once and for all the popularity of the American regional novel.

Perhaps it is strange that in one form of novel-writing, that of satire, women should prove to be so successful. It is the fashion to look upon women as sentimental creatures; and it is hard to believe that they are capable of laughing at themselves! In fact, they have done it with ever-increasing emphasis, since the early echo of Jane Austen's restrained chuckles until the present day. One has only to read Rose Macaulay's wicked and pointed commentaries, Winifred Holtby's pokes at our national snuggery or Stella Gibbons' back-to-earth novel to end all back-to-earth novels, *Cold Comfort Farm*, to realise how pointedly unsentimental women are!

It is also interesting to note the strong influence of the American writers on contemporary writing in this country. Significant, too, that many of these are exclusively short story writers, and this may reflect the increasing interest in the short story today. Kay Boyle, in both her novels and her short stories, has a style reminiscent in some ways of D. H. Lawrence. Her prose is very vital and alive, and once again subjective. Dorothy Parker's short stories are often satirical, pithy condemnations of her own class and sex. Eudora Welty, Katherine Ann Porter and Betty Brewer are becoming increasingly well known here.

During the 'thirties Malachi Whitaker and Helen Simpson, together with other writers mentioned earlier in this article, were most prominent as short story writers. Today, other authors are coming to the front and steadily increasing in importance. Anna Kavan, whose stories have lately appeared in magazines in England, has a style which is peculiarly her own, which makes everything she writes of refreshing interest. Elizabeth Berridge's stories have a quality, together with a growing sense of character and technique, which have caused the critics to single her out. Diana Gardner, nearly always sardonic and unpleasantly near the truth, may well become the Dorothy Parker of our country. Kate Roberts' stories about Wales, and written in Welsh, are about real, living, whole people. Dorothy Haynes' excursions in a macabre, strange world have a fascination of their own.

ETHEL MANNIN. *Started as stenographer in advertising agency at fifteen; author of* Children of the Earth, Confessions and Impressions, Privileged Spectator, *etc.*

In modern poetry a few women have become outstanding. Kathleen Raine, Ann Ridler and Ruth Pitter have all produced lovely and evocative poetry of the first rank. Lynette Roberts' experiments with new rythms have resulted in poems of melodic and nostalgic beauty. Morwenna Donnelly's long poem, *Beauty from Ashes*, won in 1943 the John Llewellyn prize for the best poem of the year.

Subjective writing seems specially suited to biography, particularly to personal reminiscence. Ethel Mannin's *Confessions and Impressions* and *Privileged Spectator* both take the reader into the writer's confidence in a disarmingly personal manner. For the same reason Vera Brittain's *Testament of Youth* and *Testament of Friendship* were also outstandingly successful. On the other hand, Helen Waddell, who is an objective writer of great intellectual ability, has written the biographical novel *Peter Abalard*. And Dilys Powell's biography of her husband, entitled *The Journey is Done*, is also written objectively.

Perhaps the objective woman writer comes really into her own in the mystery novel. Dorothy Sayers has set a high standard for the opposite sex. Agatha Christie, Margaret Cole, Margery Allingham, Ethel Lina White, Mary Roberts Rinehart and Josephine Bell, have each carved a particular niche for themselves in the literature of crime and deduction.

Finally, the war has been responsible for a specialised kind of writing, at which women have shown their particular aptitude, a style known as 'documentary'. There is a definite distinction to be made here between 'reporting' and 'documentary'. Reporting demands an objective approach; and the good reporter is often a male. But for a good documentary picture the subjective attitude is necessary. The best documentary writer is subjective when forging a bond between herself and the subject observed, and objective in recording it. Inez Holden's novel, *Nightshift*, is documentary in character. So, too, is Monica Dickens' autobiography, *One Pair of Feet*. *War Factory*, published by Mass-Observation, is the result of the research of a woman observer amongst people in a munitions factory. In this written report of the conversations of the women workers and observations upon their behaviour, they stand out as real people; and this scientific survey becomes as interesting to read as a novel. On a smaller scale, and from a different angle, is Amabel Williams-Ellis' pamphlet, *Women in War Factories*, written as a result of the author's visits to factories all over the country.

A survey of this kind can be little more than a catalogue of names, and no attempt has been made to be critical. But it is sufficient to show that the woman writer has a place of importance in the literature of today. A place that she holds in her own right, declining to become the imitator of the opposite sex. A place that it is to be hoped will one day be reflected in the larger society which composes the world.

POPULATION PROBLEMS IN A SHRINKING WORLD

E. A. GUTKIND, architect and planner. Author of *Creative Demobilisation*

ESTIMATES of the future population of the world show beyond doubt that the white races will decline in numbers if existing trends persist. On the other hand, we witness an increase of population in other parts of the world. The population of India, for instance, has increased at a rate of roughly 50 millions during the last decade. The population of China seems also to increase, in spite of the war, and social and economic upheavals. The same holds good for some African peoples, and even for some of the islands of the Pacific. Estimates have been made of the population which could be supported by the food production capacity of the world under present conditions and they arrive at figures between six and eight thousand millions. At present the world's population is something like two thousand millions; and its rate of yearly increase appears to be about eighteen millions. Consequently, there is no fear that the world as a whole will be in danger of overpopulation, even if the increase of population should proceed on a large scale and swiftly. Moreover, the influence of science on food production has not been taken into full account in the estimates mentioned above.

On the other hand, we have been presented with estimates of the population capacity for *individual countries*. It is here that the figures are open to an even more critical attitude. The figures for the settlement capacity of individual countries have been worked out either on the basis of their possible food production, or on the conclusions which can be drawn from the density of population and settlement in other countries with similar geographical conditions. Two criteria are obvious. The first is that food can be imported, and in this way the capacity of settlement be increased (e.g. Great Britain). The second criterion concerns the distribution of population and settlement which has served as a basis of calculation. A country is considered as overpopulated if the ratio of the whole population to the whole area of the state is high. But does this say anything as to the actual distribution of settlement? And does it exclude the possibility of an unfavourable distribution? Especially during the last decades, we have gained a better understanding of the problems of 'town and country planning'. And we know now that a redistribution of population, even in a so-called overpopulated country, can totally reverse the situation! It is suggested, therefore, that overpopulation does not exist—except in a few islands of the world, and that the standards which have been used to arrive at figures for the capacity of settlement in individual countries are out of date. It is obvious, of course, that all estimates of the capacity of settlement for the whole world should also be treated with great reserve, since they are based on similar assumptions. The difference is merely one of degree, as the margin between the existing and the potential population of the world as a whole is so enormous that it does not matter so much at the moment.

Unfortunately, the estimates for individual countries play a rôle which they do not deserve. If they are taken as a basis of important decisions, they may do great harm. On the one hand, these estimates are used as a proof that a country is 'overpopulated'—and that it needs more living space. The obvious examples are Germany and Italy. Both wanted a larger population within their boundaries, although they pretended that they were overpopulated. This larger population was needed to exert political pressure on other countries and to provide an excuse for expanding their territory. On the other hand, there are 'open spaces' capable of absorbing great numbers of people, such as Australia, Canada, and others. But these countries have opposed any attemps to fill up their open spaces for economic or other reasons.

Some figures may be of interest. The *minimum* potential population of Canada has been estimated as 48 millions; of Australia as 27 millions; of South Africa (including both Rhodesias) as 17 millions. But attempts have also been made to arrive at the *maximum* potential population for different countries, the sum total of which would give the world a population of 6·2 thousand millions. On this basis, Europe could support 570 millions; Asia 1·7 thousand millions; Africa 1·6 thousand millions; the Americas 2 thousand millions; not to mention other parts of the world. These figures appear fantastic. But they



Overcrowding is not only a town problem. This is one of the rural villages of China!

do give a certain idea of the potentialities of the individual continents, even though they are based on very generalised assumptions, and cannot be considered as anything like reliable. We cannot tell to what degree science will alter the face of the earth, and how social trends will change the structure of settlement, work and distribution. We do know, however, that the palaeotechnic methods of production which are still predominant will be superseded by more efficient ones, and will open up parts of the world which at present are considered inhospitable. The new Siberian town of Igarka lies over 60 miles to the north of the Arctic Circle and has its own vegetable supply. The wheatland of Canada has been extended by about 60 miles northward. There is the production of rubber in the U.S.A. with its reaction on Malaya—and all these enterprises are just a beginning. They more or less demonstrate the great changes which are possible. No country, however, can produce results without the co-operation of others. What we need, therefore, most urgently is a thorough knowledge of the potential development of all the countries of the world, of their settlement capacity, and, first of all, of their population problems in relation to these other factors. We need this knowledge for a sound international population, production and consumption policy, even if we aspire at the moment to cope only with short-term demands.

There exists in almost every country a considerable number of people who are convinced that everything would be all right if only the population of the world could be redistributed on a large scale, and the 'surplus' directed to the open spaces. They are afraid of 'overpopulation', and its alleged attendant symptoms of war, poverty, unemployment and generally insufficient living conditions. While they are right as regards the desirability of filling up thinly populated countries, they are wrong in their fear of 'overpopulation', and in their desire to shift people from one country to another. This fear of overpopulation is symptomatic of our present situation. It coincides with the breakdown of outworn social and economic systems all the world over. And it is the unconscious expression of an uncertainty which arises out of the fact that new values, and new ways and means to implement them, are only in the very first stage of emerging out of the spreading chaos. While about a century ago the general conviction was that population growth was indispensable for an expanding and dynamic economy, we have become very modest by now, and we believe

The Danger Spots of the World. There are five main regions where people are crowded—China and Japan's coastal belts; parts of India; Western Europe; and the North-East of the U.S.A. But are these countries overpopulated as a whole? No! They are not!

that population growth should be checked, especially in the orbit of Western Civilisation. Thus public opinion turns to the evils of 'overpopulation', forgetting the fact that population growth was, as long as it existed, an incentive of the first order to an increasing production, and the raising of the standard of living, whilst the checking of population growth during the last decades has not produced any relief in the economic field. This attitude is very typical of the human habit of looking for an explanation of self-produced difficulties in causes outside one's own sphere of responsibility. A scapegoat is needed. And it seems to offer itself in this case in the form of 'overpopulation' of one's own country. And in order to give it a proper justification, the underpopulated regions of other lands are a welcome excuse to divert attention from the need for putting one's own house in order. These regions require development and development requires more people; more people can be provided from the 'overpopulated' countries. Thus everything will be all right in the end, and those countries which provide the human material can pose as the benefactors of mankind. Is not all this dangerously akin to 'charity begins at home', and to an attitude which attempts to help others by first helping oneself? Is such a shifting of population from one country to another, from one continent to another, practicable in reality? Is it necessary? And, lastly, is it desirable?

Is it *possible*? Two main difficulties are obvious. They are the availability of a sufficient number of people who are *willing* to migrate and the readiness of the reception countries to accept immigrants. It is absurd to assume that the countries of the Western Civilisation can afford to give up substantial numbers of their population. Their birthrate will be falling in about one generation's time, if present trends persist. This would 'solve' their problem of 'overpopulation'. Incidentally, this bugbear of overpopulation haunts even countries which are very thinly populated, e.g. Canada. In such a case it is not spatial but 'economical conditioned overpopulation'. The possibilities of the countries of the Western Civilisation serving as an overflowing reservoir should be ruled out. The same holds good for the fantastic suggestion put forward recently that about 20 millions of the population of Britain should be sent overseas during the next two generations, in order to fill up the Anglo-Saxon stock in various parts of the Empire.

If the peoples of the Western Civilisation cannot provide any numbers worth mentioning, what can be done? The obvious alternative seems to be to turn to other groups, such as the peoples of East Asia and South Asia. But here



The potential capacity of the Continents. Europe and Eastern Asia are filled to capacity. Other parts of the world are potential 'reception areas' In each circle the black portion represents population, the remaining white portion shows additional potential population capacity

the argument gets confused. Why? Another set of emotional prejudices appears on the scene, foremost among them being the superiority complex of the White Man. As the colour bar excludes every other race (not only Negroes, but also two of the most highly cultured peoples of the world, the Indians and the Chinese), it is hard to imagine what can be done without a widespread epidemic of colour blindness. This is the more desirable, as it appears, unless all the signs are wrong, that the non-white races may erect a colour bar of their own after the war. Their nationalistic feelings will be screwed up to the highest pitch, and this state of mind is apt to lead to the most primitive 'retaliations'. Everything possible should be done to break down this barrier. Russia's example is a proof that it can be done. South Africa, which can easily support more people, has already a mixed population. And, in spite of opposition, and an inexcusable race policy, it should be possible to accept other than white people, and in this way to develop the country on more efficient lines. Australia has been much accused for its immigration policy. Although the white people seem to be quite adaptable to the hot climate of the North, Chinese and Indians would be a useful addition New Zealand, with its Maori population, which is increasing, will not be faced with this problem to the same degree. Canada is a difficult case. But its population growth is restricted, and its social and economic structure needs a re-adaptation to other conditions. Russia's Siberian spaces will probably be filled from her own resources, even after war losses. China's population has already infiltrated into Manchuria, in numbers which exceed 30 millions. The war migration from the East to the interior parts of the West will almost certainly have a permanent bearing on these parts—and beyond—on Inner Asia. Japan's population may cease to grow before it reaches 100 millions (according to Carr Saunders). Her problem might be solved by a certain amount of emigration to the South, and by an internal redistribution of population and settlement. These are only a few relevant remarks. The problem is of world-wide significance, and still needs much thorough research. In any case, we may safely assume that the sparsely populated countries cannot expect to receive from Europe and the U.S.A. sufficient numbers to contribute considerably to their own growth. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the U.S.A. itself is a sparsely-peopled country. A great part of the population is crowded together in the North-East. Other regions are only thinly settled. Although such planned enterprises as the Tennessee Valley Authority are taking people to hitherto neglected areas, we cannot predict with certainty how strong this trend towards the Middle States and the West may be.

We have put the question whether an interchange of population on an international scale

is possible. The previous remarks may give some indications of the inherent difficulties. As regards the technical side, we may refer to the exchange of population between Turkey and Greece, under the auspices of the League of Nations, after the last war. About one million and three quarters of both people were moved. And, as far as one can judge from official and unofficial reports, the results seem to justify expectations, although almost certainly many people had to undergo considerable temporary hardship. Other examples are the re-settlement of the Armenians, also after the last war, and also organised by the League of Nations; and on a smaller scale (only about 6,000 persons being involved) the re-settlement of the Assyrians from Iraq in Syria.

To sum up: while large-scale migrations are technically feasible, provided they are well prepared at both ends, it is difficult to suggest an efficient world-wide solution on such lines, taking into account the declining birthrate of the peoples of the Western Civilisation, and the unwillingness of the 'reception-countries' to accept others than whites. This, of course, applies to the present situation. There is hardly any chance that the trend of population growth among the white races will change to such a considerable degree that a surplus population would be available. But there may be a chance that race prejudices will disappear.

Is an international exchange of population *necessary*, in order to restore such a balance of the population of the world that the natural resources of the world may be fully employed? If we put the question in this way, the reply should consist in another question: what is meant by a balance of the world population? Is it really necessary to attempt a redistribution of many people in order to utilise the natural resources in the interest of the greatest numbers with the greatest efficiency? The case for an international re-settlement rests largely on two assumptions. The first is that certain parts of some countries are so densely populated that the resulting congestion impedes the full deployment of their social and economic forces. The other, the reverse side of the same picture, that in some countries the numbers of their inhabitants are so few that they cannot fully develop their socio-economic structure. Both assumptions are wrong if they are meant to predict future possibilities. They are only justified if they refer merely to the past and present. It is a misconception that densely populated districts are mostly industrial, whilst thinly populated districts are agricultural. For, although densely peopled areas include the region round New York, certain coastal plains of Japan, the Middle Belt of England and Belgium, they also include a great part of the coastal regions of China, the river valleys of India and parts of the Dutch East Indies. Thinly populated areas include South-Western Australia, France, European Russia and Argentina. It should be obvious, therefore, that both industrial and agricultural regions can be either densely or thinly populated, and that extreme cases of either possibility do not affect —with a few exceptions—the respective countries as a whole.

The existing distribution of population in individual countries is largely the result of palaeotechnic methods of production and use of natural resources. New technological trends will alter these methods. One of their foremost characteristics is that less people can produce more in a shorter time. If this is true, then two conclusions should be drawn. Regarding the densely populated parts, rationalisation of production and the use of electricity power will lead to a thinning out and a decentralisation of population and industry. As to the thinly populated regions, these trends will result in a gradually increasing, and thus improving, use of the natural resources by the relatively small number of their inhabitants. In both cases a better internal distribution will be the result, accompanied by a more efficient use of natural resources, and better methods of production. This will be the primary achievement. The secondary fruit—by no means a by-product—will be better living conditions as expressed in more security, healthier homes, more inspiring surroundings, and more leisure. All of them are incentives of the first order for an increasing birthrate.

Rationalisation of production affects industry as well as agriculture. While with regard to industry it leads to decentralisation, in respect of agriculture it will result in a concentration of rural settlement. In Canada and U.S.A., isolated farms and villages will disappear, while in China there will be a thinning out of the agricultural population. In any case, an *internal* redistribution of population and industry will take place, making an external influx on a large scale unnecessary. This is, of course, a long-term process. But a problem of such dimensions cannot, and should not, be conceived as a short-term policy.

There should, however, be no mistake as to the *desirability* of a free movement of population all the world over. The barrier of the entry *visa* must disappear. The meaning of frontiers must be reduced to a minimum. An intelligent

Is the small number of whites in Africa entitled to impose its interests on the large population of natives? Over 77% of the population of Africa is non self-governing



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migration policy can easily eliminate the drawbacks of confused population movements on a large scale, which are after all not too likely if the conditions at home improve. Quite apart from the impossibility of providing great numbers of people from the so-called overpopulated regions to move to countries which are thinly settled at the present (the alleged surplus does not in fact exist), there is no need for such a new great migration, if an internal redistribution of population and industry is carried through systematically, and on an accelerating scale. The balance of the world is disturbed, not because some parts have fewer inhabitants than others, but because the internal distribution of population in a great number of countries is still conditioned by a socio-economic structure which belongs to the past.

If an international redistribution of population in considerable numbers must be ruled out, the

problem arises how the internally changing structure of population and settlement should be made adaptable to the growing unification of the world. Up to the present, the interdependence of the individual countries was finding its expression in trade agreements which were expected, in the first instance, to regulate export and import and, only to a much lesser degree, to have some adjusting influence on production. Practically no consideration at all was given to the existing structure of settlement in any of these schemes. This is one of the main reasons why trade does not, and cannot, flow smoothly; why trade agreements land invariably in an *impasse* after some time, and, worse still, are superseded by economic and political pressure, emanating especially from those countries which complain of 'overpopulation'.

The raw materials needed for production are spread over the whole world. Large-scale industries and specialised goods require wide markets. The subtle adaptation of materials to function, and their great diversity needed even in the production of seemingly simple goods, make the location of industry more and more free. Ready access to raw materials is therefore an imperative necessity. The sources of raw materials are fixed. But where the materials are used in the production of producers' and consumers' goods does not matter a great deal. Consequently, there is no need to preserve the lop-sided economic structure of many countries, such as countries which are almost wholly agricultural (China), or rely on one crop only (Egypt), or are mainly industrial (Great Britain). Even if we assume that the unification of the world will proceed successfully, and exchange of raw materials and manufactured goods will meet no obstacles, there is no justification for expecting that the division of the world into the two categories of raw-material and manufacturing-countries will persist. The agricultural countries will gradually add industry to their structure, and the industrialised countries will have to adapt their industrial output to the changing situation which will result from the springing up of new industries in other parts of the world. Clinging to a distribution of settlement and industry which remains rigidly fixed to outworn systems of social and economic functions will produce disaster. The socio-economic changes, especially in those countries which are dependent mainly either on industry or on agriculture, must find their expression in a better balance between both, resulting in a new pattern of settlement.

What does this mean in practice? Two examples will make this clearer. If cotton goods were manufactured almost exclusively in those countries where they were consumed, many British workers would be thrown out of work. They would have nothing to fall back on. But if they lived in or near the countryside, they could have part-time work in industry and part-time in agriculture or horticulture. Or if the industrialisation of China proceeded as far as is compatible with efficiency in the form of small co-operative enterprises spread over the country, these co-operators could rely on their industrial as well as agricultural work. A far-sighted social and economic policy at home will have to take these trends into account. In the past it was possible to live in isolation. In the future integration and interdependence will be the dominant factors.

The Hot Springs Conference drew up a programme for post-war relief and agriculture, and UNRRA is considering settlement of refugees and rehabilitation. But bread and butter and homes are not sufficient to solve post-war problems. The work of UNRRA should include at least the investigation of the problems mentioned above.

We should give up toying with the idea of an international exchange of population in order to fill the 'open spaces', and to relieve population pressure on the overpopulated countries and regions. Instead, we should devote attention to a re-adaptation of the social and physical conditions in the individual countries. This will pave the way for a world-wide integration of those values and forces which centre round the social life of mankind. The idea of the individual sovereign state is disintegrating. Gradually the outlines of a world community of peoples are emerging. We must adapt ourselves to thinking on a large scale, and must invent methods of administering the world as one unit, without any discrimination between white and other races, between raw material countries and others, and between free and subject peoples.

Man is more important than the goods he produces. He cannot be shifted around like cattle. There is no nobler aim than to re-shape his environment in such a way that he can make full use of natural resources and of his own creative powers. Much too long have we been thinking in terms of quantity, and so-called common-sense realities. We must change this state of mind. *Quality* is more important than quantity, and possibility more than an alleged reality. We have all the means at our disposal to develop each individual country to its fullest capacity, and to make its inhabitants happy human beings.

WHAT DO WOMEN WANT?

PETA MAY

THE other day I was asked what appeared to be an easy question to answer. But when I tried to do so, I realised that it was too big, and by far too important to be dismissed in a few phrases. So I decided to study it awhile, in its many and varied aspects.

The question? Just this. 'What do women want when the war is over, and they are once again free to lead lives of their own choosing?'

First, I think, we must divide women into different categories and groups. Of these there are naturally many. So, to commence, let us deal with those who, having been enrolled into the different women's services, W.A.A.F.S., W.R.N.S., A.T.S., M.T.C., N.F.S., and so forth, are probably enjoying comradeship, and a certain kind of freedom, for the first time. The majority of the above, if unmarried, will no doubt find it irksome to return to their homes, *and parental authority*, even if of a limited kind! Many are handling their own money—and love affairs—for the first time. And, whether wisely or otherwise, they certainly *won't* want to go back to the dual control of parents.

During the war years these girls have been trained and directed to the nth degree of efficiency, and a knowledge of the team spirit, hitherto unparalleled in our youngsters; and I am sure they will never again be satisfied with small town habits and customs, as understood by our mothers' generation. On the other hand, they must be tired of being regimented; and the lack of privacy is certainly a trial to many of the more fastidious. A good few have crammed a great deal more travel and sightseeing into their war service than most British women get in a normal lifetime. Those who have 'got what it takes' have doubtless acquired for themselves such jobs as will enable them to satisfy their desires, and prove their capabilities. It is only natural that they should wish to continue as 'career women'—at any rate for a few more years, before settling down. The process of de-gilding some gingerbread is slower than others. But eventually the basic substance will show, and by that time these women should be able to form a balanced opinion as to what they really do want—and then go all out to get it.

With regard to married women, things are different. Many have given up home life and the company of husband and kids, while many have never even had the chance to sample these simple joys. Undoubtedly there will be large numbers in this category whose greatest wish will be to settle down, and pursue a wholesome family life, with its attendant amenities and pleasures. But not in Nissen huts! Nor even in outdated houses and flats! Never again will they be satisfied with homes containing all the usual labour-making abominations. They will certainly want (and almost certainly insist on getting) modern and properly constructed places, which contrive to combine the maximum of comfort with the minimum of effort: above all, central heat, refrigeration, and all those electric gadgets which do so much to lessen the daily chores of mistress and maid. And rightly so. If America can, and does, produce them *en masse*, why can't we? I believe that a great many married couples have suffered so much unhappiness through being parted that as a result they will appreciate home life as never before.

There must unfortunately always be a large percentage of divorces in wars. But, generally speaking, these men and women find their own level, and either sink or swim accordingly. Anyway they don't matter very much, and are not representative of the nation at large.

Many of our girls are marrying foreigners; and for them there can be 'little or no returning', since in most cases they will go far away to new and strange lands and customs. One can only hope that the future they envisage may in some measure be comparable with what they will find. Personally, *je m'en doute*!

Many women have taken over men's places in the entourage of politicians, and ministries, and 'a little knowledge' may have given them wrong ideas on which to base a happy family life. Most men may not prefer blondes. But they do *definitely* prefer their women folk to have less grey matter than themselves! Unfortunately, women who have sufficient intelligence to act down to having less than their lords and masters are rare. However, there are successful men with wives cut to this pattern . . . There is also four-leaved clover.

The majority (mostly middle-aged) of these women who have the brains, necessary knowledge of life, plus the great good luck to have

found their right niches in the various organisations now abounding, will seldom again be satisfied with the uneventful lives which, as the wives of country squires or prosperous business men, were, generally speaking, their lot. Rather will they wish to strike out in new ways on their own. In the post-war planning and peacetime re-construction there will be jobs in plenty to keep them occupied. And they will, without doubt, be a very great and very real asset in these affairs. But, and it is a very big but, being highly qualified to tackle difficult questions, they will insist on equality of pay, position, and responsibility, with their male co-workers. Or should I say competitors? Anyway, they have definitely earned their right to all these things, and proved their ability to obtain them.

Mr. Bevin's Young Ladies will probably mostly want to return to something akin to their pre-war occupations, because, while a few are happy, a great many don't like the idea of being 'directed', and, between ourselves, are very square pegs in very round holes.

Nurses, with few exceptions, will continue to nurse. Having once tasted the joy of giving so much to so many, they are not likely to be content with anything less, and this is one of the professions in which the results of one's labour are both cumulative and visible from the start.

On the other hand, domestic workers from the pre-war era will be extremely reluctant to return to 'service', and to my mind the only way to combat this prejudice is for mistresses to endeavour to be more tolerant and understanding of those little things which tend to disrupt the household peace. There is plenty to be said for both parties, and the sooner a system of good fellowship between employer and employee can be established, so much the better for all concerned. The days of 'do this, and do that' are definitely dodo-ish. And we must not expect to receive more than we are willing to give in any walk of life, be it in kind, or human kindness. This may sound like a fairy-tale, but it should be ultimately possible in a world based on justice, fellowship, and good neighbourliness. At any rate, it is surely worth a try-out.

And last, but certainly not least, what about those grand old girls, the over-fifties? They have probably suffered more changes through the war period than any others and in many cases it has given them a great stimulus. People who had grown a trifle weary and discontented with the routine of house and family came forward in their hundreds and did a sterling job. They are still to be found in most of the dull immobile posts, plodding along in their own unhurried way: dependable, brave, and uncomplaining, though often weary and discouraged, and I regret to say often unrecognised and unsung. To these women, then, I would remove my hat with a flourish. Having paid homage, I would pack them off back to their families and firesides, because I feel sure that it is just what they would prefer. They should feel that at last they have earned the right to peace and leisure, having doubtless acquired by dint of pure hard work and service a greater appreciation of just those things which in the peace era passed as ordinary and humdrum. These grand old girls will, in fact, go back to being just old girls. *And* they will like it!

To my mind, in a world of peace, there will still be a few things which must remain of paramount importance; and probably many other women feel as I do. Above all, I want simplicity of outlook. Let's cast away the ultra-artificiality of pre-war life, with its snobbism, and *ridiculous idea that money is the only medium to happiness*. Let's cut out the hideous mental and physical wear and tear of life as it is today.

Seeking Service! Women queuing to join the W.A.A.F.S.



On Service! Women salvage collectors advance

Most of us are doing far too much, and the result is bad. We all need breathing space to sort out our own reactions, and adjust our mental balance. Let us learn to be dependent on ourselves when necessary, but let us also acquire the grace to be thankful if we don't have to be!

I want facilities for pleasant intercourse with interesting people. Stimulating conversation, and opportunity to study and appreciate beauty in its many guises. Beauty, which, according to Charles Kingsley, is 'God's handwriting'. Time in which to bear children, and leisure to know the joy of bringing them up, both happily and wholesomely. A return to the days when Sunday was a day of rest and restrospect. I like to think of it as a sort of 'buffer' between the week's worries.

I want my own home, however modest; to know again the joy of having my own *lares et penates* around me. I want to entertain in the simple manner; to be able to serve my friends with properly roasted meats and lush green peas, new potatoes (not forgetting the mint) from my garden (need I add scraped, and *not* peeled). And to know again all the homey things, so long foregone.

Facilities for easy laundering, cleaning and shopping. Good transport at home, and more frequent services. At present, to board a bus or train in the metropolis is fraught with as much danger, and twice as many difficulties, as a voyage to the Far East. I want to return to taximen who accept a fare with alacrity, and a normal tip with pleasure. As a nation we need to travel, and I would welcome everything which would tend to make this easier.

I want freedom to spend my pennies as and when I wish to, and not only as directed by the Chancellor. After all, aren't they *my* pennies? Decouponage and decontrol of unnecessary items. A world where women can indulge their feminine longings; perfumed bath salts, silk stockings and 'sheers', with leisure for 'hair do's', manicures, and the hundred and one little 'isms' which go to make up at least a part of their lives, and without which they are not nearly so charming. Looking nice gives a woman a 100 per cent feeling of assurance. And a satisfied woman is usually a nice one, with potentialities for great good. I think all of us long for the days when pretty clothes will once more be the order of the day. When all is said and done, they are really the expression of our personality, and a little glamour goes a long way towards gladdening the heart, be it masculine or feminine.

I also want a saner world where women are recognised as intelligent folk, and useful, not necessarily on the equality of sex basis, but as home-makers, sometimes wage-earners, and all the time comforters.

I want to travel when the spirit moves me. To find sunshine and warmth, and to study further how the rest of the world lives and dies. To absorb beauty in these lands, and eventually, perhaps, to return home to my own small plot knowing that in my garden the same sweet-smelling lilac and stocks are coming to flower; that though the snow may lie thick on my orchard, spring will come again, and with it the budding blossoms. 'The sun, the wind and the heather . . and a Labrador dog at my heels.'

To know at last that sense of contentment and peace within the home which fulfilment of Nature around it brings to most of us. To ponder awhile on what it's all about. And when the end comes, I want some good friend, be it man or dog, to speed me peacefully on my way, leaving behind no tangled skeins, or hopeless mess, and so, to make a happy exit. Time waits on no man . . . and yet how much we waste!

THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS

THE TREND TO A GAGGED PRESS

ANOTHER notable sign of the times is the sudden and general disposition of the democracy to resort to the most familiar weapon of autocracy and of monarchy. France and Italy, scared by the Anarchist outrages, have been legislating in a fashion which would have delighted Castlereagh. The Anarchist Law of Repression, which last month passed the French Chamber, abolishes trial by jury whenever the prisoner is accused of Anarchist crimes, or 'of committing by any other means acts of Anarchist propaganda by extolling attacks on person or property.'

THE REALLY DANGEROUS CLASSES

IF Lord Salisbury wishes to protect England and Scotland from a dangerous incursion from foreign shores; if he wishes to prevent this island becoming the hatching house of desperate crimes, he had better give his Alien Bill a new direction. If he wishes to check revolution, and above all agrarian revolution, let him leave the Russian Jews alone, and see what he can do to shut out the American millionaire. If Lord Salisbury does not know the facts, his nephew, Mr. Balfour, a Scotchman, can tell him that Winans, the American, who has depopulated whole districts that he may have solitude for his deer, has done more to create revolutionary unrest through Crofterdom than all the agitators who tried to incite the Highlands to revolt.

THE HOMELESS WOMAN OF 1894

FROM some cause or other, into which we need not enter now, the very centre of home-life among the poor has received a shock from which it will never rally. The streets at night swarm with girls of fourteen or fifteen years of age, who either have no home to go to, or, if they have, won't enter it. So the doss-house girl—essentially a *fin de siècle* product—has her bed made for her, her floor scoured, her kitchen utensils provided. She never thinks of patching her clothes, but renews her raiment from the pop-shop. Domestic duties are unknown; the little unselfishnesses of family life never come in her way, and she grows up thriftless, improvident, defiant of authority, ignorant of the rights of property, bold, shameless, and unconcerned.

Mrs. Sparrow in the *New Review*

THE BEAUTY OF AMERICAN WOMEN

IT is now, fortunately, the fashion to allow girls to live in the open air, to play games which were formerly called hoidenish, to train themselves through gymnastics with scientific attention and regularity. They may take as much exercise as they like, and they can ride 'cross-country. The beauty of today does not tie her waist-belt five inches too tight; she needs all her muscles for lawn-tennis, and she does not overtax her spine. The doctors have cut off the heels of her slippers, and her pretty foot has its chance. We need to take no credit to ourselves for the beauty of our women. N. E. W. Sherwood in *Cosmopolitan*

A FRENCH WOMAN ON AMERICAN WOMEN

AT Chicago Madame Bentzon was, of course, warmly welcomed by the working philanthropists, artists, and literary women who do so much honour to America; but they were more or less astonished when she told them that she had never spoken in public in her life, and did not feel equal to take part in a Conference. She observes whimsically that they 'seemed as much grieved as were the Turkish ladies when they discovered that Lady Mary Wortley Montague was imprisoned in a corset, or as we ourselves might feel in watching the mutilated feet of a Chinese woman.' *Revue des Deux Mondes*

HOW THE MONOPOLIST HELPS THE ANARCHIST. *A Voice from the Deep: Press hard, and when your measure is full it is my turn.* From *Das Petroleum-Weltmonopol*

2

SCIENCE FRONT

THE USE OF WORDS

It is a great puzzle. When I speak, why do I make the particular noises I do to convey a given meaning; and why does a Japanese, for instance, make a different set of noises? It is unlikely that our ancestors in the remote past, on first learning how to speak, drew up a code of noises: it is much more probable that just as letters and writing grew out of simple pictures, so words grew out of something simpler—the noises in Nature, for instance. Sir Richard Paget in this country and Professor A. Johannesson of Iceland, to name two prominent speech investigators, hold the view that speaking is really a way of gesturing with the mouth. Words beginning with b, p, and other labials, involving a pushing out of the lips and blowing away of air, are very often words of parting or repulsion; there are some examples in this very sentence. Prof. Johannesson has analysed the various languages of the world to find a common basis, and he claims that all the noises made by man are reducible to no more than 2,200 common roots; of these, about 500 are onomatopoetic, drawn directly by imitation from natural sounds, the cooing of doves, the rustle of trees, the babble of brooks.

Given the starting of speech in this way, we can say rather more about the evolution of speech amongst different peoples, because some of this evolution has gone on within historic time. English contains many words donated by the Romans, and also has gifts from Anglo-Saxon, French, and other immigrants and invaders. Jesperson's work is very well known in this connection, as he traces the mutations of a word like the Graeco-Roman *pater*, through the German *vater*, the French *père*, and *padre*, *patrone*, *father*. The languages of Western Europe mostly belong to the Aryan group (a term originally used to signify a common linguistic and not a common racial heritage) within which evolution has been traced in great detail.

Another aspect of speech study has recently been opened up by Mr. Udney Yule, in a book just published. He has studied statistically the actual words used by a given writer, to discover the range of his vocabulary, and as regards nouns, how frequently the same words recur. Again, he has measured sentence lengths, and structure, and so is able to characterise a given writer's style in a completely objective manner—quite a new idea in literary criticism. This has already led to some interesting results. The *De Imitatione Christi* of St. Thomas à Kempis has sometimes been thought to have been written instead by Archbishop Gerson. By analysing Gerson's style in his definitely-known writings, Thomas à Kempis in his, and the style of the *De Imitatione*, the characteristics of vocabulary and sentence length can be compared, when it at once becomes clear that the book must have been by St. Thomas, since his style and that of the book are similar, and Gerson's style totally different. By analysing some of Macaulay's essays, the works of John Bunyan, and the Bible, the astonishing fact emerges that half of the nouns used occur only once in the whole book. This seems quite an argument for the use of Basic English. If the Gospel of St. John in Basic is compared with the Authorised Version, however, 25 per cent of the nouns used still occur only once in the whole book, although of course the total number is less. Since it may require twelve readings of a given word before its meaning sticks in the memory, the result is that even with Basic English, the speed of learning new vocabulary will not be great without extensive reading, because though the total vocabulary is much smaller, the frequency of occurrence of many words is still very low.

Analyses of this kind are performed by statistical sampling, and not of course by a total count, and therefore there are various errors to guard against, as Mr. Udney Yule points out. But the 'population' of words in a book is quite amenable to proper statistical treatment, and apparently has a random distribution—the nouns occur about as frequently as if the author had just written down at random any word that came into his head. This must mean that the statistical analysis is only a partial analysis: there is still room for extension and refinement to capture more of the characteristics of literary style. At the same time, the method is probably applicable to the analysis of music, and also to painting; it may be possible to characterise an artist not only in terms of the spectral hues he uses but also by the shapes in which he breaks up his canvas, and the most favourite positions for different colours. If this were done, anyone with the measurements in his head could tell a fake from a Rembrandt, and the eye of the connoisseur would be no longer required.

Verindal, poison dust, diffused from plane on to trees at Gadow in an attempt to exterminate plague of caterpillars

MORE LIGHT ON POTATOES

THE war has really brought the potato into its own. Chemists have analysed potatoes for vitamins, for protein (meat) value, for fats: and not only old potatoes but new potatoes; not one variety but hundreds; not only the potato as a whole, but the different parts of one—the core, the cortex, the section just under the skin which the cook always peels off. Physiologists have been busy too. How much potato can a rat stand? Will a young rat continue to grow on a potato diet? Pathologists have sought the reason why potatoes grown in England get persistently diseased, so that we have continually to import fresh seed potatoes from Scotland, where the potato remains healthy. Engineers have told us how to make a dehydrated powder of potatoes, which can be reconstituted with a little milk or water to give excellent mashed potatoes with no loss in food value. Most important of all, the botanists have asked themselves whether we are growing the best potato possible: they remember that most of the potatoes grown in Europe are from a rather chance selection brought back from America by Sir Walter Raleigh—some hundreds of years ago now. So they sent a special expedition to the ancestral home of the potato, in South America, where most of its relatives were also most likely to be, and they brought back samples of as many different kinds as possible. Some of them were funny-looking things, rather like battered sausages, with purple skins and green insides: real wild potatoes.

Many of them have now been studied at Cambridge, with a view to seeing whether it would be worth while to breed from any of them. The chemists have analysed them, the physiologists fed them, and the botanists have studied their agricultural properties; what sort of soil and weather suit them best; how much vegetative growth (leaves, etc.) does each plant produce; the time and quantity of flowering and seeding; the time of maturity; the degree of tuber production; the resistance to diseases, especially virus diseases: these are the kind of problems which interest the agricultural botanist. Many of the properties they investigate are inheritable in whole or in part, and can therefore be passed on by suitable cross-breeding, which can thus combine in one plant advantages possessed individually by three or four different varieties.

One property, in particular, on which they recently reported goes under the general heading of 'Vernalisation'. Quite a while ago the Russians discovered that the flowering and ripening times of cereals could be altered by giving the young seedlings an intensive period of light or heat treatment for some days. By applying this technique they were able to grow wheat further north than ever before. The short summer was no longer a bar, because pretreated wheat would ripen quicker. The same has recently been found to be a property of the rice plant. If 7-day seedlings of rice are given a six weeks' course of eight to ten hours daylight per day in the warmth, they grow up bigger and mature faster, even when the course is over, whereas under continuous illumination or the normal long summer day, and at low temperatures, their growth is slower and more prolonged. The controlling factor is exposure to short rhythmical periods of light.

In the case of the potato, 75 clones of 8 species of South American potatoes were compared, and the differences of reaction to light and heat were apparently inheritable. Some kinds gave no tubers if the plant was given long days of light, or if it was kept warm; other sorts were quite the reverse, and tuber-production benefited by just these conditions. It appears that the actual total light the potato seedling gets is more important than the lengths of 'day' it is split into; a different situation from the case of the cereals.

How light influences plants and plant growth not only at once but for months to come, is not known. The chemistry of the plant's internal workings is still almost completely unknown. So far it has defeated the biochemists and botanists. But that light does have an effect is a fact, and one already being put to useful work.

ORIGINAL VIEWS OF LONDON AS IT IS

THOMAS SHOTTER BOYS

REVIEWED BY CYRIL RAY

FOUR years ago I was bombed out of my rooms in No. 10 Nevill's Court, the seventeenth-century house with the lilac trees in the garden that hid behind the hoardings in Fetter Lane. I was bombed out of there into a modern block of what is known as 'luxury flats', in St. John's Wood—central heating, endless narrow corridors, a vast anonymous population, and a million wireless sets. We had uniformed porters, to modify a Thurber phrase, like some people have mice. I disliked the furnished flat I had there, its distance from Fleet Street, its expensively null furniture, its richly unimportant pictures, its temperature so perpetually July afternoon that you never knew whether to take an overcoat to see you through the morning's long journey on the 13 bus.

One thing alone charmed me. On a wall in the warm, noisy, yet claustral sitting-room was a print of Pall Mall, looking east, cool and airy, tinted in clear transparent washes, the sun catching the western wall of Barry's noble Reform Club. In the left foreground workmen were busy with ladders and scaffolding at a house, long since gone, on the north side of the street. The dashing open cabriolet driving towards you, the tall gas lamps, the dresses of the passers-by, all fixed the date as somewhere in the eighteen-forties. It was enchanting. In one corner was 'T. Shotter Boys del. et lith.'

There was an unusual sentimental compulsion, no doubt, that helped me to fall in love with that first of Boys's London prints I had come across. It was the autumn of 1940; the raids were at their fiercest and London was tumbling, or so it seemed, about my ears. Sure enough, there is a gaunt skeleton of a Carlton Club in Pall Mall now in place of the successor to the building in Boys's foreground. More than one of the buildings are gone now that had survived a century after Boys had sketched them for his series of London views.

London is still standing, though, and the prints still charm me. Can it be because planning is in the air, and because one of Boys's pictures gives you a glimpse of the Regent Street quadrant, another a view of St. Paul's, to remind you that there were Wren and Nash and that London should be worthy? But I don't know that Boys was much interested in planning, or would be now. He was an observer simply. Today, no doubt, he would carefully set down on the stone a picture of our Regent Street and make no comment. Which is one reason for being glad that he lived when he did, and another for being sorry that he did not take his sketching block and stool around Regent's Park. There is not as much of London's stucco as one could wish in *London As It Is*. Boys drew chiefly buildings that were already historic—the Abbey, the Tower, St. James's Palace—or important, or big, or fashionable. For grace he went to St. James's Park or to high fashion near Park Lane. There can have been little of the planner about Boys; or he would have been out, delighted, in Nash's terraces and crescents.

St. Dunstan's, Fleet Street

Perhaps when we have planned, and built to the best of our planning, I shall still be in love a little with Boys. London will be more different still from the one he drew, and his pictures to

that extent the more remote and charming. If I possess by then a copy of 'Piccadilly, looking East', I shall be able to look at the two little spherical free balloons in its clear summer sky—Boys saw London always under a clear summer sky, cool and as if just after rain—and remember that I met his pictures first when there were other balloons over London.

When, after a year's exile in St. John's Wood, I was back in civilisation and hunting about to furnish my new set of rooms, I began taxing the London Library, the printsellers, and my learned friends to tell me what they knew about Shotter Boys's prints. I found that it was in 1843, according to the Dictionary of National Biography—in 1842, the better authorities have it—that Shotter Boys published his *Original Views of London As It Is*: twenty-six lithographs of London, from Greenwich to Hyde Park Corner, in a large folio volume with an orotund text (and a French version of it) by Charles Ollier. There were the usual coincidences, of course. Never having heard of Shotter Boys till I discovered him for myself in my incidental rooms, I soon found London prints of his hanging in a pub off Bond Street, and set in a wall panel in a teashop-sandwich-bar in Lower Regent Street. There was one in a dark corner of my editor's room. Every book on London I picked up reproduced a scene by Shotter Boys—Thomas Burke's on the *Streets of London*, Beresford Chancellor's on the West End. A colleague I had spoken to every day for four years knew all about Shotter Boys, and did not quite succeed in hiding his surprise at my ignorance.

I like to think now that I know much about Boys, and largely from owning and studying some of his prints, but I am not the writer, nor is this the occasion, to write about Boys's importance simply as an artist, or about the æsthetic qualities of his water-colours, some of which have been sold recently as Boningtons, many of which hang in their own right beside Bonington's and Samuel Prout's and David Roberts's in current exhibitions, and fetch their forty guineas or so apiece. They are represented, I think, in the Victoria and Albert, the British Museum, and at one time, at any rate, they were better represented still in the Musée Carnavalet in Paris. It is as a draughtsman and lithographer, as an observer and recorder of the London scene, that Boys finds his place here. The London book was published for four guineas plain, rather more for the sets coloured by hand. It is unobtainable now except occasionally in the saleroom, where the coloured set will fetch a couple of hundred pounds or so. The dealers buy it when they can lay their hands on it, break it up and sell the plates framed or for framing. These, the coloured ones, could be had for half-a-guinea or thereabouts in the last war; they were going for five or six guineas each, according to Beresford Chancellor, in the nineteen-twenties, and now fetch seven to ten. A Bond Street dealer tells me that there are more now in the United States than in this country; a Bristol print seller bought up as many as he could when the war broke out and exported them in the expectation—I cannot say the hope—that London would be bombed and that he would profit by his enterprise from the sentimental Americans.

Nobody I have met has ever seen the uncoloured plates, though more were published originally than of the coloured ones. There is every reason to suspect that most of them are coloured by now. An original folio of the uncoloured plates could he had for £2. 10s. in 1912; by 1926 it was worth about £40. The black-and-white plates were on paper, the coloured on thin card; I have seen one plate on paper, but coloured, the quality of its tints proving conclusively that they had been applied over blacks and whites and greys that had been meant to remain black and white and grey. There are many such on sale for the unwary.

But there is nothing muddy about the real things. Not that all the twenty-six plates are equally successful. The three shallow horizontal ones of the river are weak; the scale of the buildings is too small, and the water unconvincing. The picture of the west end of Westminster Abbey is both careful and bold but, like that of the Bank and that of St. James's Palace, it is too exclusively architectural. These pictures are accurate—Boys, as Hugh Stokes has pointed out, is 'a draughtsman of the highest order. Architecturally he leaves nothing to question.' But they lack the rural charm of 'London from Greenwich', the fairy-tale grace of the St. James's Park pictures, the lively crowds of 'Hyde Park from Grosvenor Gate' and the Regent Street pictures. All of them, though—the genuine hand-tinted ones—are fresh and clear in colour, thanks to light unexaggerated washes, the people in them as gay, James Bone says, as gardenias.

There are no better illustrations, few as good, of the London of young Victoria, of d'Orsay and Blessington, its ladies' dresses, its dandies' fancy waistcoats, its tilburies, cabriolets, and horse omnibuses, the buildings that are still with us and those that have yielded to the housebreaker or the bomb. Hugh Stokes prefers the series of plates that Boys had done earlier of

The Club Houses, Pall Mall

Paris, but I am with Chancellor in the matter. (Much of what I know of Boys and his work comes from Beresford Chancellor's charming and now scarce re-issue of Boys's *London As It Is*, published by the Architectural Press in 1926). Stokes finds the Paris views more 'sympathetic'; nothing, surely, could be more so than the London pieces. All that the London plates lack, compared with the earlier set, is technical interest; the Paris set was colour-printed, 'the parent work of chromo-lithography', Boys's own invention. To set against that is the story that Boys himself coloured by hand thirty of the London sets, and that he introduced a tiny touch of clear jade green—as Bonington loved a touch of red—into each picture that came under his own brush. There is no warrant for the story of which I know, but I cherish it if only because each of the three prints I possess has its touch of clear jade green; a lady's veil in the picture of Hyde Park from Grosvenor Gate, a cart-wheel in the picture of Fleet Street, a coachman's coat in that of Charing Cross.

Not only is there no warrant for that story, but there is a sound argument against it which I prefer to ignore. But there is one charming idiosyncrasy of the artist that stands in many of the plates for all to see—his delight in introducing his own name or initials into his picture. An urchin scribbles it, with the title of the book, on the wall of the Temple church in the picture that forms the book's title-page; it is on a hoarding in the Mansion House picture, on the base of King Charles's statue by Charing Cross, on a cart in the picture of Fleet Street. In the picture of the Tower and the Mint there is a top-hatted artist at work that ought by rights to be a portrait by Boys of his own back view.

It is agreeable to have some sort of glimpse, if only of what we think may be his back, if only of his quirks. There is not much else we know of him save dates and places, and he was forgotten in his own lifetime. He was born in Pentonville, in 1803, when that London suburb was a place of 'deep green lanes, richly hedged and studded with flowers'; was apprenticed and educated as an engraver and illustrator, and in 1825 was in Paris, a friend and possibly a pupil (although he was much the same age) of Bonington. It was in the 'twenties and 'thirties and 'forties of the century that Boys was successful, well-known, perhaps even prosperous. It was not till 1874 that he died, forgotten, paralysed, eccentric they say, estranged from his wife, with no relative to sign the death register, no friendly art critic to remember him in an obituary notice for any one of the art magazines of the self-conscious eighteen-seventies. He died in St. John's Wood, round the corner from the block of flats in which I first met, and was charmed by, one of his London prints.

NEW BOOKS

FAITH, REASON AND CIVILISATION

By Harold J. Laski. *Gollancz*. 6s.

An essay in historical analysis attempting to prove that Socialism, as a faith to enrich and bring hope to ordinary men and women, is the worthy and superior successor to Christianity. Not that Mr. Laski denies the validity of religious revelation. He merely asserts that for ordinary people 'adequate external circumstances are likely to mean adequate internal fulfilment'—which seems to me a depressing view of human possibilities. And of course he represents the history of institutionalised Christianity, especially Roman Catholicism, as a fairly constant attempt, in the interests of the ruling classes, to bamboozle the masses with hopes of salvation in the next world as compensation for their privations on earth. The theme is developed with great erudition and zeal, and it contains much that is true and valuable. But he neglects the transcendental quality of religion because he neglects the unfathomable quality of man, which, I think, leads him to minimise the social value of mystical experience, even though it cannot be shared by the many. He expects more of science than many a scientist. T. S. Eliot is harried unmercifully, being charged with 'intellectual treason' for alleged 'contempt for the masses'; Aldous Huxley's thought is distorted beyond recognition; and, of course, he reviews the ideas of Christopher Dawson, the Catholic historian, with deep distrust, chiefly because he wants to know for *whose* benefit a return to the unity of Christian civilisation would operate. This is a significant book. It shows the dangers inherent in a way of thought from which the world, and especially the common man, has much to gain.

JAMES EASTWOOD

THOUGHTS ON WAR

By Captain Liddell Hart. *Faber & Faber*. 15s.

If questions of strategy can be clarified by a collection of military aphorisms, an exercise of this kind by so experienced a military writer and critic as Captain Liddell Hart may be enlightening, especially to the lay reader, whose interest may be maintained more easily by flashes than by sustained elucidation. The military student on the other hand, may find *Thoughts on War*, even with its careful grouping of subjects, too much interrupted by these vague signposts to military science.

Captain Liddell Hart explains that the origin of the book is a remark made to him earlier during this war by Captain Cyril Falls, the *Times* military critic.

Perhaps the book's most valuable contribution to our understanding is the precise definition of the aim of the strategists: 'Where the strategist is empowered to seek a military decision, his responsibility is to seek it under the most advantageous circumstances in order to produce the most profitable result. *Hence his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this.*' (Author's italics). What a warning against impatient criticism by the newspaper reader, who resents, above all, apparent inactivity in the field! Witness the long waiting (by the public) for the fighting in Africa, in Italy, and then for the Second Front. (Perhaps even more such intervals before this complex war is ended.)

In a time of frequent fundamental changes in military concepts, the author has been able to collect a rich store of illuminating examples of which his wide knowledge of military history enables him to recognise the significance. They may lead us to study certain campaigns which will do more for us than any abstract principle.

The book will certainly have permanent value for reference. Dividing the volume into three parts, the author deals first with 'Elements of War' which has the following preamble:

'The history of mankind is the history of thought—of the gradual ascendency of mind over matter: subjugation of brute force, and at present even from brute force, can never be a fully intelligent practice.'

Here the author, of course, leaves his unavoidably limited sphere for that of philosophy, which gives him the opportunity to deny the justification of war *eo ipso*.

The second part deals with the 'Conduct of War', in which the author passes from 'Grand Strategy' to 'Economy of Force' and 'Command in War'. The influences of mechanisation have been poured into a new form and now appear as aphorisms, disjointed, but true enough, if sometimes a little obvious. For example, 'Command of the Sea' has become like a constitutional monarchy—subject to important limitations. But this epigrammatic method may be misleading if taken too seriously. To say that 'the supremacy

of the sea, like constitutional monarchy is subject to severe limitations' is amusing for a moment, but the analogy soon breaks down. In constitutional monarchy the governing factor is the constitution, or the 'imitation' itself, but the supremacy of the sea, though changing, disputed and qualified, may be decisive. An aphorism, indeed, will soothe the mind like a miniature with the impression that we are encompassing a great matter at a glance, but it has only the same relation to the truth as a game has to life.

In the third part, which is devoted to 'Conduct of Military Operations', Captain Liddell Hart clearly expounds recent changes in tactics under headings like 'Use of Manœuvre', 'The Use of Obscurity', 'The Approach'. To these vital aspects of war his reflections give fresh meaning.

The author has surpassed the high record of his previous publications. *Thoughts on War*, together with the publications of Captain Cyril Falls (*Ordeal by Battle* and *The Nature of Modern Warfare*), are conspicuous even among all the admirable military treatises which have appeared in this country since the outbreak of this war and which supply what was earlier a considerable lack in abstract strategical treatises in Britain. The gap is being speedily filled.

W. E. HART

WILLIAM THE SILENT

By C. V. Wedgwood. *Cape*. 18s.

The reader will find himself at times wishing that the historian's curiosity about the stalwart defenders of democracy had set Miss Wedgwood to digging up evidence in quite a different century. Then, no doubt, we should see that she is capable of viewing history with some levity, a sense of humour, completely missing from the present work. Yet it remains to be seen whether the author will ever regard history as anything other than a solemn, fussy, academic business.

As it now stands, academicians or maybe those who work or play at the pleasant pastime of burrowing in old tomes and crusty parchments, who prefer piquant sauces and savouries to red-blooded meats in their reading as well as on their dinner table, will revel in this scholarly biography. If it lacks the colour, virtuosity, great depth of emotion or sympathy which made Garrett Mattingly's *Catherine of Aragon* such a brilliant success, the book tries to make up for it in its dignity, its accurate but unobtrusive statement of the plain facts for which one rarely looks, unless, perhaps, in the impersonal pages of the encyclopædia.

William the Silent was born on Thursday, 24 April 1533, on the modest but cosy estate of his parents, the Count and Countess of Nassau-Dillenburg, in Germany. In this pious, simple, healthy Lutheran atmosphere of schoolroom, common sense, ponies and dogs, William grew up with his sixteen brothers and sisters. He gave up this rustic backwater existence at the tender age of eleven years when he fell heir to the rich estates of the Prince of Orange. From then on his career was one series of extraordinary changes after another; startling transitions from country cousin to dashing courtier and elegant young man of the world; from minion of Emperor Charles the Fifth to one of the most admired and astute politicians of his day championing the rebellious hordes against the dynasty.

We ask ourselves how William, very much at home in the midst of all his worldly splendour, could have devoted himself so unselfishly to the people's cause. We find our best answer in the fact that William the Silent was trained to be a a man of action rather than words. The early moulding of his character during those childhood years in a Lutheran household was to prepare him for the stupendous, exacting tasks ahead. He had a moral sense of right and wrong which he did not learn at Court in Brussels. A stubborn nature, along with his being a fatalist, enabled him to wage ceaseless war against Spanish tyranny, to keep both the Catholic and Calvinist factions in the Netherlands comparatively happy and, in the end, to face a violent death for a cause which was not to bring in dividends until a century later, or not until the Holland of the future was finally established.

Power-politics, as we know the game to have been played so ruthlessly in the past by Elizabeth, Cromwell and Napoleon, hardly enters into the picture at all. The author clearly loves her subject.

A man endowed with so many potential claims toward greatness as William the Silent should have been brought more vividly to life for us, and if not him, then certainly the turbulent age in which he lived. It is interesting to read about the struggles, beliefs and desires of men and women faced over four centuries ago with the same problems confronting us today, but the reader would also like to see, to be able to feel the rich sense of alive, swarming humanity; the smells, the sounds, the loud vulgarity, even the coarseness, which leaps out at us, say, from a Breughel canvas and is sure to exist wherever the masses are being depicted.

RICHARD McLAUGHLIN

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MAISKY

By George Bilainkin. *Allen & Unwin.* 15s.

SURVEY OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

By B. H. Sumner. *Duckworth.* 16s.

Biography is a difficult art. An author who attempts it should be sure that he possesses the capacity to make a man live; when you have finished a biography, you should have the feeling of having met the man whom it sets out to describe.

Mr. Bilainkin's *Maisky* did not give me this feeling. There were copious quotations from the Ambassador's speeches—many of them very wise and penetrating speeches. The author lavished upon him a wealth of approving epithets. Yet, after reading Mr. Bilainkin's book, I do not have the feeling that he has made M. Maisky come alive for me.

Indeed, it can hardly be said that this book is primarily about Maisky. It is rather an account of Anglo-Soviet relations. This account is overburdened with a welter of quotations from the press: two, three or four to a page. You picture the author diligently at work with his scissors and his pot of paste. From time to time, by way of relieving the dreary flow of press extracts, there is a patch of 'bright' writing; 'In Macdonald's flat in Lincoln's Inn, progressives from all the world gathered—for talk, tea, talk, cakes and talk.' New characters are introduced with their appropriate epithet, after the manner of *Time*, 'happily smiling Mrs. Winston Churchill', 'surprised Mr. Butler', and so forth. Even more distressing, however, is Mr. Bilainkin's capacity for seeing history exclusively in terms of black and white. Throughout, Soviet Russia is shown as wholly blameless, devoid of original sin. Every misunderstanding is laid solely at the door of the British Government. The errors of British diplomacy and the prejudice against Soviet Russia during the inter-war years must be plain to every objective observer, and Mr. Bilainkin would have made his point far more effectively if he had not couched his book in so censorious and carping a vein.

By contrast, Mr. Sumner's *Survey of Russian History* is the work of a scholar who sets himself a very high level of objectivity. For that reason, people who like to see things in black-and-white terms will not like Mr. Sumner's book. For it is not an eulogy, but an attempt to present facts and interpret them fairly, and in their historical setting.

The author writes his history backwards, that is to say, he starts with the present, analyses it, and then shows the causes which led up to it. Personally, I prefer this approach to the strict chronological sequence.

Perhaps the most important lesson of this book is that Soviet Russia, as it exists today, is quite as much the product of Russian history as of a Communist theory which originated, in the main, outside Russia. As Mr. Sumner puts it, the contrast between the new and the old Russia could not be greater; and yet there are certain very general features which are common to the Soviet and the Tsarist régime; amongst them the great concentration of power, the extreme range of state action, massive bureaucracy, extreme emphasis upon the army and the semi-deification of the leader or sovereign. Mr. Sumner avoids the error, common to so many superficial students of Soviet Russia, of seeking to interpret the Soviet Union without giving due weight to the Russia from which the present régime had its origin.

PETER MATTHEWS

THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FUTURE

By L. S. Amery. *Oxford University Press.* 6s.

A collection of speeches and articles that gives a fair sketch of the Britain and her place in the world as desired by some sections of the Conservative Party. Briefly, it is a Britain distinguished by 'national unity', citizen service, private enterprise accepting state direction on broad principles of policy, social security, and, above all, equal membership, but with due regard to her motherhood, of the Commonwealth.

A persuasive statement of the view, now increasingly ventilated, especially by those in sympathy with the tendencies of *The Times*, that Britain, to maintain her position as a great power after the war, must stress the Imperial connection, excel by the quality of her people and her products, and in doing these things acquire something in the nature of an ideology, or, if you prefer, a faith. The source of this faith seems to be a sort of inter-imperial nationalism. Whether such a policy may lead to the formation of huge overtly hostile and perhaps mutually exclusive areas—despite good intentions—is debatable, and needs debating. Significantly, Mr. Amery seems to think in such terms as 'patriotism' and 'national unity' which, in their context, suggest no great faith in international organisation. Then, too, his attitude towards Europe is strangely negative.

JAMES EASTWOOD

A Government office in Gydnia

From *Poland's Progress*, 1919–1939. Edited by Michael Murray. *John Murray*. 10s. 6d.

WOMAN IN ART

By Helen Rosenau. *Isomorph*. 5s.

THIS book in words and in pictures shows the position of women in society in the different stages of history, and the changes from matriarchal tendencies to marriage in its various phases, leading finally to the fusion of the concepts of love and marriage.

The beginning of the nineteenth century brought to the English artist the idea of intellectual companionship between the sexes as typified by the Brownings, and to the French that of erotic realism. In the twentieth century, revolution developed two outlooks among Russian women, that of Lenin's wife sacrificing her own independence to be wife in a traditional manner, and that of Alexandra Kallontai who professed free love.

Dr. Rosenau tells us of the achievements of many well-known women in different creative fields, and discusses the combination of motherhood with a public and a creative career.

Woman in Art is the forerunner of a series of monographs on science, sociology and art. It is a well documented review of the different concepts of womanhood through the ages, though nothing new is brought out. The points are vividly conveyed by the illustrations. The effort to assist the eye by an unusual form of lay-out leads to an overcrowding of some pages, and bad spacing in others. However, the illustrations, which range from the palaeolithic to the modern abstract, retain their interest and are the main attraction of the book.

J. M. ORDEIG

THE CRAFT OF COMEDY

By Athene Seyler and Stephen Haggard. *Muller*. 5s.

FOR any youngster fondling the idea of a stage career, here are eighty pages of fascinating and profound counsel. But for every one such aspirant there must be thousands of playgoers, and surely a number of these take an intelligent interest in the art of acting. So to these members of the audience, also, I recommend this book, knowing that its perusal will enhance their appreciation and heighten their pleasure.

The book is a series of letters exchanged between that great comedy actress, Miss Athene Seyler, and that charming and talented young actor-writer, Stephen Haggard. The news of his death on active service in Egypt reached Miss Seyler with the first specimen pages. Anyone who experienced the delight of seeing Haggard on the stage (for example, in *The Black Eye*) or who read his promising first novel, *Nya*, will understand the loss to theatre and literature which this news signified.

The purpose of their correspondence arose from the fact that Haggard was anxious to help a friend, a young bank clerk, improve the technique of his playing at his amateur dramatic society. Miss Seyler is the fountain-head of advice while Haggard, acting as an intermediary, plies Miss Seyler with problems and their pupil with precepts. In his liaison rôle, Haggard uses his own stage experience and gifts, and by this means enriches Miss Seyler's teaching.

The authors agree on the three principles of comedy acting as being: distortion, contrast, surprise. But, as Miss Seyler writes, 'All these things are only relative to something else: the truth. So that you must first see the truth of a character before you can upset its balance.' In a later letter, she classifies dramatic expression into three categories: 'Firstly, poetry; secondly, straight drama and comedy; thirdly, artificial or high comedy'.

Many of the techniques used by players to achieve comedic effects are explained. Miss Seyler, writing of one which is called on the films 'the double take 'em', says: 'Suppose one character accuses another of doing something, the accused can agree absent-mindedly with the accusation in his thought for a fraction of a second and then, realising its full import, deny it with sudden force . . . it's a favourite low comedy trick but, like adversity, can be charming if sweetly used.' Haggard reveals one of his earliest discoveries, that comedy often arises out of what he calls 'anti-modal'

actions or remarks: 'that is to say, that although an actor is sunk in one particular mood, he suddenly says or does something which calls up a totally different one . . . as, for example, in that film of Deanna Durbin's, where she asks her young engineer boy friend, just after he first kisses her, "What *is* a Diesel?" '

Detailed analyses of scenes from such classics as Congreve's *Love for Love*, Schnitzler's *The Wedding Morning*, and Wilde's *The Importance of Being Earnest*, give practical illustration to the author's instructions.

PETER CROMWELL

RE-SHAPING MAN'S HERITAGE

Allen & Unwin. 5s.

This collection of essays, introduced by H. G. Wells, sets out to prove that (as Mr. Julian Huxley says in his epilogue) 'the advance of Science has made it possible, granted a certain re-organisation of our economic and financial system, for everyone in a country like ours to have enough for health and a reasonable standard of security and decent living.'

The eminent scientists who contribute the twelve essays which fill its ninety-five pages have many interesting things to say, though they do not always say them well. In their effort to talk down to us, they evolve prose like this: 'We are nowhere near over-production in the literal sense either here or in America or anywhere else'; they use words like 're-infestation', and tell us 'to get together and have some mutual system of rat control!'

But the book is full of stimulating information. It is certainly news that in Britain 'each ship is inspected as it comes into port, rats taken off and those rats examined for plague'; that Keens, an Isleworth gardener, made the first strawberry (as we know strawberries) in 1806 by crossing a big purple species from Chile with the small red European species (wild strawberry); that 'a Jersey cow is as artificial as a cream separator'; that 'there are often 300 rats in our corn stacks, equivalent to a middle-sized bear living in the stack and eating the corn; and that sheep have been artificially made to breed twice instead of once a year!' This and much else is marshalled to show how much man might accomplish to improve his condition, and indeed the fact cited in the book, that our health is better in war than in peace, has proved the case already.

Re-shaping Man's Heritage provides a fascinating and encouraging hour's reading, and it is a valuable reference book as well.

GEORGE EDINGER

PREVIEW OF HISTORY

By Raymond Gram Swing. *Macdonald.* 10s. 6d.

This book should not disappoint those who have followed Raymond Gram Swing's war commentaries over the air with unflagging interest; nor will it fail, for that matter, to satisfy anyone who wishes to get a first-hand picture of current affairs. It represents the best of this popular commentator's material, edited from his numerous broadcasts, articles and lectures. Much of the contents may appear old; but from the viewpoint of a sane re-examination of events leading up to and during our global war, we could not ask for a better balanced or more intelligent analysis of political and economic causes behind the present world disorder. Mr. Swing can usually be relied on never to spread alarm unnecessarily. We can depend on him to offer scarcely ever a hasty opinion about the developments of the war for either side. His remarkable discrimination when it comes to judging between the humbug and *bona fide* is most commendable in a news forecaster nowadays. It may be the reason for Swing's equally wide popularity here and in the States. His informal, easy method of presentation, the absence of theatricals from his news broadcasts are a welcome relief to those of us tired of radio's constant blare. Few of Swing's fellow commentators have his knowledge of the complex international framework or his previous practical experience and thorough familiarity with Europe's political and economical background. A cursory review of their commentaries in print would only send us flying to the more reliable, less spectacular, war-reporting found in the present volume.

RICHARD McLAUGHLIN

'I want a murder mystery—but no butlers'

S. R. I.

YUGOSLAVIA

By R. D. Hogg. *Macdonald.* 5s.

In his philosophic preface to this interesting little book, M. Grol, a former Foreign Secretary of Yugoslavia, prepares the reader for the tangled story which Mr. Hogg does his best, and quite effectively, to lay before us. It may be doubted whether Solomon himself would have been wise enough to prevent the Yugoslav ship from foundering on one of the many rocks that awaited it. And here we are shown that King Alexander, with all his good intentions, was by no means a Solomon, while his successor, Prince Paul, was a ruler of whom the least said the better. My friend Raditch, the Croat Peasant leader, was too emotional and impulsive for his erudition to be profitably applied to the task of a closer understanding between Croat and Serb. Mr. Hogg regrets that London and Paris avoided every kind of contact with members of the Opposition, but one of our Envoys, Sir Howard Kennard, was more far-seeing; he asked me to bring Raditch to the Legation and during a couple of hours we listened to a Niagara of wisdom and humour which afterwards found its way to the Foreign Office. To stitch together the various component parts of Yugoslavia with their very different problems was a terrible enterprise and it was not surprising that it was not completed.

HENRY BAERLEIN

WILD FLOWERS IN BRITAIN

By Geoffrey Grigson

Collins' 'Britain in Pictures' Series. 4s. 6d.

In this small island of ours there are, it is estimated, roughly 4,500 species of plants, ranging from Alpine types to types which belong to the warm Mediterranean coasts. Mr. Grigson had, therefore, no easy task in attempting a brief survey of our wild flowers; but, being a happy combination of amateur botanist and poet, he has tackled it in an individual way and produced a most delightful essay. He believes that the attraction of any plant is, and ought to be, increased by any curious fact about it, so there are strange and curious facts here a-plenty. For instance: 'when the Linnaean collections were being photographed at the beginning of the war, the photographer was stung by a nettle which Linnaeus had dried two hundred years ago.' Mr. Grigson tells some interesting stories about the introduction into Britain of many plants now regarded as natives; and he shows the debt we owe to the sixteenth century, in particular, for the delicious names of a great number of our wild flowers—names that are poems in themselves.

The illustrations are very happily chosen and worthily support the text.

R. MILES

LATEST FROM U.S.A.

ISOLATION DEAD

A significant fact about America's Wartime Election is that already the rôle the United States is to play in re-shaping the post-war world has ceased to be a matter of political controversy. The future of international collective security has been thoroughly discussed in Congress and the press. *Public agreement that there must be no return to Isolationism has been unmistakable.* And so with this firm foundation to build on, Roosevelt has been able to produce American proposals for a new League of Nations which have been accepted by leaders of both the Republican and the Democratic parties. This remarkable measure of agreement has been achieved on what only a few years ago was regarded as one of the most difficult and explosive issues of American politics. The contrast between the present state of affairs and the bitter cleavage of opinion which was produced by President Wilson's League proposals in 1919 is striking. Since both major parties are also agreed upon the necessity of prosecuting the war until complete victory, it is clear enough that neither war nor peace can be a matter for conflict in the coming Elections. The issues that will be debated most vigorously will concern the administration of the Home Front during the war and the course to be pursued within the United States after the war.

After Nominating Conventions are over, there will be three months of intensive campaigning, and in the first week of November, the American electors will go to the polls. There are many imponderables. In the first place, the state of war itself is certain to exert a major influence upon voting. In the second place, nobody is quite sure yet what will be the effect of the great changes in status and whereabouts of large sections of the population. Something like 12,000,000 men and women will be in the armed services of the United States, at home or abroad. They'll all be given the opportunity to vote. There is wide belief they'll tend to favour the re-election of Roosevelt. Finally, there is the prospect that women will exercise more influence on the result than ever before.

FITZGERALD, New York
Exclusive Cable to *World Review*

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NOW READY

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LH/6/1

BURNS OATES

RESULT OF PLANNING COMPETITION

In our May number we offered prizes for planning suggestions sent to the Editor. This competition is now closed. A guinea prize has been awarded to the six best entrants:

Miss Emma Ali, Norwich
Mr John Shatwell, Holcombe Brook
Mr. W. Johnson, Brackley
Mr. J. Nussbaum, Leeds
Miss Nora Strachan, London, S.E.1
Mrs. Mabel Harding, Swindon

We publish below five interesting queries sent in, with their answers.

'SIZE-OF-FAMILY' HOUSES?

Would it be a practical proposition to build houses of different capacity with the object of letting them on a 'size-of-family' rota? For instance, an elderly couple is left in a large house after their children have grown up and left home. Under the proposed plan they would be compelled to leave the house for a much smaller house and a younger couple with a growing family would take possession. Wouldn't such a plan go a long way towards solving the habitation problem?—B.A.

It is not everybody who likes moving each time his family is enlarged or becomes diminished. Modern methods of prefabrication would make it possible to design houses in such a way that temporary rooms could be added and taken away again if later they were not required. The flexible house or the flexible family size would help to provide a solution to many of the present problems.

PUBLICITY FOR PLANNING IS IMPORTANT

I have been a regular reader of World Review *since February* 1941 *and have been very interested in the variety of subjects reviewed in your magazine. Planning, in my opinion, will enter into world affairs in an increasing degree after the war and your articles on this subject are certainly in step with current affairs.*

In taking this opportunity of entering your competition I submit the following question for your consideration: 'Should more detailed publication be given on planning in the future?' Local and national schemes are apt to be cloaked with an air of secrecy which is not conducive to full public interest and participation, to the detriment of all concerned—J.N.S.

Yes. Present trends show that the press are devoting an unprecedented proportion of their space to the discussion of planning problems. Published reports on planning (e.g. The County of London Plan) are circulating widely among the general public.

When the planning office is established as a permanent agency in local government, it may become a statutory obligation for the planning officer to publish an annual illustrated report to show people how they stand in matters relating to their environment, in the same way as the annual Medical Officer of Health's Report now shows people how they stand in matters of health.

Broadcasting and films, too, are indispensable instruments of planning publicity.

DISADVANTAGES OF THE ONE CLASS NEIGHBOURHOOD

Would it be possible, in the new Town Planning, so to arrange things as to avoid the separation, which inevitably occurs, between working-class and residential localities?

This 'division' gives rise to an undesirable 'class' consciousness and falls, unfairly, on those who are forced to remain in the less pleasant part of the town amid drab surroundings.

Not only does this neighbourhood become drab, but remains so (even if no worse) for the 'powers that be' do nothing to rectify matters, but rather add to the trouble by allowing fairs, shows, etc., to creep in.

Could not the whole town be planned attractively? I realise that the more we surround ourselves with delightful objects the less we care to see them impaired or destroyed. Surround the people with beauty, educate them by training them to take care of what is, after all, their own, and to take a pride in beautiful surroundings, and in this way preserving the beauty of their district.

The 'migration' referred to might not then take place; at any rate conditions would be better for those remaining.—M.H.

Class consciousness is very much bound up with the present economic system, and particularly with the separation of classes in the schools. The school is the centre of neighbourhood life and the elimination of class consciousness in neighbourhoods could only be commenced with the elimination of class consciousness in education, and while we have segregated schools we shall also have segregated neighbourhoods. The stewardship for the environments certainly, as you suggest, requires to be engrained into the individual at a very early stage. This is very sadly lacking in present school curricula. The films, the press, the radio, could do a great deal to remedy this as well as the schools themselves.

HOW TO COMBINE LOCAL INDIVIDUALITY WITH CENTRAL LARGE-SCALE PLANNING?

I always read World Review *with great enthusiasm because it seems to me to be the only magazine which discusses all the new ideas in reasonably untechnical and simple language. Your series called 'This Changing World' seems to me, for instance, a triumph in journalism, and every now and then you have an extremely good art article, which I wish would appear more regularly. However, in this letter I want to take advantage of your offer to answer questions on planning made in the last number in the course of a most informative article by Max Lock, telling me more in a few pages about planning than I had collected previously from many books.*

Question.—*Planning is discussed in Parliament and by architects and experts, and the ordinary man in the street may begin to think that our physical environment is really going to improve rapidly, but when you leave Whitehall and architectural experts, and try to find out about planning locally and as an individual, the picture is very different.*

In the district where I live, for instance, there are very few, if any, who understand or even take an interest in the subject; the Town Council, and even our planning officer, are not in the slightest degree up to date in these matters.

Then what about the builders? Builders are very sound members of the community, and I like most of the builders I have met, but they look at the matter from exactly the opposite end of the stick. They are looking round for land to buy and to develop—they want to be allowed to build houses as best suits them, even architects in the ordinary way they regard as highbrow interlopers, who charge much too much for their interference, and as for the kind of planning discussed by Max Lock and others in your magazine, the builder just doesn't believe it is ever going to come down to his level.

How are these two points of view ever going to be reconciled without a ruthless revolution, particularly in this country where we are individualists, whereas planning is essentially a thing requiring to be done on a big scale? How are we ever going to marry the two so very opposite ends of this same stick? The local and individual with the central and big scale?—N.S.

One would suggest that the tail cannot advance until the head has also advanced.

The problem seems to be to lessen the enormous distance between the head and the tail.

This should be achieved in a democratic society (*a*) by public demand for well-informed representatives to local and central government as well as for the right type of officials; and (*b*) general and special education directed towards a knowledge of planning, both local and national.

It might be added that the institution of regional planning offices is proving of great assistance in reconciling the tensions which tend to exist as between local and central authority.

HOW TO STOP ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION

In many towns it has been discovered that a certain tonnage of soot and fumes reach and settle in dwelling quarters yearly. Are there any ways of stopping the soot and fumes from dirtying the dwelling quarters?

—J. N.

There are four courses which can be taken, as follows:

(i) Prohibit the use of all but smokeless fuel in the houses themselves, since the domestic fire is chiefly responsible for smoke pollution.

(ii) Enforce the introduction of special filters in industrial chimneys combined with the correct combustion of coal in the factories.

(iii) Provide for the compulsory submission of all factory plans to the Smoke Inspector prior to their being passed by the Town Planning Committee.

(iv) Insist that your local Council employs a Smoke Inspector.

CROSS-SECTION
OF THE WORLD'S PRESS

A. Crossman

British Trade in Latin America

BRITISH industrialists are most cautious. They certainly will not offend overseas buyers by high-pressure methods.

Many of them have even hesitated to offer their first-class products to Latin-American countries, who are most keen to have them after the war, because they feel that there will be some world arrangement by which the United States will commercially 'own' Latin America as a sphere of influence.

Every statesman and industrialist in Latin America knows how impossible even the suggestion is: from every point of view they wish to keep open trade relations with the whole world.

Several times recently British industrialists have approached Mr. Harcourt Johnstone, head of the Department of Overseas Trade, asking for guidance from the government. While making no official statement, Mr. Harcourt Johnstone made it quite clear that Great Britain is in no way under any obligation to the United States to dissociate herself from trading with Latin America.

He pointed out to them that the President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Hugh Dalton, in the debate in the House of Commons on 27 July last, gave publicly the assurance that: 'We do not intend to disinterest ourselves in Latin America, and nobody has suggested that we should.'

The United States Government has been officially made aware for some time that the British Government are not putting any ban, official or implied, on overseas advertising by British companies.

British industry has first-class products to offer—products which after the war will even show an improvement on pre-war standards by the increased skill in production and scientific developments born in the stress of war effort—and it would be unfair to the people of Latin America not to let them know now, when they are making plans for the future, what products will be available to them both for consumer use and to equip their growing industries.

Latin-American World

British Aviation and Brazil

WITH British investments, totalling nearly £1,000,000,000 in Latin America, it is understandable that Britain will want to maintain the closest and swiftest contact with the South American continent after the war. British Overseas Airways are making, according to Lord Knollys, chairman of B.O.A.C., an intensive study of the air service requirements in that part of the world.

Britain has never before sought to establish air lines in South America. That was left to United States, French, German and Italian enterprise. But the post-war position will be vastly changed. The British shipping companies who catered for Anglo-Latin-American trade before the war have already announced their plans for the operation of air lines in place of passenger ships.

Mr. John W. Booth, chairman of the Booth Line, has gone so far as to forecast that the bulk of the passenger traffic will be carried by air to South America, and only freight and those few passengers to whom speed is no object, or air travel not to their taste, will go by sea.

When British air lines enter the Latin-American field they will find a vast groundwork already in existence. It is therefore worth studying, for a moment, the air-travel facilities that already exist, to see how British inter-continental services will be able to link up with internal routes and so transfer passengers to air lines which can carry them to any part of the vast South American continent.

Brazil, of course, will be the keystone of the whole South American airways system. Today a curtain is drawn across Brazilian air developments for natural strategic reasons. But in the year or so before the time of Pearl Harbour extensive developments had taken place which provide some inkling of the vast network which was even then being built up to tap the rich resources of the interior of Brazil.

. . . . . .

Brazil has one-quarter of the world's known iron reserves, with a metallic content as high as 70 per cent. Most of these reserves, totalling 15,000,000,000 tons, are untouched, but new air lines will help to bring the areas in which they are found in closer touch with the outside world.

F. C. LIVINGSTONE in *Latin-American World.*



The plans of Zucker's rocket may hold the key of the flying bomb. At present they are lost in London. WORLD REVIEW *published this picture and an article about Zucker (supplied by a German) in December 1943*

War is Uninspiring

MY principal impression of this year's Summer Exhibition at the Royal Academy in London is that the war has failed in recent months to inspire even one really great picture.

There are, of course, subjects of topical interest, but those with permanent qualities seem to be lacking. Even that seasoned Academician, Dame Laura Knight, is at her best in her warm and vigorous portrayal of 'Gipsy Girls at Ascot'. It carries far more interest and character than 'Take-off', admittedly a fine picture of the interior of a bomber with the crew at their stations, or 'Bomber Construction', a factory interior remarkable mainly for its size.

The portraits easily hold first place in this show. By far the finest of them is James Gunn's exquisite painting of his wife, 'Pauline in the Yellow Dress'. As time goes by, this picture should be worth even more than the £1,000 for which it sold on Opening Day.

E. G. L.

in *Latin-American World*

Our Friend Franco

TIMES have changed since the summer of 1940, when gangs of Fascists roamed the streets of Madrid shouting their claims to Gibraltar, and the Franco Government put up official posters laying claim not only to Cuba and the Philippines, but to California, Arizona, Texas and Florida. In those exuberant days Fascist toughs stoned both the British and American embassies, Fascist newspapers made daily attacks upon the 'decadent pluto-democracies' in the best Goebbels style, and either Franco or his brother-in-law Serrano Suñer delivered a weekly speech attacking the Allies and threatening that Spain would enter the war at any moment.

Now, though the *Caudillo* himself may hang on for a time, he can probably do so only at the price of liquidating the rabble-rousing Falange and putting himself in the hands of the Army, the landowners and the Church. These, as we shall see, have intentions of their own which are contrary to the democratic principles of the American people. But at least they know Spain's

weakness and are not likely to risk fighting a foreign war.

. . . . . .

Although Franco still allows himself the luxury of insulting the democracies—the most striking late example was his message of congratulation to the head of the Japanese puppet government in the Philippines—he has officially declared that his policy is now one of neutrality. The militia of the Falange was dissolved soon after the Allied armies began to make progress on the road to Rome, and the centre of gravity is now shifting in the direction of such men as Count Jordana, the successor of Serrano Suñer as Foreign Minister. It is still possible that Franco, realising that the Rightists are only biding their time until Don Juan can be put on the throne, may fall back on the Falange, with all its empire-mongering, for support.

THOMAS J. HAMILTON
in *Foreign Affairs* (U.S.A.)

Commonwealth Defence Not Good Enough

AFTER this war new defence problems will confront the British Empire and its great Allies, viz., the U.S.A., Russia and China. The position of each of these Powers is different. The U.S.A. cannot easily be assailed; Russia has again shown her invulnerability; China is less difficult to attack, perhaps, than Russia or the U.S.A., for, in fact, with Japan crushed, Russia is the only power that could threaten her. But the British Empire remains vulnerable, and must remain so, by the nature of its construction and because its vast territories still depend, in the main, on the small British islands with their not very large population of stout-hearted people.

The Empire, therefore, has to face the possibility that while it may need again, as it has needed in this war, help from powers such as the U.S.A. and Russia, those two powers may not require help from us in the same degree. It must be uncertain, therefore, whether the existing international combination will remain a stable one; it will only endure if those who compose it have as a common object the peace of the world. It is probably true that no nation can be absolutely relied on by another for support. Despite vicious aggression, for example, the British Empire and France were the only two nations that went to war before being themselves attacked.

. . . . . .

How, then, does Imperial Defence stand as at present organised in time of peace? The main cost of Imperial Defence is borne by the Mother Country. That is not entirely an altruistic act. If the Empire did not exist in its grandeur the Mother Country would still have to spend annually almost as much money on its own security; for our national life is built up on oversea trade, imported food and materials. The various parts of the Empire have accepted British defence as its basic safeguard in war. To it each part has added either a small or considerable quota, according to its means to the risks to its freedom it has envisaged or its inclinations and sentiments. This general plan of Imperial security has been the best that the Committee of Imperial Defence has been able to create in the state of development of the Empire. It has many weak points.

Moreover, by the Statute of Westminster, each Dominion is entirely free to act as it wishes in times of danger. It can join in the battle, when other members of the Empire are attacked, or can remain neutral. Although the right to do this has only been taken advantage of in one instance, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether this uncertainty in Imperial Defence organisation is either prudent or practical.

The Empire must stand or fall as a whole. In days of wars for world domination, neutrality may not be accepted by the aggressor, any more than Germany respected the neutrality of Norway.

Admiral of the Fleet LORD CHATFIELD
in *Empire Review*

Progress in the Sudan

'I WAS once told that I had been categorised by a bright young scientist as "one of those fools who think that something can be made of the Sudanese." I gladly accept the challenge. I believe, and the great majority of us who have served and loved the Sudan believe, that something can be and is being made of the Sudanese.'

The quotation is from Sir Angus Gillan, formerly Civil Secretary to the Sudan Government, who spent 30 happy years in the country and is now Director of the Empire Division of the British Council.

. . . . . .

The Sudan Government, Sir Angus said, was energetically pursuing the policy of training Sudanese in the management of their own affairs, both in the bureaucracy and in what is usually called Native Administration.

Native administration in the Sudan had nothing to do with native states. It was far more correct to call it local government.

A further expansion of local government is now in process of creation, suitable to the conditions of the Sudan in the shape of provincial councils.

They are at present intended for the representation, part advisory, part executive, of all interests in the six northern provinces, and four have already been set up. They can be extended to the south when conditions allow.

The latest development in self-government is the creation this year of a Central Advisory Council for the Sudan.

Empire Review

A Sensible Letter

SIR,

There was a row in Parliament last week in the debate on the Food and Drugs (Milk and Dairies) Bill, which I hope all farmers noticed.

The Minister of Agriculture is seeking powers therein which will enable him to refuse to register and permit him to cancel the registration of any dairyman if 'in his opinion the regulations will not be or are not complied with.'

At present there is no provision for an appeal from such an order, but it was suggested as a result of the row that there should be an appeal tribunal consisting of an official of the Ministry as chairman, a member of the M.M. Board, and a member of the N.F.U.

Unless farmers have lost all regard for their rights as citizens, may I say that such a provision as that which enables anyone in authority to deprive a farmer of his means of livelihood because it is thought that a regulation will not be complied with, is quite contrary to English law and denies a farmer even the elementary rights of a criminal that he is innocent until proved guilty.

In regard to the suggested appeal tribunal, the Minister said he would only accept their decision if it were unanimous, which means that the tribunal would be anything but independent, and the procedure anything but democratic.

I understand the N.F.U. supports this Bill, although I have never heard that it has been submitted to the discussion of branches.

The production of clean milk is, of course, vital, but the introduction of such a new principle as this is monstrous and unnecessary.

Letter to *Farmer's Weekly*
(Tenth Anniversary Number)

Jefferson on France

JEFFERSON was strongly attracted by the French, the charm of the women and the wit of the men. He liked French conversation as much as he did French wines, for which he developed a lifelong taste. Years later, when he was President of the United States, he made the following whimsical comment on French intellectuals:

'There are in France more real philosophers than in any country on earth but there is also a greater proportion of pseudo-philosophers there. The reason is that the exuberant imagination of the Frenchman gives him a greater facility of writing and runs away with his judgment unless he has a good stock of it.'

SAUL K. PADOVER in *La France Libre*

Confucius on Nationalism

THE National is considered by Confucius as an abnormal phenomenon, a disturbed and egotistic condition. It is, none the less, the point of departure of social progress toward that great community of peoples which will wipe out all divisions between countries and races.

Contrary to the political systems of the West, both ancient, as in Aristotle's *Politics*, and modern, as in Rousseau's *Contract Social*, Confucius did not take much interest in the different forms of government; instead, he centred his concern upon whatever had to do with the character or the spirit that animated the government.

He condemned government of a military or imperialistic character, exalted that of a pacifistic and universal spirit.

Chinese Mind (U.S.A.)

Dignity

MEHMET, an Anatolian villager, was under sentence of death for having murdered and robbed an old woman. But it was only when standing beneath the gallows and after the usual religious service for condemned persons that he revealed that he was also responsible for the deaths of 'six, or was it seven?' persons (he couldn't be sure).

The police had never found the murderer and now Mehmet said he was expiating his crimes. As the rope was placed around his neck he asked to be allowed to release the trap door himself 'so that I may die with dignity.' His last wish was granted.

Ileri (Turkey)

"In the present state of medical knowledge . . ."

"Good health and good sense are two of life's greatest blessings" was one of the maxims of Publius Syrus in 42 B.C. In these days of wider medical knowledge, good health is, to a very large degree, a matter of good sense. For instance, it is realised to-day, beyond dispute, that in order to maintain nervous vitality it is necessary to feed the nerves with the correct proportions of organic phosphorus and protein. And that is only a longer way of saying "Take 'Sanatogen' Nerve Tonic," for only in 'Sanatogen' do you find organic phosphorus and protein chemically combined in the form most easily absorbed by the system.

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Regd. Trade Mark

NERVE TONIC

In one size only during war time — 6/6d. (including Purchase Tax).

A 'GENATOSAN' Product

Into the thick of it! You can't get the Blue Gillette Blades for the moment. They're helping the guns abroad. But the Standard Gillette — the blade in battledress — is as tough and keen and on the job at home. Steeled for the attack, it mows down all before it — smoothing the way to that Victory smile!

Gillette

in battledress

Gillette "Standard" and "Standard Thin" Blades (plain steel) 2d each, including Purchase Tax. Fit all Gillette razors, old or new.

Sometimes difficult to get — but always worth finding. Production still restricted.



'I'm very pleased with the new girl, Pinkleton; she's worth her weight in elastic!' THE DRAPERS' RECORD

'You'll have to pull your socks up, Smith!' 'Can't. I'm wearing austerity ones!' MEN'S WEAR

Women Act Crazy Over Men!

If you want final proof that women make fools of themselves over men, just put the question to any girl you know.

'Why, darling,' she will say, rolling up her eyelashes like Venetian blinds, 'I don't think men make fools of themselves over women, and I know women act *so* foolish over men.' And she'll expect you to swallow it.

Not your mother, of course, who will simply give you that aged-in-the-kitchen look and comment, 'Well, look at your father.' Nor your wife, who has lived with you so long she has learned never to give an inch, unless to retire to a more stragetic position.

Of course the girl above—or just any girl—doesn't mean *she* makes a fool of herself, and is sure to raise her voice above a coo if you lowered your question from the abstract to the personal. By 'women' she means other women. But I don't think women are foolish because they admit it, but because they think they are so clever to admit it.

It's all part of the system by which women 'handle men'. They've been talking about it for centuries. The game is as old as the low-necked dress and its goal is identical.

Esquire

Heart Beats

In Turkey there are four people who enjoy the distinction of having their heart on the right side. One of them is 32-year-old Hakki Demirgibi, whose claim to anatomical contrariness is even greater than the other three, for in addition to his heart, his stomach and liver are also on the opposite side to normal. Apart from a period of fifteen days of inappetence every six months during which his temperature rises considerably, Hakki's health is not affected. Doctors, who have examined him, are of opinion that the high temperature, which they cannot lower, is directly due to the stomach and liver being in reversed positions.

If Hakki runs too much he gets palpitations and his heart inflates, but he can take alcohol without any ill effects. Hakki, who has been married eight years, has no children.

La Turquie (Turkey)

And in Portugal

A ten month's old child from Beja, suffering from malaria, was found on X-ray examination to have her heart and liver respectively on her right and left side, contrary to everyone else.

Diario de Noticias (Lisbon)



Miles of Lather

FOR 7½d.

The cost of covering this chin every morning with lather is a serious one. Think of the income tax and rates; you've simply got to save. You need millions of bubbles to master your beard—and Pears Jif gives them to you for 7½d. What a bargain!

Pears **Jif**

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Bulgaria: *'Should I throw this weight overboard?'*
(Harp = war)
YENI SABAH (Turkey)

Another War Sign?

A MYSTERIOUS red flower with the shape of a sword 30 centimetres long appeared in a garden at Caldas das Taipas. The people of that place who have never seen such a flower before say that it is a cabalistic sign about the war.

Seculo (Lisbon)

New Bernadette

A PARALYTIC lady from Guarda went on a pilgrimage to Fatima. Friends thought she would die on the journey, but after the Blessing she went home on her own legs. The Miracle was announced with reserve. The priest advised the woman to go to hospital in order to be seen by a doctor.

Vos (Lisbon)

Tramway Piece

IN a tramcar a middle-aged gentleman offered his seat to a middle-aged peroxided lady who replied by saying, 'Thank you, sir, but I can stand up. I am still young.' The man then replied, 'Allow me to insist madame. It is a question of principle. I always offer my seat to ladies, even when they are ugly.' *Diario de Manha* (Lisbon)

Beer

IT was during the Crimean War that beer first made its appearance in Turkey.

Istanbul, capital of the Ottoman empire, was then full of English, French and Italian soldiers, and as might have been expected, beer shops were soon there too.

The drink was sold either in bottles or on draught. Very gradually the native population tasted the new drink and by 1875 beer was thoroughly established in Turkey. Breweries were set up, the first being a branch of a big Swiss firm.

The final development was the importing of foreign beers—Spaten from Munich, Pale Ale and Stout from England, Pilsen from Bohemia.

Akcham (Turkey)

Colour Coming?

NORMAN HARTNELL, costumier to the Queen, is sure that the post-war years will give London the lead in style and elegance. The Court, Ascot, Goodwood and the Opera will once more set a standard of ceremonial and magnificent dressing.

He bases his forecast of the future on the attitude of Marshal Stalin, who has discarded his ordinary tunic for the ceremonial resplendence and gold of the field marshal's uniform.

The Daily Mail

Hot Weather Sleeplessness Cure?

WHEN she has a few moments to relax, she tries to read through *Time* and *Life* before drowsiness overwhelms her.

The Boston Traveller

Too Modest?

MRS. SOPHIE JANASKI, 3888 Pennsylvania Avenue, filed suit against Frank Janaski.

She charges 'she did everything possible to make a man of him without success.' They have eight children.

Hammond (Ind.) Times

Educational Progress

HOW to become a Born Teacher.

Teachers' World

Further Educational Note

THERE are stupid legs and intelligent legs.

MARLENE DIETRICH

Plastered?

MAPS of all sizes covered the walls and personnel from privates to generals.

—A correspondent's impression of Invasion H.Q., *Egyptian Mail*

Twin v. Double Beds

THE Chicago Judge who ruled twin beds out of existence the other day, on the grounds that they are irrelevant, immaterial, subversive and productive of distrust, ought to hold on a minute.

Around twin beds, and to some extent under them, there has grown up an entire school of American humour, which has become an institution. Some of the jokes about twin beds have been spun out into three acts, and the bedroom farce has become as much a part of the Broadway theatre as the travelling salesman or the lady he was seen with last night. For the purposes of bedroom comedy, a double bed is unthinkable.

The jurist may be right in saying that twin beds provoke distrust. As long as they provide comfort for those who are in them, and merriment for those who are out of them, a little distrust surely isn't going to do anyone any harm. It may, on the contrary, be just what the fine flame of devotion needs to keep it from dying on its feet. If, moreover, the Judge intends to make away with every article which may arouse distrust, he may soon find himself without a stick of furniture in the house.

The Judge should consider himself disagreed with. For those who prefer twin beds, twin beds there should be, and jokes about them by Eddie Cantor, and plays about them by the late Avery Hopwood, and even—if strictly necessary—rulings at law about them by sitters on the bench and wearers of the ermine.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Vital Industry (I)

IN Oklahoma City, Dr. Carl R. Bailey applied to the O.P.A. for a permit to buy a 1942 car, was asked: 'Are you engaged in production of war materials?' Replied the doctor: 'Yes. Babies.'

Time

Vital Industry (II)

FASCINATING advertisement in an Ohio paper:

'Owner of truck would like to correspond with widow who owns two tyres. Object—matrimony. Send picture of tyres.'

Censor's Joke

AN Army censor in South-East Asia evidently has a delicious sense of humour. There came to Leeds a letter from a former member of the staff of the *Yorkshire Post* now serving at the Advanced Headquarters of the British and American Forces in Ceylon. This is how it read after the censor had finished with it:

> Ceylon is straight out of Hollywood—high mountains, dense forests, thick green undergrowth, brown rivers which make one think automatically of crocodiles, snakes and even ———. We have three of these ——— working in the camp, picking up huge trees with their trunks just as if they had seen pictures of how it ought to be done.

These two deletions are doubly amusing, for an official report has been issued about the help which ——— are giving in the war to the 14th Army against the Japanese. It tells how the Japanese used ——— for bringing mortars into Burma and how British and Indian officers with two well-known Burmans persuaded over 60 ———to bolt from the Japanese lines on the Chindwin River. There were not enough mahouts to manage all the ———, and many women acted as volunteer drivers to the British lines.

NORTHERNER II in the *Yorkshire Post*

At Full Stretch! (I)

MR. SEYMOUR COCKS drew the attention of the Board of Trade to the high price and inferior quality of men's braces. He might have added the inexplicable fact that almost all the pairs available, even at full stretch, have obviously been made for a race of dwarfs. The 'close specifications' to which Mr. Dalton said braces are subject, as well as price control, must be very close indeed.

The Economist

At Full Stretch! (II)

IT was purely a coincidence, of course, but recently I experienced a record demand for braces on the very day after a certain MP had made disparaging remarks in the House about the price and quality of wartime braces.

Will this gentleman please start slanging austerity suits? His criticisms may have a similar stimulating effect on sales!

Men's Wear

A Peek into the Past

Ah, those Bourbons—a royal line of Peek Frean biscuits! They were crisply crunchy, with a sandwich layer of rich chocolate cream. To-day, Peek Frean biscuits are zoned, and supplies are limited. Mr. Peek's and Mr. Frean's peek into the past is also a pre-view of the future when their biscuits will again be plentiful and varied.

BY APPOINTMENT TO

H.M. KING GEORGE VI.

Peek Frean's

BRITAIN'S CRISPEST BISCUITS

Made by Peek Frean & Co. Ltd., makers of famous biscuits

NO CHILLS for Mr. WILLS

THE WARDEN



He packs a box of POTTER'S CATARRH PASTILLES in his pocket—and laughs at the weather.
Nothing beats these pleasant, yet powerful antiseptic pastilles for keeping you free from chills and colds. The pleasant healing vapours released smash up a cold when it's coming and show it the way out if it has arrived. A really marvellous safeguard in epidemics and most effective in Catarrh, Croup, Whooping Cough, Hay Fever, etc. All Chemists, Herbalists and Stores 1/1½d. (inc. pur. tax)

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